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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(j). The Utah 
Supreme Court transferred this matter to this Court pursuant to an order dated June 22, 2011 
and filed on June 24, 2011. (R. 486.) 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the trial court commit reversible error in granting summary judgment to 
Defendant Johnson on the ground that Defendant Johnson's negligence was not a proximate 
cause of Plaintiff s injuries? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"Summary judgment procedure is generally considered a drastic remedy." Draper 
City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1101 (Utah 1995) (citation and quotations 
omitted). "A trial court is not authorized to weigh facts in deciding a summary judgment 
motion, but is only to determine whether a dispute of material fact exists, viewing the facts 
and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party." Pigs Gun Club, Inc. v. Sanpete County, 42 P.3d 379, 385 (Utah 2002) 
(citation, quotations, and parenthetical omitted). 
u[B]ecause negligence cases often require the drawing of inferences from the facts, 
which is properly done by juries rather than judges, summary judgment is appropriate in 
negligence cases only in the clearest instances." Centers, Inc. Price v. Smith's Food and 
Drug Centers, Inc., 252 P.3d 365, 367 (Utah App. 2011) (citation and quotations omitted). 
Similarly, "[pjroximate cause is usually a factual issue and in most circumstances will not 
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be resolved as a matter of law," Unigardlns. Co. v. City ofLaVerkin, 689 P.2d 1344, 1347 
(Utah 1984). 
W hen R:\ icwing a trial u mil's inanl ol sin m miry fiiiiiiiiiail. lliisJ \uirt will "not defer 
to the trial o)i ii1 s conclusion that facts are undisputed nor its legal conclusions supported 
by those facts." Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Felding, 909 P.2d 1283, 1289 (Ut. Ct. App. 
1996) (citation and quotations omitted). This f, ouri w i . therefore review ihc (rial umrl s 
grant of summary judgment for correctness " • - * •. : i i (I r«11 
ISSUE PRESERV AT ION 
Defendant Johnson's Motion for Summary Judgment was fully briefed by Defendant 
Johnson and was opposed by Plaintiff. (K. 14lMSi, l^j-2Sy. UKMbJ, and S(uoK^ ) 
RELEVANT STATUTES 
I llaii <\ M\V A mi § 7RR-S-R17, ct scq.9 the "Liability Reform Act. An unannotated 
copy of the Liability Reform Act is included in the addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Musis a personal-injury < i-i at *••• '.,.*. n 
Februarj 1' 1 2009 Defei idant Johnson was dn\ im: his car eastbound on 1-84 near 
Tremonton, when the roads became slick with snow and ice. Defendant Johnson lost control 
of his car, causing it to slide into the median. Defendant Johnson called for help to get out 
of the median and a tow truck bany di ivrn hv l )d aidant l\ nlm;m ;u 11\ nl w illun '""0 nn miles. 
111. >ok 1 )clcn(lant k nil n. n i m i \\ I "111111 m lies to pi ill Defendant Johnson's car out of the median 
and back onto the freeway. 
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While Defendant Johnson's carwas stillhookedup to Defendant Kidman'stow truck, 
Plaintiff and his girlfriend were driving eastbound on 1-84. As they approached Defendants' 
vehicles, Plaintiff tried to slow down, but Defendant Kidman's tow truck was blocking 
roughly one-third of Plaintiff s lane. Plaintiffs car hit the tow truck, and part of the tow 
truck went through the windshield and hit Plaintiff in the head. Plaintiff sustained a severe, 
traumatic brain injury in the crash. He has incurred over $400,000 in medical bills and will 
need assistance for the rest of his life. 
Defendant Johnson filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that his negligence 
was not a proximate cause of Plaintiffs injuries. Instead, he argued that Defendant 
Kidman's subsequent negligence was the sole proximate cause. For purposes of his motion, 
Defendant Johnson admitted he owed Plaintiff a duty of care, that he breached his duty, and 
that Plaintiff suffered damages. Thus, the only issue for the trial court to decide was whether 
Defendant Kidman's negligence was a superceding cause of Plaintiff s injuries. 
The law is well settled that the primary issue in this analysis is whether the subsequent 
actor's negligence was foreseeable. The trial court found that no reasonable jury could find 
that Defendant Johnson could foresee that Defendant Kidman may negligently remove 
Defendant Johnson's car. As a result, the trial court granted his motion for summary 
judgment. The trial court certified its decision as a final judgment under Rule 54(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court's ruling did not affect Plaintiffs claims 
against Defendant Kidman, which are still proceeding through litigation. 
3 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
I. The Incident. 
1. In the morning of February 17,2009, Defendant Johnson was driving his 1994 Honda 
Civic eastbound on 1-84 near Tremonton, Utah. (R. 319-320, pgs. 4-5.) 
2. As Defendant Johnson was driving, it started to snow and the freeway became very 
slick with snow and ice. (R. 319, pg. 4; and 336-337.) 
3. Defendant Johnson lost control of his car in the snow and ice, and it slid off the 
freeway into the median. (R. 320, pg. 8.) 
4. Defendant Johnson called the police for help, and they said that they would send a tow 
truck to assist him. (R. 321, pgs. 9-10.) 
5. Nothing out of the ordinary happened in between when Defendant Johnson called the 
police and when the tow truck arrived. However, Defendant Johnson "[s]at there in solitude, 
scared to death that somebody else would slide off and hit [him]." (R. 321, pg. 10.) 
6. The tow truck driver, Defendant Kidman, arrived at the scene within 20 minutes. (R. 
329,pg.l7.) 
7. When Defendant Kidman arrived, the asphalt was covered with a solid sheet of ice 
and there was a slope to the median where Defendant Johnson's car was located. (R. 322, 
pg. 14; and R. 330, pgs. 26-27.) 
8. But it only took Defendant Kidman about 10 minutes to pull Defendant Johnson's car 
out of the median and back onto the freeway. During this time, no cars drove passed them 
on the freeway. (R. 323, pg. 21.) 
4 
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9. As their vehicles were sitting on the freeway, Defendant Kidman suggested to 
Defendant Johnson that they move them off of the freeway, because "[pjeople [we]re going 
to - you know, we're going to get hurt." Defendant Johnson then turned around and started 
waiving for traffic to slow down. (R. 330-331, pgs. 28-30.) 
10. While Defendant Johnson and Defendant Kidman were still parked on the freeway, 
Plaintiff and his girlfriend, Julie Hunsaker, were driving home from a trip to Sun Valley. (R. 
341,pg.20.) 
11. As they were approaching the location where Defendant Johnson and Defendant 
Kidman were on the freeway, they saw that several other vehicles had slid off the freeway. 
(R. 342, pg. 26.) 
12. Plaintiff tried to slow down, but the back of Defendant Kidman's tow truck was 
covering approximately one-quarter to one-third of the left-hand lane of 1-84. (R. 342-343, 
pgs. 28 and 33; and R. 336-337.) 
13. Plaintiff could not avoid a collision and crashed into the back of Defendant Kidman's 
tow truck. The T-bar of the tow truck went through Plaintiffs windshield, hit him in the 
head, and pinned it against the back of his seat. (R. 324, pgs. 37-8; and R. 336-337.) 
14. Plaintiff was seriously injured in the collsion. (R. 324, pg. 38.) 
15. Defendant Johnson and Defendant Kidman disagree as to whether Defendant 
Johnson's car was still connected to the tow truck at the time of impact. (R. 325, pg. 41; and 
R. 330,pg.28.) 
i 
16. However, it is undisputed that if Defendant Johnson had not lost control and slid off 
5 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the freeway, Defendant Kidman's tow truck would not have been there at the time of the 
collision. (R. 332, pg. 51.) 
II. The Trial Court's Ruling. 
17. Defendant Johnson moved for summary judgment arguing that his negligence could 
not have been a proximate cause of Plaintiff s injuries. (R. 391.) 
18. The trial court recognized that Defendant Johnson admitted for purposes of his motion 
that (a) he owed Plaintiff a duty of care, (b) he breached his duty, and (c) Plaintiff suffered 
damages. (R. 391.) 
19. The trial court also recognized that" 'but for' Defendant's negligence in skidding off 
the roadway, Mr. Kidman's tow truck would not have been on the scene." (R. 392.) 
20. However, the trial court held "that Defendant could [not] foresee that a tow truck 
operator would negligently perform his duties in recovering Defendant's vehicle from the 
median." (R. 392.) 
21. The trial court came to this conclusion, because it found that the "direct cause" of 
Plaintiffs injuries was Defendant Kidman's subsequent acts and said: 
Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendant did not exert control over how Mr. 
Kidman went about his business of towing Defendant's vehicle out of the 
median. Defendant did not direct Mr. Kidman on how to tow his vehicle out 
of the median or where Mr. Kidman should park his tow truck in order to do 
the towing. Rather, Defendant reasonably relied upon Mr. Kidman to tow his 
vehicle out of the median safely given the totality of the circumstances present. 
Therefore, the Court concludes that Defendant's negligence in skidding off the 
roadway could not reasonably be found to have caused Plaintiffs injuries. 
(R. 390-394.) 
6 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Court should find that the trial court erred in granting Defendant Johnson's 
motion for summary judgment, because there are questions of fact as to whether Defendant 
Johnson's negligence was a proximate cause of Plaintiff s injuries. Defendant Johnson 
admitted negligence for purposes of his motion. However, Defendant Johnson claimed that 
his negligence was not a proximate cause of Plaintiff s injuries, because of the subsequent 
conduct of another actor, Defendant Kidman. The primary issue in a superseding-cause 
analysis is whether the subsequent actor's conduct was foreseeable. 
Here, Defendant Johnson was driving down any icy freeway, lost control of his car, 
and slid into a median. Defendant Johnson called for help and was informed that a tow truck 
was on its way. As Defendant Johnson was waiting for the tow truck, he was worried that 
other vehicles would slide off the road and hit him. Defendant Kidman arrived on the scene 
shortly thereafter and was able to tow Defendant Johnson's car back onto the freeway within 
30 minutes of him losing control and sliding into the median. 
As Defendant Johnson and Defendant Kidman were standing on the side of the 
freeway, they realized that their vehicles posed a threat to oncoming motorists and decided 
to finish up the paperwork down the road. However, as other motorists approached them, 
they started to slide off the roadway and crash into one another. While this was happening, 
Plaintiff was driving down the same freeway and crashed into the back of tow truck, which 
was sticking out into the left lane of travel. Defendant Johnson's car was still hooked onto 
the tow truck at impact. 
7 
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Based on these facts, a reasonable jury could find that Defendant Johnson could have 
foreseen that the tow truck he called may create a hazardous situation on the freeway. The 
natural result of negligently losing control of your car on a freeway, sliding into a median and 
getting stuck, is that a tow truck would be needed to get your car out. And, given the road 
conditions and slope of the median, it was foreseeable that a tow truck on the side of the 
freeway may pose a threat to oncoming motorist. The Utah Supreme Court and courts from 
other jurisdictions have found that summary judgment was inappropriate in similar 
circumstances. And this Court should find that the trial court erred when it usurped the jury' s 
fact-finding role and granted Defendant Johnson summary judgment. 
The Court should also find that the trial court erred, because super-superseding cause 
is no longer an issue with respect to unintentional torts. Utah's comparative-fault statute 
requires trial court's to let juries allocate fault to each defendant for the percentage of fault 
attributable to them. The definition of fault under the statute includes all degrees of 
negligence that proximately cause or contribute to an injury. Because the trial court granted 
Defendant Johnson's motion, the jury will not be allowed to allocate fault as required by the 
statute. Moreover, superseding cause now requires a subsequent intentional act under Utah 
law. There is no evidence here of a subsequent intentional act. Therefore, the Court should 
find that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. 
8 
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ARGUMENT 
L THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND, AS A MATTER OF LAW, 
THAT DEFENDANT JOHNSON'S NEGLIGENCE WAS NOT A 
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES. 
Defendant Johnson moved for summary judgment on the sole ground that his 
negligence in losing control of his car and sliding off the freeway was not a proximate cause 
of Plaintiff s injuries. Defendant Johnson conceded for purposes of his motion that (1) he 
owed Plaintiff a duty, (2) he breached that duty, and (3) Plaintiff sustained damages. The 
trial court also found that Defendant Johnson's negligence was the "but for" cause of the tow 
truck being on the roadway. Thus, the only issue for this Court to determine is whether the 
trial court erred in making the factual finding that Defendant Johnson's admitted negligence 
was not a proximate cause of Plaintiff s injuries. 
The Utah Supreme Court has long recognized that proximate cause is usually an issue 
for the jury to decide, and that there can be more than one cause of an injury. See, e.g, 
McCorvey v. UDOT, 868 P.2d 41, 45 (Utah 1993). When proximate cause involves a 
potential superseding cause, the primary issue is the foreseeability of the subsequent conduct. 
Waiters v. Querry, 588 P.2d 702, 702 (Utah 1978). Here, a reasonable jury could find that 
Defendant Johnson could have foreseen that losing control of his vehicle on an ice-slicked 
freeway may create a hazardous situation on the freeway by requiring a tow truck to come 
and pull him out of the median. 
9 
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In Walters, supra, the Utah Supreme Court held, in a similar situation, that the issue 
of proximate cause was for the jury to decide. There, the plaintiff was driving behind the 
first defendant. The first defendant made a sudden stop, and the plaintiff stopped behind 
him. However, the second defendant rear-ended the plaintiffs car. The trial court basically 
instructed the jury that the second driver's acts could be a superseding cause without 
considering the issue of foreseeabililty. The jury found that the first defendant was negligent, 
but that his negligence was not a proximate cause. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court 
reversed the trial court, because the issue of foreseeability should have been properly 
submitted for the jury to decide: 
The more fundamental test is whether under the particular circumstances he 
should have foreseen that his conduct would have exposed others to an 
unreasonable risk of harm; and this includes situations where negligent or 
other wrongful conduct of others should reasonably be anticipated.... 
* * * 
The difficulty with the instruction about which plaintiff complains is that, as 
applied to the instant situation, it would seem to exculpate defendant 
Hemingway (who created a dangerous situation) if it is found that the 
defendant Querry (the later actor) was negligent, whether or not the latter's 
conduct was foreseeable. If the principle of law just discussed is properly 
applied to the evidence in this case, it appears to us that there is a legitimate 
question as to whether a jury could reasonably find that defendant Hemingway, 
in making the alleged abrupt stop, should have foreseen that, in traffic such as 
there was on that highway, some momentarily inattentive driver following her 
would not be able to react and brake quick enough to avoid collision with her 
car or the car behind hers. 
10 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Id. at 7041. 
Likewise, in Jensen v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., 611 P.2d 363 
(Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision to grant summary 
judgment on proximate cause. In that case, the first defendant parked his van in an 
intersection. The second defendant wanted to make a left-hand turn, but could not see 
around the van. The second defendant waited for two minutes and then decided to drive 
around the van. When he did this, he collided with the plaintiffs car. The trial court held 
that the second defendant's negligence was a superseding cause. On appeal, however, the 
Utah Supreme Court reversed: 
Based on these facts the District Court apparently determined that the conduct 
of [the second defendant] and plaintiff as a matter of law was of a type that 
could not have been foreseen by [the first defendant] under any circumstances. 
We hold that the evidence before the District Court was not such that it could 
be said that reasonable minds could not differ that this conduct was not 
foreseeable by [the first defendant]. Hence a jury issue is present and 
summary judgment is inappropriate. 
M a t 366. 
The Utah Supreme Court continued to follow this reasoning in Harris v. U. T.A., 671 
P.2d 217 (Utah 1983). There, the first defendant was driving a bus and parked it on the side 
of the road, but a portion of the bus was obstructing part of the travel lane. The plaintiff was 
a passenger in the second defendant's Jeep. The second defendant came upon the bus and 
!On a subsequent appeal, the Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed its position that the 
issue of proximate cause was a matter for the jury to decide. Waiters v. Querry, 626 P.2d 
455, 458 (Utah 1981). 
11 
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swerved to avoid hitting it. However, the right side of the Jeep hit the left rear side of the 
bus, which caused injuries to the plaintiff. The trial court's instruction to the jury basically 
directed a verdict on proximate cause based on the theory that the second defendant's 
negligence was a superseding cause. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial 
court and instructed: 
In the present case, the disputed instruction was erroneous because it failed to 
submit the proximate cause issue to the jury for determination. (Citing Jensen 
and Watters.) 
* * * 
We do not mean to imply that rulings by the court which decide a factual 
contention as a matter of law are never appropriate. But the right to a trial by 
jury is a basic principle of our system that cannot be allowed to be eroded by 
improper instructions on the jury's prerogative. In the instant case, the issue 
of [the second defendant's] negligence and proximate cause should have gone 
to the jury. If, as plaintiff contends, [the first defendant] stopped the bus too 
rapidly, or failed to drive out of the lane of traffic, or had faulty brake lights, 
he may have contributed to a rear-end collision by a momentarily inattentive 
driver, which would not have been so "extraordinary" as to be unforeseeable. 
M a t 220. 
Courts from other jurisdictions have reached similar results. For instance, in J, 
Wigglesworth Co. v. Peeples, 985 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999), the first defendant was 
driving a wide load. He missed his required exit and got stuck in a construction zone, which 
caused traffic to back up about 300 yards. As plaintiff approached some trucks that were 
about 40-50 vehicles behind the backup, he got on his CB radio and warned the trucks behind 
him. The second defendant heard this warning, but could not stop in time. The trial court 
refused to instruct the jury on superseding cause, and the court of appeals upheld this ruling: 
12 
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[Tjhis is precisely the type of intervening act (i.e., a wreck involving a third 
party) that Kirby, in the exercise of ordinary care, could reasonably foresee 
would result from missing his exit, blocking traffic, and backing up his 
eighteen wheeler in a construction zone. Because it was reasonably 
foreseeable, as a matter of law Harmon's act could not be a new and 
independent cause. 
M a t 665. 
See, also, Cooke v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 14 So.3d 1192 (Fla. Ct. App. 2009) 
(subsequent negligence was not a superseding cause even though the first accident happened 
one hour before and there was one to one-and-a-half miles in between the accidents); Hook 
v. Heim, 369 N.E.2d. 563, 566 (111. Ct. App. 1977) (denying a motion for a directed verdict 
and finding that there was "nothing freakish or fantastic in the sequence of events" between 
the two separate crashes); and Wing v. Morse, 300 A.2d 491 (Me. 1973) (defendant was still 
a proximate cause even though there were 10 minutes in between his accident and the 
plaintiffs). 
Consistent with these authorities, the Court should find that the trial court committed 
reversible error when it ruled - as a matter of law - that Defendant Johnson's negligence was 
not a proximate cause of Plaintiff s injuries. There was no dispute below that Defendant 
Johnson breached a duty owed to Plaintiff and that Plaintiff sustained serious injuries in the 
crash. Consequently, the only issue that the trial court had to decide was whether a 
reasonable jury could find that Defendant Kidman's actions in removing Defendant 
Johnson's car from the median were foreseeable. 
13 
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There are a number of facts on which a reasonable jury could find in favor of Plaintiff 
on this issue. First, Defendant Johnson was the one who called for assistance and knew that 
he needed a tow truck to pull his car out of the median. Defendant Johnson also knew that 
the area was slick and there were slopes in the median, which would make it difficult for him 
to get towed out of the median. Second, as Defendant Johnson was waiting for the tow truck, 
he admitted that he was worried that other cars would lose control in the area and hit him. 
In other words, he knew that other crashes may happen while he was there. Third, the crash 
happened only 30 minutes after he lost control and slid into the median, which is a much 
shorter time than the Florida Court of Appeals considered in Cooke. Fourth, while Defendant 
Johnson and Defendant Kidman were back on the freeway, they decided that they needed to 
move their vehicles because people were going to get hurt, which means they both 
recognized the hazardous situation. Fifth, several other vehicles had slid off the freeway 
before Plaintiff arrived at the scene. So, the area where the accident happened was 
objectively hazardous. Sixth, Defendant Johnson's car was still hooked up to the tow truck 
when Plaintiff hit it. Thus, the dangerous situation created by Defendant Johnson's actions 
was still ongoing at the time of the collision. Seventh, there is no evidence in the record that 
Defendant Kidman did anything unusual or out of the ordinary while he was removing 
Defendant Johnson's car. Lastly, it is undisputed that, but for Defendant Johnson's 
negligence, Defendant Kidman's tow truck would not have been on the side of the freeway. 
14 
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Based on these facts, the Court should find that the trial court erred when it took this case 
from the jury. 
Moreover, the basis underlying the trial court' s ruling is without merit. The trial court 
found that Defendant Kidman's actions were a subsequent intervening cause, because 
Defendant Johnson did not direct Defendant Kidman on how to remove his car. The 
proximate-cause analysis does not look at whether the first actor "directed" the second 
actor's conduct. Indeed, the driver of the first car in Waiters did not direct the driver in the 
second car to hit the plaintiffs car; the driver of the van in Jensen did not instruct the driver 
of the second car to go around him; and the driver of the bus in Harris did not tell the driver 
of the Jeep to crash into him. Instead, the Utah Supreme Court has made it very clear that 
this analysis hinges on the foreseeability of the subsequent actor's conduct. And, as shown 
above, Defendant Kidman's actions were foreseeable. 
In its memorandum decision, the trial court distinguished cases like Walters and 
Jensen on the ground that the first actors' cars were the "dangerous condition" on the 
roadway, whereas Defendant Johnson's car was in the median. The proximate-cause analysis 
does not artificially depend upon which side of the fog line a vehicle is located. Instead, it 
depends on whether the first actor's conduct set in motion a chain of events that could 
foreseeably result in the hazardous situation. Here, Defendant Johnson's negligence set in 
motion the chain of events that resulted in Defendant Kidman's tow truck sticking out into 
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the roadway. Defendant Johnson's car was still hooked up to the tow truck, so the chain of 
events had - literally - not been broken. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANT 
JOHNSON SUMMARY JUDGMENT, BECAUSE SUPERSEDING 
CAUSE IS NOT AN ISSUE IN THIS CASE. 
Under modern comparative-fault statutes, juries are required to compare and allocate 
fault among negligent parties. Such a requirement renders superseding cause unnecessary 
in this situation. Further, superseding cause only applies in Utah when the subsequent 
conduct was intentional. Thus, superseding cause does not apply here. 
A. Superseding Cause No Longer Applies with Comparative Fault. 
In 19862, the Legislature enacted the Liability Reform Act, U.C.A. § 78B-5-817, et 
seq. ("LRA"). Under the LRA, a plaintiff may recover from any defendant or group of 
defendants whose fault exceeds the plaintiffs fault, and the fact finder must allocate the 
percentage of fault attributable to each defendant. U.C.A. § 78B-5-818(4). In other words, 
the fact finder must compare the fault of each party. The LRA defines fault as, "any 
actionable breach of legal duty, act, or omission proximately causing or contributing to injury 
or damages sustained by a person seeking recovery, including negligence in all its degrees 
...." U.C.A. §78B-5-817(2). 
2This is important because the Utah superseding cause cases cited above by 
Plaintiff pre-date the LRA. The LRA has also been renumbered since 1986. The current 
citation is above. 
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Under this statutory scheme, the trial court was required to allow the jury to compare 
and allocate the fault (i.e., negligence) of Defendant Johnson and Defendant Kidman. 
However, the trial court ruled that Defendant Kidman's fault was a superseding cause wiping 
out Defendant Johnson's fault, which means the jury will not be allowed to compare and 
allocate fault. Therefore, the trial court violated the requirements of the LRA. Superseding 
cause, in fact, no longer has a place with respect to comparing negligent torts in light of the 
LRA. MUJIII, CV210, Superseding Cause, Committee Notes. 
In the pre-LRA case, Harris, supra, the Utah Supreme Court used comparative-fault 
principles to overrule prior superseding-cause precedent. The court was considering a two-
pronged test from a prior case: 
(1) where a motorist sees a stationary object in the road and negligently fails 
to avoid it, his negligence is, as a matter of law, a superseding cause, but (2) 
if the motorist negligently fails to see the stationary object in time to avoid it, 
the issue of whether the motorist's negligence is a superseding cause is for the 
jury. 
Harris, 671 P.2d at 221. The court decided to overrule the first prong from that test and 
reasoned, in part: 
Finally, the unsound distinction made in Hillyard serves to frustrate the 
purpose of the Comparative Negligence Statute by precluding the kind of 
comparison of fault that a jury ought to make. The allocation of liability 
should be made on the basis of the relative culpability of both parties. To do 
that the jury must assess the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the second 
driver's actions in light of all of the circumstances, including whatever action 
it takes to avoid a collision, his initial speed, the initial speed of the first car, 
road conditions, traffic conditions, and the like. 
M a t 222. 
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More recent cases from other jurisdictions have similarly followed suit. For instance, 
in Barry v. Quality Steel Products, Inc., 820 A.2d 258 (Conn. 2003), the court held that 
superseding cause no longer had a place under Connecticut's comparative-fault system. 
There, the plaintiffs sued two defendants, and the defendants argued that some subsequent 
actors' conduct was a superseding cause. The plaintiff filed a motion with the court to 
prevent it from instructing the jury on superseding cause. The court denied the motion. On 
appeal, the court abandoned superseding cause in unintentional-tort cases: 
[W]e conclude that the doctrine of superseding cause no longer serves a useful 
purpose in our jurisprudence when a defendant claims that a subsequent 
negligent act by a third party cuts off its own liability for the plaintiffs 
injuries. We conclude that under those circumstances, superseding cause 
instructions serve to complicate what is fundamentally a proximate cause 
analysis. Specifically, we conclude that, because our statutes allow for 
apportionment among negligent defendants (citation omitted); and because 
Connecticut is a comparative negligence jurisdiction (citation omitted); the 
simpler and less confusing approach to cases, such as the present one, where 
the jury must determine which, among many, causes contributed to the 
plaintiffs' injury, is to couch the analysis in proximate cause rather than 
allowing a defense of superseding cause. 
Id. at 256-6. 
See, also, Torres v. El Paso Elec. Co., 987 P.2d 386 (N.M. 1999), overruled on other 
grounds, Herrara v. Quality Pontiac, 73 P.3d 181 (N.M. 2003) (refusing to instruct on 
superseding cause for subsequent third-party negligence); Commonwealth v. Babbitt, 172 
S.W.3d 786,793 (Ky. 2005) (stating, "the rationale for the doctrine of superseding cause has 
been substantially diminished by the adoption of comparative negligence."); Restatement 
(Third) of Torts: Liab. Physical Harm § 34, Cmt. C. ("Just as comparative responsibility has 
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obviated the need for a number of legal rules designed to ameliorate the harshness of 
contributory negligence, and comparative contribution obviated the need for the active-
passive rule permitting indemnity, rather than contribution, the advent of comparative 
principles has reduced the role of superseding cause."); The Unanticipated Ripples of 
Comparative Negligence: Superseding Cause in Products Liability and Beyond, 53 
S.C.L.Rev. 1103 (2002); and Why Superseding Cause Analysis Should be Abandoned, 72 
Tex.L.Rev. 161(1993). 
In light of these authorities, the Court should find that the trial court erred because 
superseding cause no longer applies to subsequent negligent conduct. It is simply a matter 
of proximate causation, and it the jury's role to determine whether Defendant Johnson 
proximately caused Plaintiffs' injuries. 
B. Superseding Cause Only Applies to Intentional Torts. 
The jury instruction in MUJIII sets forth the elements that must be proved for a jury 
to find that Defendant Kidman's conduct was a superseding cause: 
Defendant Johnson claims that he is not liable for Plaintiffs' harm because of 
the later fault of Defendant Kidman. To avoid liability for the harm, 
Defendant Johnson must prove all of the following: 
(1) that Defendant Kidman's conduct occurred after Defendant 
Johnson's conduct; 
(2) that a reasonable person would consider Defendant Kidman's 
conduct extraordinary; 
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(3) that Defendant Johnson could not foresee that Defendant 
Kidman would act in [Alternative A: an intentional] 
[Alternative B: a negligent] manner; and 
(4) that the harm resulting from Defendant Kidman's conduct was 
different from the kind of harm that could have been reasonably 
expected from Defendant Johnson's conduct. 
MUJI II, CV210 Superseding Cause. (Emphasis added.) The MUJI II Committee drafted 
the third element with alternatives, because there is a dispute as to whether superseding cause 
still applies with respect to unintentional torts. Id. The Court should find that superseding 
cause only applies when there is a subsequent intentional act that is foreseeable. 
This conclusion is supported the Court's post-LRA decision in, Bansasine v. Bodell, 
927 P.2d 675 (Ut. Ct. App. 1996). In that case, the plaintiffs decedent was driving with a 
friend when a car following behind them blinded the friend with his lights. This angered the 
friend who got behind the car and flipped on his high beams. The two cars got in a 
highspeed chase, which ultimately ended with the driver of the other car shooting plaintiffs 
decedent. The plaintiff sued the friend claiming that his reckless driving resulted in the death 
of plaintiff s decedent. The friend filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that the 
firing of the gun was a superseding cause. On appeal, the court adopted § 442B of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, which provides: 
Where the negligent conduct of the actor creates or increases the risk of a 
particular harm and is a substantial factor in causing that harm, the fact that the 
harm is brought about through the intervention of another force does not 
relieve the actor of liability, except where the harm is intentionally caused 
by the third person and is not within the scope of the risk created by the 
actor's conduct. 
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Id. at 677-78; and Restatement (Second) of Torts § 442B. (Emphasis added.) 
"To relieve the defendant of liability [under the rule in Bansasine], the third person 
must not only act intentionally, the actor's intent must be to harm the plaintiff." MUJIII, 
CV210 Superseding Cause, Committee Notes. Here, there is no evidence that Defendant 
Kidman acted intentionally or intended to harm Plaintiff. Therefore, the Court should find 
that superseding cause does not apply here and that the trial court erred in granting Defendant 
Johnson's motion 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing, Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court to enter an order 
reversing the trial court's ruling and remanding this case for a trial on the merits. 
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RICKY L JOHNSON, CLINTON KIDMAN, 
ALLRED AUTOBODY, LLC, a Utah 
limited liability corporation, 
Defendants. 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 100100231 
Judge Ben Hadfield 
COMES NOW Defendant Ricky L. Johnson, by and through his counsel of 
record, and submits this motion for summary judgment. Defendant Johnson was not, as 
a matter of law, a proximate cause of the harm that the Plaintiff suffered in the instant 
case. Accordingly, Plaintiff is unable to establish every element of his claim for 
negligence against Defendant Johnson as a matter of law. Therefore, summary 
judgment in favor of Defendant Johnson is appropriate. This motion is based on Rule 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the memorandum of points and authorities 
submitted herewith. 
DATED this &l day of December, 2010. 
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
Tercy M. Plan^ 
Joshua T. Gardner 
Attorneys for Ricky L. Johnson 
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RICKY L. JOHNSON, CLINTON KIDMAN, 
ALLRED AUTOBODY, LLC, a Utah 
limited liability corporation, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 100100231 
Judge Ben Hadfield 
COMES NOW Defendant Ricky L. Johnson, by and through his counsel of 
record, and submits the following Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This case is about a car accident in which the Plaintiff was injured when his car 
struck a tow truck operated by defendant Clinton Kidman. More than a half an hour 
prior to the subject accident, Defendant Ricky L. Johnson was traveling eastbound on Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Interstate 84 near Tremonton, Utah. Due to inclement weather, Mr. Johnson lost control 
of his vehicle and slid into the median near Rattlesnake Pass. No other vehicles were 
involved. Mr. Johnson called 911, who dispatched Mr. Kidman, a state authorized tow 
truck driver, to pull Mr. Johnson's vehicle out of the median. Mr. Kidman's tow truck 
was parked in the left hand median of Interstate 84 when the Plaintiff's vehicle struck it. 
There are no genuine issues of material facts as they relate to Mr. Johnson's 
involvement in the events surrounding the subject accident that prevent the Court from 
granting Defendant Johnson's motion. 
Plaintiff brought negligence claims against Mr. Johnson and Mr. Kidman, among 
others. The Plaintiff's claim against Mr. Johnson, however, fails as a matter of law 
because Mr. Johnson was not a proximate cause of the harm that the Plaintiff suffered. 
At the time that Mr. Johnson's car slid off of the highway, it was not foreseeable that the 
Plaintiff would be injured when his car collided with Mr. Kidman's tow truck nearly an 
hour later. He did no actual act that caused the collision between Plaintiff's vehicle and 
co-defendant Kidman's tow truck. Mr. Kidman, as a professional, was at all times in 
control of the operation to remove Mr. Johnson's vehicle from the median. For these 
reasons, as explained in greater detail below, the Court should grant Defendant 
Johnson's motion for summary judgment and dismiss all of Plaintiffs claims against 
him. 
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II. STATEMENT OF UNCONTESTED MATERIAL FACTS 
1. On February 17, 2009, Defendant Ricky L. Johnson was traveling 
eastbound on Interstate 84 near Tremonton, Utah. (Dep. of Ricky L. Johnson 4:1-24, 
Ex. A; Compl.fi 7.) 
2. As Mr. Johnson travelled eastbound, it began to snow. (Dep. of Ricky L. 
Johnson 5:21 to 6:1, Ex. A.) 
3. Mr. Johnson lost control of his vehicle and slid off of the road into the 
median near an area known as Rattlesnake Pass, eastbound on I-84. (Dep. of Fiicky L. 
Johnson 8:11-15, Ex. A; Compl. fl 7.) 
4. After his vehicle came to a stop in the median, Mr. Johnson called the 
Utah Highway Patrol to request highway assistance. (Dep. of Ricky L. Johnson 9:17 to 
10:10, Ex. A.) 
5. Mr. Johnson requested that the state shut down the interstate due to icy 
conditions that existed where he slid off the freeway, but the state refused to do so. 
(Dep. of Ricky L. Johnson 9:20 to 10:6, Ex. A.) 
6. Police dispatch contacted Defendant Allred Autobody, a state authorized 
tow truck operator, and requested that the company provide highway assistance to Mr. 
Johnson. (Dep. of Ricky L. Johnson 10:7-8, Ex. A; Dep. of Clinton J . Kidman 16:20-22, 
50:20-24, Ex. B; Compl. fi 8.) 
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7. Allred Autobody sent an employee, Defendant Clinton Kidman, in a tow 
truck to provide highway assistance to Mr. Johnson. (Dep. of Ricky L. Johnson 10:7-8, 
Ex. A; Dep. of Clinton J . Kidman 16:20-22, Ex. B; Compl. fi 8.) 
8. Defendant Kidman did not arrive to the scene until roughly 20 minutes 
after Mr. Johnson called 911.1 (Dep. of Clinton J . Kidman 17:1-6, Ex. B.) 
9. Once Defendant Kidman arrived on the scene, Mr. Johnson did not direct, 
give advice on, or control how Defendant Kidman went about extricating Mr. Johnson's 
car from the median. (Dep. of Clinton J. Kidman 52:9 to 53:14, Ex. B.) 
10. It took Mr. Kidman at least 10 more minutes to remove Mr. Johnson's 
vehicle from the median after Mr. Kidman arrived on the scene. (Dep. of Clinton J . 
Kidman 46:21 to 47:6, Ex. B.) 
11. Mr. Kidman finished removing Mr. Johnson's vehicle from the median and 
pulled it up onto the pavement. (Dep. of Clinton J . Kidman 54:23 to 55:7, Ex. B.) 
12. Mr. Kidman suggested to Mr. Johnson that they move to a location off of 
the freeway to complete the paperwork for the tow due to the conditions on the road at 
the time. (Dep. of Clinton J . Kidman 29:23 to 30:4, 55:8-13, Ex. B.) 
13. Plaintiff Christopher Dee was also traveling eastbound on Interstate 84 on 
February 17, 2009. (Compl. fl 11.) 
1
 Defendant Ricky Johnson recalls that it took Mr. Kidman between 35 and 45 minutes to arrive on the 
scene from the time that his car slid into the median. (See Dep. of Ricky L. Johnson 10:11-13.) 
However, on summary judgment, the "facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom [are viewed] in 
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, U 6, 177 P.3d 600. 
Therefore, this memorandum incorporates Mr. Kidman's recollection of how long it took him to arrive on 
the scene after receiving the call to assist Mr. Johnson because Mr. Kidman's time frame is more 
favorable to the Plaintiff and to the other Defendants. 
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14. Plaintiff arrived at the scene after Defendant Kidman removed Mr. 
Johnson's vehicle from the median and was preparing to leave the scene. (Dep.. of 
Clinton J . Kidman 29:15 to 30:8, Ex. B.) 
15. Plaintiff's vehicle struck the tow truck driven by Defendant Clinton Kidman. 
(Dep. of Clinton J . Kidman 31:15-20, 33:14 to 34:4, Ex. B; Compl. tf 11.) 
16. The collision between the Plaintiff's vehicle and the tow truck resulted in 
serious injury to the Plaintiff. (Dep. of Clinton J . Kidman 35:4-5, Ex. B; Compl. fl 12.) 
17. The injuries that the Plaintiff suffered in the subject accident were such 
that Plaintiff has no memory of the events leading up to or following the subject 
accident. (Dep. of Christopher Dee 9:1-7, Ex. C.) 
18. Plaintiff brought claims against Defendant Ricky L. Johnson for 
negligence. (Compl. fflj 14-18.) 
III. ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Johnson was negligent in the operation of his 
vehicle on February 17, 2009 and that Mr. Johnson's breach of duty was a proximate 
cause of the Plaintiff's injuries. However, Mr. Johnson cannot be liable for the Plaintiff's 
injuries because he was not, as a matter of law, a proximate cause of those injuries. 
A. The Court should grant summary judgment to Defendant Johnson in the 
instant case because this case is an example of the clearest instances of 
no negligence. 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that summary 
judgment "shall be rendered if. . , there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
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. . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
Utah case law indicates that courts should exercise caution in granting a motion for 
summary judgment in a negligence case. "Ordinarily, the question of negligence is a 
question of fact for the jury. Thus, summary judgment is appropriate in negligence 
cases only in the clearest instances. Dwiggins v. Morgan Jewelers, 811 P.2d 182, 183 
(Utah 1991) (internal quotations omitted). The instant case is one of those "clearest 
instances" because, as explained below, the presence of Defendant Johnson's car in 
the median nearly an hour before the Plaintiff arrived on the scene was not the 
proximate cause of the Plaintiff's injuries. When considering a motion for summary 
judgment on a negligence claim, "[i]t is only when the facts are undisputed and but one 
reasonable conclusion can be drawn therefrom that such issues [of negligence] become 
questions of law." English v. Kienke, 11A P.2d 1154, 1156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
{quoting Apache Tank Lines, Inc. v. Cheney, 706 P.2d 614, 615 (Utah 1985)). In the 
instant case, the facts as to Mr. Johnson's involvement are undisputed and but one 
reasonable conclusion—that Mr. Johnson did not proximately cause the Plaintiff's 
injuries—can be drawn from those facts. Therefore, the Court should grant Defendant 
Johnson's motion for summary judgment. 
B. Plaintiffs negligence claims against Mr. Johnson fail as a matter of law 
because the element of proximate cause is not satisfied in the instant case. 
In order for Defendant Johnson to be found liable for negligence, Plaintiff must 
show that, "(1) defendant owed plaintiff a duty of care; (2) defendant breached that duty; 
(3) defendant's breach of duty was the actual and proximate cause of plaintiff's injury; 
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and (4) plaintiff suffered damages as a result of defendant's breach of duty." Bansasine 
v. Bodell, 927 P.2d 675, 676 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (citing Clark v. Farmers ins. Exch., 
893 P.2d 598, 600-1 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)). While there may be some question in the 
instant case as to whether Defendant Johnson owed a duty of care to the Plaintiff and 
whether he breached that duty, the undisputed material facts show so clearly that Mr. 
Johnson was not a proximate cause of the Plaintiff's injuries that the potential existence 
of disputed material facts as to the first two elements of the Plaintiff's negligence claim 
are irrelevant. See Steffensen v. Smith's Mgmt. Corp., 862 P.2d 1342, 1344 (Utah 
1993) (finding no need to analyze every element of negligence where, as a matter of 
law, one of the elements of negligence was not satisfied). 
1. Mr. Johnson did not proximately cause the Plaintiffs injuries 
because those injuries were not the foreseeable result of Mr. 
Johnson's slide into the median. 
The undisputed material facts of the instant case show that Defendant Johnson 
was not the proximate cause of the Plaintiff's injuries. "Proximate cause is that cause 
which, in natural and continuous sequence, (unbroken by efficient intervening cause), 
produced the injury and without which the result would not have occurred. It is the 
efficient cause—the one that necessarily sets in operation the factors that accomplish 
the injury." Bansasine, 927 P.2d at 676 (citations omitted). In Bansasine, a decedent's 
heir filed suit against the driver of the motor vehicle that the decedent was riding in after 
the decedent was shot by another motorist when the defendant drove his vehicle in 
such a way that the gunman became angry. See id. In affirming the trial court's grant 
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of summary judgment to the defendant, the appellate court analyzed proximate cause in 
terms of the foreseeability of the injury to the decedent. 
In determining whether the driver "could reasonably have foreseen [the 
decedent] being shot as a result of his alleged 'reckless' and rude driving," id. at 677, 
the court stated that "Utah courts have consistently recognized that 'a more recent 
negligent [or criminal/intentional] act may . . . relieve the liability of a prior negligent 
actor under the proper circumstances.'" Id. (citing Steffensen v. Smith's Mgmt Corp., 
820 P.2d 482, 487 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), aff'd, 862 P.2d 1342 (Utah 1993)) (brackets in 
original). The court found as a matter of law, that, 
a reasonable juror could not have found that defendant's 
driving was the proximate cause of the death of the plaintiff's 
father. We agree that a reasonable juror could not find that 
the defendant should foresee that another driver on the road 
would fire a gun into his car simply because he shined his 
high beams on that person, passed him, then sped up as the 
driver tried to approach. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). Just as it was unforeseeable in Bansasine that the 
defendant's driving would result in the plaintiff's father being shot, it was unforeseeable 
as to Defendant Johnson in the instant case that the Plaintiff would be injured by 
colliding with Defendant Kidman's tow truck. 
In the instant case, it may be that Defendant Johnson's negligence may have 
resulted in his vehicle sliding into the median at least twenty minutes before Defendant 
Kidman arrived on the scene. The result of Mr. Johnson's act was that his vehicle came 
to a rest in the median. Once the vehicle was in the median, it posed no hazard to 
8 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
motorists using Interstate 84 in either direction of travel. No reasonable jury would find 
that the presence of Mr. Johnson's vehicle in the median would foreseeably cause injury 
to motorists using the roadway. In order for someone to be harmed on the roadway, an 
intervening cause would be needed. 
The intervening cause appeared in the form of Defendant Clinton Kidman and 
the acts of the Plaintiff himself. Once Mr. Kidman arrived, Mr. Johnson gave no input to 
Mr. Kidman on how to conduct the removal of his vehicle from the median. Mr. Johnson 
did not instruct Mr. Kidman where to park his tow truck. Mr. Johnson did not instruct Mr. 
Kidman on the use of safety or warning devices. How Mr. Kidman was to do his job 
was properly within the province of Mr. Kidman's control because he was a professional 
tow truck operator certified as such by the State of Utah. Mr. Kidman proceeded to use 
his tow truck, according to his training as a tow truck operator, to pull Mr. Johnson's 
vehicle from the median. It was only after Mr. Kidman finished the job and unhooked 
Mr. Johnson's vehicle from the tow truck that the Plaintiff arrived on the scene and 
collided with Mr. Kidman's tow truck. It was simply not foreseeable that a motorist on 
the freeway would be injured by the presence of Mr. Johnson's vehicle in the median. 
Therefore, the Court should find that Mr. Johnson was not, as a matter of law, the 
proximate cause of the Plaintiff's injuries. The motion for summary judgment should be 
granted. 
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2. Mr. Johnson did not proximately cause the Plaintiffs injuries 
because his slide into the median was a separate event from Mr. 
Kidman's tow truck operation and the Plaintiffs driving. 
In analyzing the foreseeability of the decedent's injury in Bansasine, the court of 
appeals assessed whether the defendant's driving and the gunman's shooting were 
concurring causes. See Bansasine, 927 P.2d at 677. The court stated that "[i]f... the 
subsequent criminal or negligent act was 'foreseeable to the prior actor, both acts are 
concurring causes and the prior actor is not absolved of liability.'" Id. (quoting 
Steffensen, 820 P.2d at 488). In that case, the court found that the defendant's driving 
and the gunman's shooting were not concurring causes. It stated that "[i]f such a 
response were so common as to make it foreseeable, the streets and highways of this 
country would be empty." Id. 
If the harm the Plaintiff suffered when he collided with Defendant Kidman's tow 
truck in the instant case were the foreseeable result of Defendant Johnson's sliding into 
the median then a similarly unfortunate result would be reached: the medians of this 
country would be filled with cars that had slid off the road in inclement weather. No 
person stuck in the median would dare call 911 for highway assistance if he could be 
found liable for events that occurred as the result of a tow truck driver's attempts to 
rescue him and as the result of the way every potential plaintiff drove on an icy freeway, 
indeed, Utah law does not impose upon the public "a duty not to require, as the result of 
negligence, highway assistance." Fordham v. Oldroyd, 2006 UT App 50, fl 28, 131 P.3d 
280, aff'd, 171 P.3d 411. Just as the court in Bansasine found that the defendant's 
10 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
driving and the gunman's shooting were two, separate causes in that case, the Court in 
the instant matter should find that Mr. Johnson's slide into the median was a separate 
and distinct event from both Mr. Kidman's operation of his tow truck and the Plaintiff's 
operation of his vehicle. Therefore, Mr. Johnson cannot be, as a matter of law, the 
proximate cause of the Plaintiff's injuries. The Court should grant Mr. Johnson's motion 
for summary judgment accordingly. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, Defendant Ricky L. Johnson respectfully requests 
that this Court enter an order granting his motion for summary judgment and dismissing 
the Plaintiff's claims against him with prejudice. 
DATED this (f_ day of December, 2010. 
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
Terrywl. Plant 
Joshua T. Gardner 
Attorneys for Ricky L. Johnson 
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DEPOSITION OF RICKY L. JOHNSON 
1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 RICKY L. JOHNSON, 
3 called as a witness for and on behalf of the plaintiff, 
4 being first duly sworn, was examined and testified as 
5 follows: 
6 EXAMINATION 
7 BY MR. GILCHRIST: 
8 Q You need to state your name for the record, 
9 please. 
10 A Ricky Lee Johnson. 
11 Q And you still live in Payson? 
12 A Yes, I do. 
13 Q 555 North 500 West, Trailer 51? 
14 A Yes, sir. 
15 Q Thank you. I see you're wearing an Okland 
16 Construction -- are you working for them? 
17 A No, sir. 
18 Q You have --
19 A Yes, sir. 
20 Q --at some point? 
21 Are you currently working for anybody? 
22 A Finished harvest in Idaho. 
23 Q Let's cut to it and talk about the accident 
24 that happened on February 17 of last year. All right? 
25 A Yes, sir. 
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DEPOSITION OF RICKY L. JOHNSON 
1 Q Okay. Thank you. I think in the answers to 
2 interrogatories you said that you had been visiting your 
3 mother who lives in Paul, Idaho, correct? 
4 A Yes, sir. 
5 Q And you had breakfast with her? 
6 A Yes, sir. 
7 Q Do you remember what time you left her house 
8 in Paul? 
9 A Gosh, no, sir, I honestly don't. I would have 
10 to probably backtrack the time it took to get Tremonton 
11 to there. I didn't make a stop after that. I don't 
12 know. I never even thought about that. I mean, I don't 
13 know. 
14 Q Did you make a stop in Tremonton --
15 A No. 
16 Q --is that what you're saying? 
17 A No. 
18 MR. PLANT: He didn't make any stops. 
19 MR. GILCHRIST: He didn't make any stops. 
20 Thank you. 
21 Q (BY MR. GILCHRIST) So you drove straight from 
22 her house to the point where you left the road and the 
23 accident happened? 
24 A Yes, sir. 
25 Q All right. You know, I should have looked it 
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DEPOSITION OF RICKY L. JOHNSON 
1 up. I'm not from Idaho. Where is -- is Paul by any 
2 other cities? 
3 A Rupert, Burley. 
4 Q Okay. Been there, done that. 
5 All right. Were you traveling alone that 
6 morning? 
7 A Yes, sir. 
8 Q And driving a 1994 Honda Civic? 
9 A Yes, sir. 
10 Q Is it -- do you still have that vehicle? 
11 A No, sir. 
12 Q Was that an automatic or stick shift? 
13 A Five-speed stick. 
14 Q What were the weather conditions like when you 
15 left your mother's house in Paul? 
16 A Sunshine, cold. 
17 Q They changed at some point, correct? 
18 A Yes, sir. 
19 Q Do you remember about where they changed? 
20 A Sweetzer Summit. 
21 Q And when you hit Sweetzer Summit, how did the 
22 weather change? 
23 A It got very, very cloudy, and the drizzle 
24 right before the snow. 
25 Q And then did it start to snow at some point? 
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DEPOSITION OF RICKY L. JOHNSON 
1 A Yes, sir. 
2 Q Do you know approximately where you were then? 
3 A Coming down the grade looking at the snowbelt 
4 valley. 
5 Q What was the traffic like that day, light, 
6 moderate, heavy? 
7 A Light. 
8 Q There's been descriptions of the accident, 
9 that it happened near Rattlesnake Pass. Do you know 
10 where that is? 
11 A No, sir. 
12 Q From when it started snowing to the point 
13 where your vehicle left the road, do you have any idea 
14 how far that was in time or distance? 
15 A No, sir. Honestly, I don't. I slowed down --
16 everyone slowed down. No, sir, I don't, honestly. 
17 Q All right. That's fair. 
18 A I never really thought about any of this. 
19 Q I can understand and believe that. That's 
20 probably right. 
21 So tell me what speed you slowed down to. 
22 MR. PLANT: After it started snowing you mean? 
23 Q (BY MR. GILCHRIST) Yeah. You said when it 
24 started snowing, you slowed down. I was just following 
25 up on that. 
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DEPOSITION OF RICKY L. JOHNSON 
1 A I was down to 50, 55 miles an hour. 
2 Q And with your '94 Honda, what gear would you 
3 be in? 
4 A I was out of fifth gear, in fourth gear. 
5 Q So you've reduced your speed to 50, 55. Did 
6 you go -- reduce any further before you left the road? 
7 A Yes, sir. 
8 Q Okay. So I want you to -- all right. So tell 
9 me at what point you reduced your speed. 
10 A When I felt the traction of my car gone. 
11 Q And where was that in relation to when your 
12 vehicle, in distance or time, left the road? 
13 A I maintained that on the downhill slope 
14 perhaps five to six seconds. 
15 Q And then you left the road after that five or 
16 six seconds? 
17 MR. PLANT: You have to answer out loud. 
18 MR. GILCHRIST: You're nodding yes. 
19 THE WITNESS: Yes. Yes. 
20 Q (BY MR. GILCHRIST) Which lane were you 
21 traveling in, the right or the left lane? 
22 A Right lane. 
23 Q So you're in the right lane, you start to lose 
24 traction for about five or six seconds, and you reduce 
25 your speed, correct? 
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DEPOSITION OF RICKY L. JOHNSON 
1 A It's a simultaneous movement. 
2 Q Yes, as you're losing traction, you're trying 
3 to drop speed? 
4 A Yes. 
5 Q So walk me through that sequence. When you 
6 said "simultaneous," what -- walk me through what 
7 happened as you lost control of your vehicle. 
8 A I go from fourth to third gear, gently tapping 
9 the brake, gently braking. 
10 Q Yes. 
11 A It is so bad my wheels in the little car, I 
12 can feel the ice I'm going over, and it's thick. I know 
13 I'm in trouble. I only have enough time to think, "Oh, 
14 my gosh." I'm off the road that fast. It happened --
15 you're sideways. You don't have time to do much. 
16 Q Right, okay. 
17 A And you're thinking "If I hit anything solid, 
18 I'm going to flip this car." All I could do was just 
19 say a silent prayer. I'm in the median. I come to a 
20 rest right before I hit one of the abutments that drain 
21 the median that would have flipped the car again. From 
22 the time I went off, that's what I did. 
23 Q Thank you. Did you have snow or regular tires 
24 on that vehicle? 
25 A Brand new tires had just been put on. 
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DEPOSITION OF RICKY L. JOHNSON 
1 Q Just regular all terrain or were they snows? 
2 A No, they were not snows. 
3 Q And when your vehicle went sideways, then it 
4 went off the median between the two traffic lanes? 
5 A Yes, sir. 
6 Q How far off the road do you think your vehicle 
7 went before it came to a rest? 
8 A It was almost near perfect middle of the 
9 median. Right down in the bottom. 
10 Q And the median has a grade to it? 
11 A Yes, sir. 
12 Q When your vehicle came to rest, what direction 
13 was it pointing? 
14 A Still facing south. 
15 Q Same way you had been facing? 
16 A Yes. 
17 Q So what did you do next? 
18 A I got on my cell phone and called the state 
19 police. 
20 Q What did they tell you? 
21 A They told me that I didn't have the authority 
22 to shut the interstate down. 
23 Q Did you talk to them about that? 
24 A Yes, sir. That was the first thing out of my 
25 mouth, "You've got to get someone out here." 
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DEPOSITION OF RICKY L. JOHNSON 
1 Q Because of the road and weather conditions? 
2 You're nodding yes? 
3 A Yes. 
4 Q All right. They told you you didn't have 
5 authority to shut the road down. What else did you 
6 discuss with the highway patrol? 
7 A They said they would send a tow truck driver 
8 and to stay in my vehicle. And I questioned them on 
9 that, and they said that was the safest place for me to 
10 be. 
11 Q How long did you wait before the tow truck 
12 arrived? 
13 A Thirty-five, 45 minutes. • > • 
14 Q And then what happened -- well, did anything 
15 out of the ordinary -- I mean it's snowing obviously. 
16 Anything out of the ordinary happen between the time 
17 that you called and the tow truck arrived? 
18 A Nothing. Sat there in solitude, scared to 
19 death that somebody else would slide off and hit me. 
20 Q Tell me what happened when the tow truck 
21 arrived. 
22 A He looked over the situation, shook my hand, 
23 said, "This is pretty bad." And I said, "Yeah." He 
24 said, "What did the state police say?" And I told him 
25 that they said I don't have the authority to shut the 
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DEPOSITION OF RICKY L. JOHNSON 
1 interstate down. He said, "It needs to be shut down. 
2 Has there been a UDOT truck here?" 
3 "No. No snowplows. Nothing." 
4 He said, "Well, let's see if we can't get you 
5 out." 
6 Q Fair enough. Where was his vehicle --
7 obviously he had parked and walked down to talk to you 
8 when you had this discussion? 
9 A Yes. 
10 Q Where had he parked his vehicle? 
11 A I need pen and paper. 
12 Q All right. That we can do. You can use the 
13 whole page. 
14 MR. PLANT: Off the record for a second. 
15 (Off-the-record discussion.) 
16 Q (BY MR. GILCHRIST) All right. We'll 
17 eventually mark this as Exhibit 1. You've drawn the two 
18 southbound lanes, correct? 
19 A Yes, sir. 
20 Q The way you were traveling, the median, and 
21 then we've got a portion of the northbound going in the 
22 other direction? 
23 A Yes, sir. 
24 Q All right. We were discussing where --we 
25 might as well put your vehicle in there and the tow 
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DEPOSITION OF RICKY L. JOHNSON 
1 truck. 
2 MR. PLANT: The vehicle in the median? 
3 Q (BY MR. GILCHRIST) Yeah, the Honda. 
4 A Before or after? 
5 Q Let's start with before. 
6 MR. PLANT: Remember, he just asked you to 
7 write your vehicle. 
8 Q (BY MR. GILCHRIST) That's okay. Is that the 
9 culvert? 
10 A That's the culvert. 
11 MR. PLANT: What else do you want him to draw? 
12 MR. GILCHRIST:: The tow truck. We already 
13 talked about that. The tow truck as it's parked. 
14 THE WITNESS: These are the outriggers, the 
15 pontoons that he puts down to stabilize his vehicle. 
16 Q (BY MR. GILCHRIST) Okay. You're going to 
17 have to label him "tow truck" or just "tow," T-O-W --
18 "TT," even better. And put "H" for your Honda. There 
19 we go. And that's a culvert. That's fine, "Dirt 
20 culvert." All right. Fair enough. And your vehicle is 
21 pointed the same direction as the tow truck, an arrow 
22 there. 
23 All right. So what you've shown us now is 
24 where your vehicle is at rest and where the tow truck 
25 parks when he has a conversation with you, correct? 
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DEPOSITION OF RICKY L. JOHNSON 
1 A Yes, sir. 
2 MR. JEFFERIES: Can I just interject a 
3 foundation objection, just as to where the tow truck is 
4 parked? 
5 MR. GILCHRIST: Sure. Fair enough. 
6 MR. JEFFERIES: Go ahead. 
7 Q (BY MR. GILCHRIST) All right. You have the 
8 conversation. Then what happens next? 
9 A Takes his cable out, takes it down to my car. 
10 This is all on a winch, but it's off of a pulley right 
11 here at the end of his T bar, and he hooks on underneath 
12 my car onto my framework where my A-frame comes out, 
13 with a large hook. 
14 Q Yes, okay. 
15 A First pull gets me right here. 
16 MR. PLANT: Do you want him to draw that? 
17 Q (BY MR. GILCHRIST) Yeah, first pull. Let's 
18 label that --
19 MR. PLANT: No. 1. 
20 Q (BY MR. GILCHRIST) He's already labeled it 
21 "first pull," okay. 
22 So first pull, and does the tow truck move 
23 during that first pull? 
24 A No. 
25 Q All right. So the first pull your vehicle is 
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DEPOSITION OF RICKY L. JOHNSON 
1 now in the position you've marked "first pull." What 
2 happens next? 
3 A Second pull, he moves ahead. 
4 Q "He" being the tow truck? 
5 A Yes. Sets up here still, same way he set up 
6 here. We're moving along. The reason I have to say 
7 this, this is a solid sheet of over two inches of ice 
8 anywhere it's asphalt. He has to have his outriggers in 
9 the dirt or he slides. 
10 Q All right. 
11 A He sets up, pulls me here. Second pull, I am 
12 almost where he was. 
13 Q Almost where the tow truck was? 
14 A Almost. I'm still not on firm footing. The 
15 second pull would put me right about here. 
16 Q That's going to be hard to show, isn't it? 
17 Let's put a little arrow to the side and put "second 
18 pull." 
19 When the tow truck is doing this, was he on 
20 level ground or was he partially on the grade? 
21 A Outriggers lift the truck. 
22 Q Were the outriggers, then, on the grade or 
23 were they on level ground? 
24 A They were on the grade. 
25 Q And --
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1 A It's a gentle slope here. It's not as bad, as 
2 drastic as you think. It's a gentle grade. 
3 Q All right. Appreciate that. So --
4 A Third pull he doesn't move up very far, not 
5 very far at all. I can't tell you in feet. And then 
6 I'm on firm ground, third pull. 
7 Q So when he does these second and third pulls, 
8 does he move his vehicle and park it and then pull you 
9 or is he pulling you as he's driving forward? 
10 A He sets up each time. 
11 Q He isn't ever driving and pulling you at the 
12 same time? 
13 A No. 
14 Q Looking at what's in front of me, did you have 
15 a chance to read Mr. Kidman's deposition? 
16 A No. 
17 Q He's the tow truck driver, right? 
18 A Yes. 
19 Q All right. So what happens -- where are we 
20 now as far as all these squares? We've got some squares 
21 we need to mark. What do we have there? 
22 A Second setup, tow truck. 
23 Q Fair enough. 
24 A Third setup. 
25 Q All right. And -- go ahead. I'm sorry. I'll 
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1 let you finish. 
2 Where was your vehicle when we have third 
3 setup? 
4 A Directly behind him, it would be just like if 
5 I drew it right here, only right here. 
6 Q How close to his tow truck? 
7 A I am not -- you could walk between it. I 
8 don't know how many feet. He was between it when it 
9 happened. 
10 Q You said you could walk -- is it close enough 
11 you could touch -- if you put your arms out to each side 
12 you could touch? 
13 A A little longer than that. 
14 Q And what I was saying there was if you were 
15 standing --
16 A Because the T bar --
17 MR. PLANT: Let him finish. 
18 Q (BY MR. GILCHRIST) That's okay. You can 
19 finish and I'll ask my question. Because the T bar 
20 what? 
21 A It had to be low enough to pull me like that. 
22 Q Okay. 
23 A If he had it up elevated, he couldn't pull me. 
24 Q I see. Fair enough. So he put the T bar --
25 obviously the T bar is down. So when you or someone 
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DEPOSITION OF RICKY L. JOHNSON 
1 would have been walking between the two vehicles and had 
2 your arms outstretched --
3 A There was still room between them. 
4 Q But not a lot of room? Were you pretty --
. 5 A Not a lot. 
6 Q Thank you. So now we're at the situation 
7 where the third pull and your vehicle is where in 
8 relation to the travel surface? Do you want to do a new 
9 picture or how are we going to do this one? 
10 A I'll draw it again down here. 
11 Q Let's do this then. We'll put a hard line, 
12 and I'm going to put "A" and "B." The first things we 
13 dealt with before, all the drawings have been on A and 
14 now you're going to draw on B. All right? 
15 A Yes, sir. 
16 MR. PLANT: So he's now drawing essentially 
17 where the third pull positions are; is that right? 
18 MR. GILCHRIST: After the third pull. 
19 MR. PLANT: That's what I mean, when he's done 
20 with the third pull. 
21 MR. GILCHRIST: Right. 
22 Q (BY MR. GILCHRIST) All right. You're going 
23 to have to label -- put an "H" again for you, for your 
24 Honda, and what did we have for the tow truck, »TT"? 
25 All right. So on B we now have after the 
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1 third pull, correct? 
2 A Yes, sir. 
3 Q And your vehicle is still not on any portion 
4 of the travel surface? 
No, sir. 
How were you going to get it back on there? 
I'm in dirt. 
Is there --is the snow covering the dirt or 
No, it's blowed off. 
And what happened at that point? 
Can I use the H-E double L word? 
If you want. 
All hell broke loose. 
Tell me what happened when all hell broke 
I was standing right here. 
As long as we're drawing, put a little mark 
there, put a little circle or whatever you want to do. 
"X" is fair enough. Why don't you circle that, if you 
21 would? 
22 All right. "X" with a circle is you, and 
23 you're behind your Honda facing which way? 
24 A Facing north. 
25 Q Oncoming traffic, right? 
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1 You're nodding yes? 
2 A Yes. 
3 Q I'm sure it was very traumatic. Trust me, it 
4 was for my client, too. And I appreciate that. I'm not 
5 trying to put you through this to make you feel bad. 
6 A It's okay. 
7 Q I just want you to get through it. 
8 A It's fine. 
9 Q So you're facing the other way, standing 
10 there. What happens next? 
11 A The tow truck driver is right here getting 
12 ready to get underneath my car to unhook me. 
13 Q Let's put a little arrow and -- whatever you 
14 want to do. 
15 "TTD," okay, with an arrow. And we've got the 
16 "TTD" in the middle -- written in the median, but the 
17 tow truck driver is behind his vehicle, in front of your 
18 vehicle, on the passenger's side? 
19 A Yes. 
20 Q And what happens at that point? 
21 A I yell "Look out" and he yells "Look out" at 
22 me at the same time as he's kneeling down. We both 
23 yelled "Look out" almost simultaneously. 
24 Q What happens? 
25 A This lane and this lane are both full of semis 
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1 and they're going crazy. 
2 Q And those are both of the southbound lanes, 
3 correct? 
4 All right. Both lanes, you said, were full of 
5 semis and they're going crazy. What happened? 
6 A They're up here. They're up here. 
7 Q So they are north of you or off the bottom of 
8 our page, correct? 
9 A Coming down the grade. 
10 Q Yes, sir. Same direction you had been 
11 traveling? 
12 A Yes. 
13 Q And what happens? 
14 A One's starting to jackknife and he's pushing 
15 the other one away and he's hitting the rear of another 
16 one and he's making that one jackknife. 
17 Q Okay. 
18 A And in between it all comes this gray Sable. 
19 It's in the middle of that mess. 
20 Q I'm sorry. When you say "in the middle," is 
21 it in front of these semis or is it behind? 
22 A It's kind of behind it because behind him he's 
23 got two more semis. 
24 Q So the jackknifing semis and the mess are in 
25 front of the Sable and then the Sable and then some more 
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1 semis? 
2 A Yes. 
3 Q So what happens next? 
4 A The driver of the Navajo Truck Lines 
5 jackknifes right here before he even gets to us. 
6 Q Is he the one you said had jackknifed before 
7 or is this a different jackknife? 
8 A This is the first initial wreck. 
9 Q All right. Navajo --
10 A No one -- there's nobody here while this is 
11 happening. Nothing is here while this is happening. 
12 MR. PLANT: "This" being --
13 THE WITNESS: Right, while we're towed out. 
14 Q (BY MR. GILCHRIST) While you're being pulled 
15 out? 
16 A No traffic whatsoever. No one passed us. 
17 None. 
18 Q How long do you think -- I'm sorry. We're 
19 going to go back to the jackknife, but while I thought 
20 of it, how long do you think this sequence took to get 
21 you pulled out with the three pulls? 
22 A Fifteen minutes, ten minutes. 
23 Q So for that ten, 15 minutes, no traffic, and 
24 then all of a sudden here they come? 
25 A They come in a large group. 
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1 Q Yes, sir. And the Navajo semi you said was 
2 jackknifed? 
3 A Jackknifing. It's two inches of ice. 
4 Q Yes, sir. Okay. 
5 A It's a skating rink. 
6 Q Okay. 
7 A He's over here and his cab is twisted sideways 
8 sliding down the borrow pit in the median over here on 
9 the side. 
10 Q On the far right side of the road? 
11 A His trailer followed him, but the other 
12 drivers were down here now. 
13 Q Were past where your vehicle --
14 A Uh-huh. They had come to a stop. Their 
15 rear -- and we had one more -- the one that he hit is in 
16 the median, and his trailer is tipped sideways. 
17 MR. PLANT: When you say "median" you mean --
18 THE WITNESS: The outside, right side median. 
19 Q (BY MR. GILCHRIST) Where we've drawn the "A" 
20 and "B"? 
21 A Right. His trailer is sideways with the back 
22 of it all torn apart. 
23 Q This is Navajo? 
24 A No. The Navajo is twisted sideways. He's 
25 dead. You can see that. You don't even have to walk 
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1 over to him. He's dead. 
2 Q All right. So I'm trying to figure out --
3 A He hit the semi that ends up right here, 
4 Navajo. 
5 Q Okay. 
6 A When he went sideways, this semi came around 
7 and ended up right here. We've got two semis now. 
8 Q So we've got two semis in the southbound 
9 direction of traffic, one off the road, one in the right 
10 lane? 
11 A Yes. 
12 Q Okay. And they both come to a stop? 
13 A Yes. 
14 Q And then we also -- now we have Navajo back 
15 behind them flipped over and dead off the road on the 
16 right side? 
17 A We have two more semis. 
18 Q Am I right? Is that right so far? 
19 A Yes. 
20 Q Okay, two more semis. Yes, sir. 
21 A I'm still standing here. Now I have my cowboy 
22 hat off waving. 
23 Q Okay. Yes, sir. I'm with you. What happens 
24 next? 
25 A I've got more coming down the hill. I can see 
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1 them. This car is in front of the two semis that are 
2 coming behind him. 
3 Q This is the Sable? 
4 A Yes. He can't get around this guy. 
5 Q He can't get around the guy who's stopped in 
6 the right lane? 
7 A In this lane. He tries to go to this lane and 
8 he can't -- this is when he loses control. 
9 Q "He," being the Sable, tries to move to the 
10 left lane and loses control, correct? 
11 A Yes. 
12 Q So his direction of travel is towards you? 
13 A Yes. He's up here. 
14 Q But he's --
15 A He flies by me. 
16 Q To the north of you, okay. 
17 A Flies by me and comes to a rest right here 
18 very suddenly. . 
19 Q Stops on the travel surface or shoulder --
20 A With impact, that's what stopped him. 
21 Q What does he hit? 
22 A The T bar. 
23 Q Now, is this the Sable or -- this is the first 
24 car or the second car? 
25 A This is the first car. 
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1 Q Okay. All right. 
2 A He's pinned with his neck against the T bar. 
3 Q Was there a car in front of him that was off 
4 the road? 
5 A No, that came after. That car came after and 
6 went here, and almost hit me. Now I've left here 
7 because he was coming --he was coming straight at me, 
8 so I ran to the median, into the median, back where I 
9 came from. I was following my tire tracks. That's the 
10 only firm footing I could have, and he almost hits me. 
11 He comes to a rest in the median, and I don't know who 
12 pulled him out. 
13 Q All right. The vehicle my client was in that 
14 hit -- impacted with the tow truck, it hit it, it's been 
15 listed -- and he was a passenger -- excuse me, he's the 
16 driver, listed as a blue Volkswagen? 
17 A I don't know what it was. I'm not a mechanic. 
18 Q I'm sorry? 
19 A I'm not a mechanic. 
20 Q Fair enough. Fair enough. And it was 
21 emotional, I can tell, by talking to you. 
22 But that vehicle that struck the --
23 A It was a station wagon. 
24 Q Whatever it was, that struck the tow truck --
25 you're doing great. 
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1 MR. PLANT: You're doing great. 
2 Q (BY MR. GILCHRIST) Are you all right? 
3 A Yeah. 
4 Q We'll get through it in a second. How many 
5 vehicles struck the tow truck? 
6 Two/ all right. Okay. The first one is the 
7 vehicle -- let me make sure it's right. Is the first 
8 one the first vehicle that tried to transfer from the 
9 right lane to the left lane and then came and impacted? 
10 A Yes, sir. 
11 Q And that one hit where? The T bar? 
12 A The T bar, the towing bar. It's a long T that 
13 he can lay down. 
14 Q Yes, sir. That's what I thought you said. I 
15 just wanted to make sure. 
16 And how fast do you think that vehicle was 
17 going when it impacted that? Pretty good speed? 
18 A I couldn't even hazard a guess. 
19 Q But he was going pretty decent speed or was he 
20 going slow? 
21 A No. He scared me. 
22 Q So that vehicle's direction of travel was from 
23 the right lane to the left lane and then impacted the 
24 tow truck, correct? 
25 A Yes. 
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1 Q And did it hit your vehicle? 
2 A No. 
3 Q Was your vehicle still hooked up at that 
4 point? 
5 A Yes. 
6 Q Did the tow truck move? 
7 A Yes. 
8 Q Which direction did it move? 
9 A About two inches forward. 
10 Q About two inches forward. Okay. And then --
11 okay. So that vehicle hits and moves the tow truck 
12 about two inches forward. Then what happens next? 
13 A I'm chased to the median by the next car. 
14 Q And the next car is behind --
15 A Him. 
16 Q Behind the one who has impacted the tow truck, 
17 correct? 
18 A We have two more semis coming down. They make 
19 contact with this one, and this one is able to go 
20 through and he pulls over in the front. 
21 Q Which happened first, the vehicle almost hits 
22 you or the two more semis come? 
23 A It was just same. 
24 Q Bang, bang? Simultaneous? Same time? 
25 You're saying yes, nodding your head? 
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1 A Yes. 
2 Q So the vehicle that almost hit you, did it 
3 also come from the right lane and move to the left lane? 
4 A I don't know where he came from. I looked up 
5 and he was chasing me. I was looking up on the hill 
6 still trying to get people to stop up on top. 
7 Q And that vehicle that almost hit you, where 
8 did it come to rest? 
9 A Almost where I had been. 
10 Q In the --
11 A Right here. 
12 Q Oh, in the median. Where you had been in the 
13 median, okay. So if we look at "A," which is going to 
14 be the top of Exhibit 1, the gray vehicle when it came 
15 to rest -- I just want to make sure I understand this --
16 was almost where your vehicle was when it was behind the 
17 dirt culvert, correct? 
18 A Yes. 
19 Q And you were close to that when you had been 
20 running? Where did you end up? 
21 A On the culvert. 
22 Q You said -- are you all right? 
23 A Just reliving it. 
24 Q I'm trying to do it as quickly and painlessly 
25 as we can. 
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1 A It's all right. I've faced a lot of things. 
2 Q I don't mean to make it any harder than it is. 
3 You said a second vehicle struck the tow 
4 truck. 
5 Before we do that, we've talked about the 
6 gray -- you didn't say what color it was. You talked 
7 about a vehicle that chased you into a median. We've 
8 talked about two more semis. One comes through. What 
9 happens to the other one? 
10 A He hits the rear of the one that's parked here 
11 that didn't go off the road, and pushes him. They just 
12 kind of do this number now on the ice. 
13 Q They're kind of sliding and banging into each 
14 other front to back? 
15 A Uh-huh. 
16 Q All right. So the semi that had been parked 
17 in the right outside lane gets struck from behind by 
18 this -- next two semis that come, correct? 
19 A Yes. 
20 Q And they move down the road to the south with 
21 kind of a stop-and-go sliding --
22 A Bumping, hitting, like bumper pool. 
23 Q Whereas the other semi manages to get in the 
24 inside or left lane and goes through, correct? 
25 A Yes. 
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1 Q All right. Then we were talking about --
2 okay. Let's just do it this way. What happens next? 
3 A Then came the pickup and more cars -- another 
4 pickup pulling a load of ties and pallets for shoring, 
5 shoring up houses, big timber. He ends up going through 
6 all of this where the car is sitting now. He goes and 
7 he's in oncoming traffic. 
8 Q So he's traveling southbound, loses control, 
9 travels through the median and ends up in northbound 
10 traffic? 
11 A Right. They had a skid steer on another 
12 vehicle that was following him, and they actually used 
13 the skid steer to reload the trailer over here on this 
14 side. By then traffic was stopped. By then we had the 
15 traffic on the hill stopped. That was the last wave 
16 that came through. Nobody hit nobody. The Silverado 
17 hit him as they come through. This guy went around this 
18 way. The Silverado hit the car. 
19 Q And the one --
20 A They came together. 
21 Q Two cars come together. One of them goes off 
22 the road, through the median, and stops in northbound 
23 traffic, correct? 
24 A Yes. 
25 Q And then another, which is a Silverado, is 
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1 also traveling southbound -- what lane is he in and what 
2 does he do? 
3 A He's actually over in here now. 
4 Q He's on the inside lane and somewhat off the 
5 road? 
6 A Yes. 
7 Q And traveling southbound? 
8 A Yes. 
9 Q And what does the Silverado do? 
10 A Hits the rear of the car that's underneath the 
11 tow truck. 
12 Q So the car that was -- had hit the tow truck 
13 was then hit from behind by the Silverado? 
14 A Yes. 
15 Q How fast was the Silverado going when it hit 
16 the tow truck? 
17 A About the same speed everybody else was. I 
18 don't know. 
19 Q Pretty good speed? 
20 A It was --
21 Q Yes? 
22 A It was --it happened fast. 
23 Q I bet it did. Yes, sir. 
24 Was that a hard impact when that Silverado hit 
25 the back of the other vehicle? 
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1 A Yes. 
2 Q Did it also strike -- you said the tow truck 
3 or was it just that it pushed the other vehicle into the 
4 tow truck again? 
5 A He didn't hit the tow truck. 
6 Q I thought you said it had been hit twice, so I 
7 was trying to figure out -- did the tow truck get hit 
8 twice or just the vehicle? 
9 A Well, I consider that hitting the tow truck 
10 twice because he pushed him into the other truck and --
11 Q That's what I wanted to make sure I 
12 understood. So what you're saying is when the car that 
13 hit the tow truck was hit from behind by the Silverado, 
14 it or the Silverado impacted the tow truck for the 
15 second impact? 
16 A In between the second impact and the first 
17 impact on the car, I had called the state police a 
18 second time and said "Now do you believe me? Now will 
19 you shut this road down?" 
20 Q Right. 
21 A And the state policeman said, "I can't 
22 believe -- tell me that's not happening," because he 
23 could hear it. 
24 Q The crashing and bangs? 
25 A Yeah. 
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1 Q Was your vehicle still hooked up to the tow 
2 truck when the Silverado came? 
3 A The first impact broke the hook. 
4 Q How far did the tow truck move as a result of 
5 the second impact? 
6 A I didn't even get out to look. I was so shook 
7 up after that and I was starting to freeze. 
8 Q So do you have any information one way or the 
9 other? 
10 A I don't even remember. 
11 Q Okay. And if you don't remember, you don't 
12 remember. That's all I want you to tell me is what you 
13 remember. 
14 A Traffic is stopped. I had it stopped by then. 
15 Q Good. That's a good thing. Thank you. 
16 Were there any more impacts after the 
17 Silverado came and hit the rear of the vehicle that had 
18 struck the tow truck? 
19 A None. 
20 Q Any more vehicles --we talked about the two 
21 vehicles, the Silverado and the other one that ended up 
22 in the northbound lane. Any more vehicles come through 
23 or come into the scene after that? 
24 A I had --by then I was -- I had left here, I 
25 was up here --
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1 Q You had run up the road a ways to the north? 
2 A -- and the semis filled both the lanes on top 
3 of the hill, stopped traffic. They were actually coming 
4 down the hill, but they stopped. We shut the interstate 
5 down. 
6 Q And so I would assume you're then telling me 
7 that once -- there were no more vehicles that came 
8 through after the Silverado? 
9 A None. 
10 Q That's correct? 
11 A Yes. 
12 Q Thank you. All right. What do you remember 
13 happening next? 
14 A The tow truck driver and me go to the man that 
15 was hit here and telling him we couldn't help him. The 
16 tow truck driver on 911 saying we needed medical 
17 assistance. I'm looking at the passenger door trying to 
18 figure out how I can get this guy out of there. In a 
19 miracle, he still has his head on. Getting in the tow 
20 truck cab to get warm. Telling the tow truck driver 
21 "We've got to do something for that guy." I didn't even 
22 have a blanket to put over him. Cache County sheriff 
23 showed up, I don't even know how long after that. 
24 Q Did the guy in the -- I'm sorry. 
25 A The state police called me back and asked me 
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1 if there was any more and I said "No, we've got the 
2 interstate shut down." 
3 Q Did the guy who was in the vehicle that hit 
4 the tow truck have any passengers with him? 
5 A No. 
6 Q He was alone? 
7 A He was alone. 
8 Q Do you remember anything else from the scene 
9 that you haven't told us? 
10 A I remember very little after that. The 
11 paramedics and the sheriff's department getting that guy 
12 out from underneath the T bar, giving my statement. The 
13 state police came. I remember looking at my car. I 
14 walked down into the median and took a picture of 
15 everything after it all settled. I couldn't believe it. 
16 It didn't get hit. It sits there all by itself. 
17 Everybody else is banged up. 
18 Q I think I've seen that picture. Is it from 
19 the median looking up? 
20 I have seen that, yes. 
21 A How do you stand in a storm and not get hit? 
22 Q Somebody was looking out for you that day, 
23 Mr. Johnson. You called in some chips that day it 
24 sounds like. Yes? I think so. 
25 A I hope I saved a few lives. 
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1 Q You did, so you did a good job. Appreciate 
2 that. You did. 
3 Did you talk to any of the other drivers? 
4 A I heard them talking. 
5 Q Which ones did you hear? 
6 A Gosh, I couldn't put them in their trucks. I 
7 couldn't. I heard them talking to the state police. 
8 Q Oh, okay. 
9 A The state police pretty much kept me to 
10 myself. They told me sit in my car again and wait for 
11 them to come back and get my statement. 
12 Q The vehicle that kind of chased you when you 
13 were running through the median, did you ever talk with 
14 him? 
15 A I said "You were doing your best to hit me, 
16 weren't you?" And he Sciys "Everywhere you stepped, the 
17 car went." 
18 Q Any more than that? Any more conversation 
19 then? 
20 A Don't remember. 
21 Q The gentleman who was in the vehicle that hit 
22 the tow truck, did you see what had hit him? I mean, 
23 did he hit his head on the vehicle and part of the tow 
24 truck? Did you see anything like that? Describe that. 
25 What did you see? 
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1 A The T bar went through his windshield, 
2 shattered his windshield in between the canopy of his 
3 car. It pushed his head like this. 
4 Q You're showing me your left cheekbone, 
5 correct? 
6 A Yes. 
7 Q Pushed his head to the right and up? 
8 A Yes. Over the top of his headrest of his car. 
9 Q Was he being held in that position? 
10 A Yes. 
11 Q By the T bar? 
12 A Yes. He was hit a second time after. 
13 Q By the Silverado? 
14 A Yes, that pushed it further and pushed his 
15 head further. That's why we could not touch him. We 
16 were scared to help him. We didn't know what to do. 
17 Q Did anyone render assistance to him before the 
18 paramedics arrived? 
19 A We tried. We tried to comfort him. We tried 
20 to tell him -- cell phones -- his passenger was with 
21 him. It was a woman. I can't even remember. 
22 Q Because before you said he was alone, but he 
23 had a passenger with him? 
24 A Yeah. 
25 Q All right. 
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1 A We knew he was still alive. 
2 Q But he was pretty seriously injured? 
3 A Yes. 
4 Q All right. Did anyone move any of these 
5 vehicles prior to the police arriving? 
6 You•re shaking your head no? 
7 A No. 
8 Q Were you there when the police were taking 
9 photos? 
10 A Yes. 
11 Q Had anyone moved them prior to that? 
12 A Only when the county sheriff started saying do 
13 stuff, following instructions. 
14 Q After the photos were taken. 
15 A Yes, tried to clear traffic. 
16 Q Sure. Do you remember anything else we 
17 haven't discussed from the scene that day? 
18 A I can't think of anything else. 
19 Q You've been pretty thorough. I appreciate 
20 that. I just want to mcike sure I've asked you 
21 everything. 
22 You wrote out a statement for the police, 
23 correct? 
24 You're nodding yes? 
25 A Yes. 
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1 Q Did you do that at the scene? 
2 A Yes. 
3 Q And then it looks like two days later that 
4 somebody from Progressive called you, correct? 
5 A Yes. 
6 Q Other than those two statements, have you 
7 given any other statements to anyone? 
8 MR. PLANT: Formal written statements --
9 formal recorded type statements? 
10 MR. GILCHRIST: Yes. 
11 MR. PLANT: Have you? 
12 THE WITNESS: No, unless what I've talked to 
13 you about. 
14 MR. PLANT: That's why I ask. He's talked to 
15 me at length but nothing recorded. 
16 MR. GILCHRIST: I would assume that, but I 
17 just wanted to make sure there wasn't one that I've 
18 missed. 
19 (Whereupon, Exhibit No. 1 was marked for 
20 identification.) 
21 Q (BY MR. GILCHRIST) So we've had your picture 
22 that you drew marked as Exhibit 1. All right? 
23 A Okay. 
24 MR. GILCHRIST: I don't have any more 
25 questions, then. Thank you. Told you I would make it 
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1 as short as I could. 
2 MR. JEFFERIES: I just have a few, if that's 
3 okay. 
4 MR. PLANT: He represents the tow truck 
5 driver. 
6 EXAMINATION 
7 BY MR. JEFFERIES: 
8 Q Yeah. I'm Resh Jefferies. I represent Allred 
9 Towing and Clint Kidman, the gentleman who was driving 
10 the truck. I just wanted to ask you just a few 
11 follow-up questions. 
12 You mentioned that there was a -- I believe 
13 you said two-inch-thick sheet of ice that you could feel 
14 underneath you as you were driving. 
15 A Yes, sir. 
16 Q And you talked about how the tow truck pulled 
17 you out. You were on the grade? 
18 A Yes. 
19 Q But you were sitting in dirt at that point in 
20 time? 
21 A Yes. 
22 Q Explain to me the difference between where the 
23 ice was located and where the dirt was located. How was 
24 it that you were on dirt? 
25 A Anything that was asphalt had a sheet of ice 
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1 on it, anything. The snowstorm that came through was 
2 accompanied by a high wind. It came through as a very, 
3 very, very -- almost between water and sleet. When it 
4 hit the frozen highway, it just collected. The same 
5 thing happened on the other side of the mountains. 
6 That's why the state police couldn't come and help me. 
7 They were already involved in a wreck on the other side 
8 of the mountains going to Pocatello. 
9 Q I see in your Exhibit 1 here, you've drawn the 
10 location of the tow truck, and I see that it's kind of 
11 straddling the line there to some degree. 
12 A That's asphalt. 
13 Q The asphalt. This sheet of ice, did it 
14 prevent you from seeing the lines? Is that --
15 A You could see them clearly. It was clear ice. 
16 Q It was clear ice, okay. That was my question. 
17 Now, you were hooked up to the tow truck at 
18 the point of impact? 
19 A Yes. 
20 Q Explain a little bit how the cars were able to 
21 impact the tow truck and not hit your car. Were they 
22 coming on an angle or --
23 A Yes, it was an angle, but I don't know how 
24 they missed my car. Both times. 
25 Q And so -- I mean, we can assume they didn't go 
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1 through your car --
2 A God. God's hand. 
3 Q You mentioned that they were coming from the 
4 right lane to try and sort of avoid the semis towards 
5 the left lane? 
6 A Yes. 
7 Q In your opinion, is that the reason why they 
8 missed your car because they were coming from one lane 
9 to the other lane? 
10 A Yes. 
11 Q Now, how did you get home after the accident? 
12 A The state police told me that I could leave. 
13 Q So you got in your car and drove home. That's 
14 obvious. 
15 What were the conditions like at the time that 
16 you drove home? 
17 A I left the ice as I got on the road. I went 
18 around the accident. I drove south. I couldn't even 
19 call anybody on the cell phone and tell them what I had 
20 been through I was so shook up. I got to Tremonton. I 
21 pulled off and got a cup of coffee. 
22 Q Did you have any trouble getting out of the --
23 going from the dirt to the ice as you drove out of 
24 there? 
25 A Front wheel drive. Good tires. 
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1 MR. PLANT: So no? 
2 THE WITNESS: No. 
3 Q (BY MR. JEFFERIES) A question about -- okay. 
4 From the time that you slid off into the median until 
5 the tow truck arrived to come get you, did you -- was it 
6 snowing at that time? 
7 A No, it stopped. 
8 Q You said you were sitting in your car a good 
9 amount of time, like 30, 40 minutes, right? 
10 A It stopped. 
11 Q So as you're sitting there in your car and 
12 waiting for the tow truck, there's no snow? 
13 A No, it stopped. 
14 Q So nothing's happening at that time. No cars 
15 are coming off the road? 
16 A No. There's no traffic. 
17 Q When was the first conversation you had with 
18 the tow truck driver, do you remember? 
19 A When he pulled up, he came -- I seen him come 
2 0 northbound. He went up to the next exit, came back. I 
21 knew he was coming for me. And then he came back around 
22 and pulled to where he sat right there. 
23 Q Do you remember - - d o you have any memory of 
24 his lights being on at the point when he drove from here 
25 to there? 
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1 A As soon as he came by me, he had his lights 
2 on. 
3 Q You talked about -- I know this is pretty 
4 traumatic, but where the gentleman had his neck pushed 
5 up against the T bar. You said there was a second 
6 impact that actually forced him more so. Did you 
7 actually see --
8 A Yes. 
9 Q You saw that impact and saw him --
10 A Yes. I can't believe he's still alive. 
11 Q And just for clarification, at one point you 
12 said that there was not -- there was no one in the car 
13 with him, but then you later went back and said that 
14 there was actually --
15 A To tell you the truth, I can't remember. 
16 Honestly, it seems like there was someone with him, 
17 because she -- because someone was saying "We've got to 
18 help this guy." 
19 Q Did you ever talk to the gentleman in the 
20 Silverado? I'm assuming it was a man. 
21 A Yes. 
22 Q Did you ever have a conversation with him? 
23 A Just about this guy we couldn't help. 
24 Everyone wanted to help him. 
25 Q Right. Just so that we have the sequence of 
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1 events correctly, the first thing that happened was 
2 obviously you slid into the median. And then was the 
3 next thing the gentleman hitting the tow truck, was that 
4 the next impact -- I'm sorry. We talked about a lot of 
5 semis and things like that. So let me just distinguish 
6 the two events that I'm talking about. 
7 The gentleman that actually skid off the road 
8 and chased you after the gentleman -- the first 
9 gentleman that hit the tow truck; is that correct? 
10 A Yes. 
11 Q And you said that you were able to run back 
12 through the median, you were following your own tire 
13 trucks because that's the only place you could run? 
14 A Yes. 
15 Q And you said that the -- you had a 
16 conversation with the gentleman and he said that he 
17 followed you everywhere you went, right? So to some 
18 degree did he sort of take the same path that you did 
19 off the road? 
20 A Yes. 
21 MR. JEFFERIES: I don't think I have any 
22 further questions for you. I appreciate you coming out. 
23 MR. GILCHRIST: I just want to make sure I 
24 understand a couple of things, Mr. Johnson. 
25 
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1 FURTHER EXAMINATION 
2 BY MR. GILCHRIST: 
3 Q The vehicle that struck the tow truck was 
4 moving at an angle, you said that, correct? 
5 A Yes. 
6 Q That's why he missed you. And that would have 
7 been from right -- from the right lane towards the left 
8 lane? 
9 A . He was over here like this. 
10 Q All right. FcLir enough. But it was from the 
11 right to left was his angle, correct? 
12 A Yes. ,-w-r-^ . ~. 
13 Q Which would -- if you're going to -- if he had 
14 not hit, he would eventually have gone off the road 
15 also? 
16 A Yes. 
17 Q Do you remember or do you have any information 
18 as to where the impact points were on the tow truck and 
19 the vehicle that hit it? Do you know what I mean by 
20 that? 
21 A No, I don't. 
22 Q Okay. The rear -- let me start over. 
23 Where on the front of the vehicle was the 
24 impact on the one where the gentleman was hurt, was it 
25 the driver's side --
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1 A Driver's side. 
2 Q passenger's side? 
3 Driver's front? 
4 A Yes. 
5 Q And to midpoint, past midpoint, all the way 
6 across, or just on the driver's side? 
7 A Driver's side to midpoint. 
8 Q And did he hit flush on the tow truck's back 
9 or did he hit on the point of it, do you know? 
10 A He hit the T bar. 
11 Q And did he hit -- the T bar goes all the way 
12 across? 
13 A He had it extended down so that he could pull 
14 me out. 
15 Q Did he hit the end of the T bar, hit the 
16 middle of it? Do you know on that? 
17 You can draw it if you want. Use a different 
18 piece of paper, though. 
19 A I can just show you right here. His car was 
20 pretty much right here like that, just like that. 
21 MR. PLANT: Label what you've shown. 
22 THE WITNESS: Yeah, right here. 
23 MR. PLANT: I apologize. 
24 THE WITNESS: Right here. He was wedged in 
25 just like this. He had just barely missed my car. I'll 
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1 do perforated little lines for you. 
2 Q (BY MR. GILCHRIST) All right. That will 
3 work. Kind of a ghost car. 
4 A Right. 
5 Q And that one that has kind of the soft 
6 lines --
7 A Represents his car and how it was wedged in 
8 the T bar. 
9 Q I just want to put a different initial in 
10 there or something. I think it's a VW. Can you put 
11 "VW" in there? 
12 MR. PLANT: So the record is clear, this is on 
13 B portion of Exhibit 1. 
14 Q (BY MR. GILCHRIST) It is on the B portion, 
15 and it's kind of a soft line. "VW" is just to the right 
16 of the lightly sketched in vehicle that shows its kind 
17 of direction of traffic and where the impact was on the 
18 T bar, correct? 
19 A Yes. 
20 MR. GILCHRIST: All right. I don't have any 
21 more questions. 
22 MR. PLANT: Do you have anything? 
23 MR. JEFFERIES: No. 
24 MR. PLANT: We will read and sign the 
25 deposition. Give her a mailing address where you would 
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1 like this thing sent. 
2 THE WITNESS: 555 North 500 West, No. 51, 
3 Payson, Utah 84651. 
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I, Jeanette Lund, a Registered Professional 
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and for the State of Utah, do hereby certify 
That the deposition of RICKY L. JOHNSON, the 
witness in the foregoing deposition named, was taken on 
November 5, 2010; that said witness was by me, before 
examination, duly sworn to testify the truth, the whole 
truth, and nothing but the truth in said cause; 
That the testimony of the witness was reported 
by me in stenotype and thereafter transcribed into 
typewriting and that a full, true and correct 
transcription of said testimony so taken and transcribed 
is set forth in the preceding pages; 
That the same constitutes a true and correct 
transcription of the testimony so taken and transcribed 
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foregoing annexed deposition set out; 
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otherwise associated with any of the parties of said 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 CLINTON J . KIDMAN 
3 was called as a witness, having been first duly 
4 sworn, was examined and testified on his oath as 
5 follows: 
6 --0O0--
7 BY MR. GILCHRIST: 
8 Q. All right. I need you to state your name 
9 for the record. 
10 A. Clinton J. Kidman. 
11 Q. Excuse me for a moment, Mr. Kidman. 
12 You're 34 years old? 
13 A. Mm-hmm. 
14 Q. All right. Where do you live currently? 
15 A. In Plymouth. 
16 Q. What's your address there? 
17 A. 20425 North 4950 West, Plymouth, Utah 
18 84330. 
19 Q. Thank you. Married? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. What's your educational background? 
22 A. High school diploma. 
23 Q. Where and when? 
24 A. I graduated in '94, Bear River. 
25 Q. Okay. The employment history I have says 
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1 you were a painter for Bear River Fabrication? 
2 A. A body tech, yeah. 
3 Q. Okay. How long did you do that? 
4 A. About five years. 
5 Q. And then you -- excuse me. Let me talk 
6 about that for a minute. Body tech, was that auto 
7 body painting? 
8 A. Mm-hmm. 
9 Q. Yes. Did you do any towing of vehicles 
10 for that company? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. Were you certified when you did that? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. Okay. When did you get your certificate 
15 first? 
16 A. (Hands certificate to counsel.) 
17 Q. Thank you. You have a Wreck Master 
18 certification card, WM Level 2 with a star, 3 with a 
19 star. Your operator ID is 071844; your expiration 
20 date, 1/7/11. On the back, the code 2 is a WM Twin 
21 Level No. 2, and 3 is a Recovery Level 3. It says it 
22 expires in 11. 
23 Do you remember when you first got that? 
24 A. I don't. 
2 5 Q. Okay. When did you start working for 
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1 body tech? 
2 A. For Kirby? 
3 Q. Yes. 
4 A. I don't remember. 
5 Q. Okay. Do you remember how old you were? 
6 A. No. 
7 Q. Where is Body Tech? 
8 A. Body Tech, is that --
9 Q. They're called Bear River Fabrication. 
10 Is that different than Body Tech? 
11 MR. PLANT: He told you he was a body 
12 tech. 
13 A. I was a body tech, not for Bear River Fab 
14 either. I was a painter for Bear River Fab. 
15 Q. Okay. 
16 A. I thought you was asking me about 
17 Allred's. 
18 Q. Nope. Okay. Just a painter for Bear 
19 River Fab, correct? 
Did you do any towing for them? 
You framed house for Coby Roberts. 
24 How long did you do that? 
25 A. About a year. 
2 0 A. Yeah. 
21 Q. Okay. 
22 A. No. 
23 Q. Okay. 
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1 Q. Was the first body tech work you did for 
2 Allred? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. And you were hired by them June 21 of 
5 '04. Does that sound about right? 
6 A. Sure. 
7 Q. Okay. Do you remember when you received 
8 that towing certificate when you worked for Allred? 
9 A. I don't. 
10 Q. Okay. Do you know how long you had been 
11 working there at the time? 
12 A. I don't. 
13 Q. Okay. I assume it was after they 
14 purchased their tow truck. Correct? 
15 A. When I started doing this, yeah. 
16 Q. Okay. What was the procedure to obtain 
17 the Wreck Masters certification you have? 
18 A. Take a test. 
19 Q. Did you have to go somewhere, read a 
20 booklet, do it on line? What did it consist of? 
21 A. They sent you a test, and you filled out 
22 the answerers. 
23 Q. Okay. Was there any kind of training 
24 before you took the test? 
25 A. No. 
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1 Q. Do you have to study a booklet or do 
2 anything? 
3 A. Enough to pass the test. 
4 Q. All right. How long did it take you to 
5 study for and then take the test? 
6 A. I don't remember. 
7 Q. A couple hours? A couple days? A couple 
8 weeks? 
9 A. If I was to guess, I would say a week. 
10 Q- Okay. Did you receive any other kind of 
11 training from anyone at Allred in regards to towing 
12 and how to tow vehicles, other than being given the 
13 Wreck Masters materials? 
14 A. No. 
15 Q. Did they tell you, "This is how we want 
16 to do it," or "This is how we do it"? 
17 A. No. 
18 Q. Okay. Did you receive any training from 
19 anybody else, from the state or anywhere else, in 
2 0 regards to towing and that certificate? 
21 A. No. 
22 Q. Okay. 
23 You left Allred, it says, March 24 of 
24 '09. Why did you leave that employment? 
25 A. Just didn't get along, I guess. 
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1 Q. With Mr. Rhodes? 
2 A. Yeah. 
3 Q. Okay. Was there any particular thing 
4 that caused you to leave? 
5 A. I'm sure there was. 
6 Q. Do you remember what it was? 
7 A. No. 
8 Q. All right. So that was March 24 of '09. 
9 Have you been employed since then? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. Where? 
12 A. I worked for Streamline, and then I work 
13 for Bob's Auto Body right now. 
14 Q. What kind of business is Streamline? 
15 A. It's a body tech. 
16 Q. Okay. Did you do any towing for them? 
17 A. No. 
18 Q. How about Bob's Auto Body? Where is that 
19 located? 
2 0 A. I will not do any more towing ever again. 
21 Q. All right. After this accident or --
22 A. Yeah. 
23 Q. Is that the last tow you ever did? 
24 A. Near as far as I can remember. 
25 Q. Okay. And why do you say you'll never do 
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1 any again? 
2 A. It seems to me there's a lot of liability 
3 in other people. I mean, it's ridiculous. 
4 Q. Okay. Why do you say it's ridiculous? 
5 A. Because it's kind of scary. 
6 Q. Okay. And why do you say that? 
7 A. You can't control what other people do. 
8 Q. All right. Okay. 
9 What kind of safety equipment was there 
10 on the Allred tow truck? 
11 A. As far as? 
12 Q. As far as let's start with warning or 
13 directing other traffic. 
14 A. There's emergency flashers. 
15 Q. Okay. Where were they located on the 
16 vehicle? 
17 A. On the top of it. 
18 Q. Okay. And when you say "emergency 
19 flashers," plural, how many were there? I've got a 
20 picture of it. Do you want a picture of it? 
21 A. Right there. 
22 Q. Okay. It looks like a tree of lights 
23 going across the top? 
24 A. Yeah. It looks like they're on too. 
25 MR. JEFFERIES: Just answer his questions 
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1 for now. 
2 MR. GILCHRIST: You're doing a good job. 
3 I appreciate it. We'll get you out of here sooner and 
4 get you to where you want to be other than here. 
5 MR. PLANT: Just about anywhere, right? 
6 Q. (BY MR. GILCHRIST) Any other -- any 
7 other -- other than the tree on the top, any other 
8 flashers on this thing, warning lights? 
9 A. No. 
10 Q. Okay. How about any cones or marking 
11 traffic control devices? Did it have those? 
12 A. I believe there is some cones in there. 
13 Q. Okay. Orange plastic cones? 
14 A. Yeah. 
15 Q. Did you ever use those? 
16 A. No. 
17 Q. Okay. Do you know what the Wreck Master 
18 certification training says about using cones? 
19 A. I don't recall. 
2 0 Q. Did you ever talk to Kirby Rhodes or 
21 anybody at Allred about using cones? 
22 A. No. 
23 Q. Did they ever tell you to use them or not 
24 to use them? 
25 A. I don't recall. 
Si! 
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1 Q. Fair enough. Where were they stored on 
2 the vehicle, the cones? 
3 A. Side container. 
4 Q. Driver's side or passenger side? 
5 A. I don't recall. 
6 Q. Any other devices to warn traffic? 
7 A. No. 
8 Q. What kind of communication equipment was 
9 there in that vehicle so you could check in if you 
10 had a problem? 
11 A. I had a cell phone. 
12 Q. Was it your own, or did Rhodes give it to 
13 you? 
14 A. Rhodes gave it to me. 
15 Q. Do you remember what the number was? 
16 A. Nope. 
17 Q. He didn't know either, and he didn't know 
18 what service. Do you know what service it was under, 
19 Verizon or any other? 
20 A. No. 
21 Q. Did you have that just when you were at 
22 work, or is that something you could use on your own? 
23 A. I was on call, so I had it on my person. 
24 Q. Okay. 
25 When you were working for Rhodes at the 
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1 time of this accident, how many tow jobs would you do 
2 on a daily, weekly, monthly basis, whatever you can 
3 tell us? 
4 A. It varied --
5 Q. Okay. 
6 A. completely. Sometimes I would do one 
7 every night --or every day, you know, and sometimes 
8 I'd go two, three months, you know. I don't know. 
9 Q. All right. That's fair. Was there a 
10 rotation within the company as to who would do them, 
11 like you would do one, he would do one, somebody else 
12 would do one? 
13 A. Whatever the boss said is what happened. 
14 Q. Okay. Back at the time of this accident, 
15 was there anybody other than you and Rhodes doing 
16 tows at that time? 
17 A. He did have somebody else doing them, but 
18 I don't remember if they were doing it at this time. 
19 Q. Okay. I think it's Matt Starks or 
2 0 something like that. Do you know him? 
21 A. Mm-hmm. 
22 Q. Okay. And he did tows? He was the other 
23 guy, or was there somebody else? 
24 A. There was somebody else. 
25 Q. Okay. You don't remember his name? 
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1 A. Brian Allred. 
2 Q. Okay. He was related to Rhodes? 
3 A. Mm-hmm. 
4 Q. I think we talked with him. Okay. 
5 When you were on call, would you also be 
6 doing body work, or would you just be home doing 
7 whatever you wanted to do? 
8 A. At night you mean? 
9 Q. Yeah. 
10 A. I was on call at night, you know, and 
11 other than that I was at the shop, so... 
12 Q. Okay. If a call came in and you were at 
13 the shop, they would send you out or somebody else 
14 out pretty much? 
15 A. Mm-hmm. 
16 Q. Okay. 
17 Did you have to do anything else besides 
18 get the Wreck Master certification to start towing? 
19 Did they require you to do anything else? 
2 0 A. Not that I remember. 
21 Q. Okay. Did you get any kind of physicals 
22 or anything like that? 
23 A. (Shakes head.) 
24 Q. No? 
25 A. No. 
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1 Q. All right. 
2 Tell me -- describe for me -- it's 
3 probably on here -- this vehicle. Do you remember 
4 what the make and model and things were on this tow 
5 truck? 
6 A. It was a Chevy model. It had a Nomar bed 
7 on it, TopKick, Chevy TopKick. 
8 Q. Okay. I didn't ask Rhodes. Was it new, 
9 or did you get it used? 
10 A. It was used. 
11 Q. Do you remember about how many miles it 
12 had on it? 
13 A. I don't. 
14 Q. Any problems in operating it? 
15 A. No. 
16 MR. GILCHRIST: Are we keeping you awake? 
17 MR. PLANT: What am I doing? I'm just 
18 writing. 
19 Q. (BY MR. GILCHRIST) Are there any 
2 0 operating problems with this thing, with this tow 
21 truck? 
22 A. Not that I recall. 
23 Q. It worked okay? 
24 A. Yeah. 
25 Q. Okay. How many times do you think you 
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1 operated it and used it to tow people? 
2 A. I couldn't guess. 
3 Q. All right. Do you think a hundred times? 
4 A. It could be. I don't know. I don't 
5 know. 
6 Q. All right. Are you familiar with how it 
7 worked, though, and operated? 
8 A. Yeah. Oh, yeah. 
9 Q. Okay. 
10 Had you ever been involved with any other 
11 accidents or collisions with this vehicle, not 
12 pulling someone out or going to a scene but where 
13 this vehicle struck or was involved in the accident? 
14 A. No. 
15 Q. Do you know if anybody else had been? 
16 A. NO. 
17 Q. All right. 
18 Let's talk about this accident. 
19 February 17, '09. Does that sound about right? 
2 0 A. (Shakes head.) 
21 Q. That's what the police report says. 
22 A. Okay. 
2 3 Q. " And the police report says 11:12 in the 
24 morning. 
25 A. That sounds about right. 
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1 Q. Okay. Do you remember what you had done 
2 earlier that day? 
3 Let's start with this: Were you working 
4 in the shop that day when the call came in? 
5 A. Yeah. 
6 Q. What was your normal shift? 
7 A. Oh, 8:00 to 5:30. 
8 Q. Okay. Do you remember anything out of 
9 the ordinary happening from 8:00 to the time of the 
10 call? 
11 A. No. 
12 Q. Okay. It says it was a Tuesday? 
13 A. I don't recall. 
14 Q. Okay. Was it a normal workday rather 
15 than a weekend as far as you remember? 
16 A. As far as I remember. 
17 Q. Okay. Tell me what you remember about 
18 the call coming in. 
19 A. I don't remember the call coming in. 
20 Q. Okay. Did someone tell you -- dispatch 
21 you to go, someone else at the shop? 
22 A. I believe dispatch did call, yeah. 
23 Q. Okay. You don't remember taking the 
24 call, though? 
25 A. No. 
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1 Q. All right. Did you go directly from the 
2 shop to the accident scene? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. How long did that take you? 
5 A. I'd guess 2 0 minutes, maybe -- maybe a 
6 little bit longer. 
7 Q. Okay. And what route did you take to get 
8 to the accident scene? 
9 A. 1-84. 
10 Q. Straight there? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. What was the weather like in town, at the 
13 shop, when you left? 
14 A. I don't really recall. 
15 Q. Okay. Do you remember the weather as you 




Do you remember what the visibility was? 
Not great. 
Okay. Could you tell us any more than 
23 that as to car lengths or distances or anything like 
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1 A. Oh, it wasn't -- it wasn't horrible. I 
2 mean, you could see a ways, but... 
3 Q. All right. But you couldn't give us any 
4 more than that distance-wise? 
5 A. It was a light skiff of snow. 
6 Q. Okay. So it was snowing? 
7 A. Yeah. 
8 Q. Was there a point where it got better or 
9 worse as you approached where this vehicle was? 
10 A. It seems like the later it got a little 
11 bit more snow. 
12 Q. As you got closer? Is that what you're 
13 saying? 
14 A. Yeah. 
15 Q. Okay. What was the traffic like as you 
16 were driving to this area? 
17 A. I don't recall. 
18 Q. Do you remember how fast you were 
19 traveling? 
2 0 A. I'd say I went 6 0 miles an hour, if I was 
21 to guess. 
22 Q. Okay. When you arrived at the scene 
23 where you were going to pull the person from the 
24 median, did you have to check in with the shop? 
25 A. No. 
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1 Q. Okay. Had you used your cell phone at 
2 all as you were traveling? 
3 A. No. 
4 Q. All right. When you got there before the 
5 accident, so you were just arriving and the car is 
6 there, tell me what you found. You're just pulling 
7 in, so tell me, what do you see? 
8 A. On my way out: there, he was in the 
9 median. I pulled over on the fast side, and I asked 
10 him what direction he was going. 
11 Q. Okay. 
12 A. He said he WCLS headed back towards 
13 Tremonton, so I went up on the exit, turned around 
14 towards Tremonton, and pulled over to the side, off 
15 the side of the road. 
16 Q. Okay. How far a distance was it to go to 
17 the exit and turn around to the other side of the 
18 road? 
19 A. Oh, I'd guess 500 yards. I don't know. 
2 0 Q. All right. So you stopped -- how long do 
21 you think you stopped and talked to Johnson before 
22 you had to go and change directions? How long did 
23 that take? 
24 A. One second. 
25 Q. Okay. All right. 
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1 A. "Which direction are you going?" 
2 "Tremonton." 
3 Q. See you. Okay. So you went up, turn 
4 around, and came back on the other side, right? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. Okay. What did you do next when you 
7 arrived back at the scene after switching sides? 
8 Then what happened? 
9 A. I pulled over to the side of the road and 
10 got out of my truck, hooked it up, winched it in. 
11 Q. Okay. What was the conditions like on 
12 the road as far as snow covering? 
13 A. They were slick. The wind had been 
14 drifting over the road, and so it was particularly 
15 slick. 
16 Q. Okay. How far off the road was the 
17 vehicle in the median? 
18 A. Probably smack dab in the middle. 
19 Q. Okay. When you pulled over to the side 
20 of the road, did you have your -- your lights on? 
21 A. Yes. I had them on when I originally 
22 started pulling up to ask him which direction he was 
23 going. 
24 Q. Before you switched sides you put them 
25 on? 
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1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. Okay. Where did you park your vehicle in 
3 relation to the edge of the road when you had already 
4 switched sides and were going to pull him out? 
5 A. I was off clear as far as I could 
6 possibly get without getting stuck. 
7 Q. Okay. And what did that mean as far as 
8 the front of your vehicle? How far off the road 
9 could you -- were you? If we take the -- well, do 
10 you know what the fog line is, the solid white line? 
11 And I'm pointing to a picture. 
12 A. Okay. 
13 Q. Do you know what those are? That's just 
14 yes or no. If you were to use that as a reference, 
15 is there one of those inside, if you know? 
16 A. Yes, there is. 
17 Q. There usually is. If you use that as a 
18 reference point, do you know how far past that 
19 towards the median your front tires were? 
20 A. I don't recall. 
21 Q. Okay. How about your rear tires? Do you 
22 remember where they were in relation? 
23 A. I was parallel with the road, I would 
24 say. 
25 Q. Okay. And when you say you were parallel 
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1 with the road, were both of your rear tires off the 
2 travel surface? 
3 A. Off the travel surface of the road at 
4 all? 
5 Q. Yeah. 
6 A. I mean, you're talking about a white 
7 line. 
8 Q. Yeah. 
9 A. Okay. So I -- I just remember being off 
10 to the side of the road as far as I could get. 
11 Q. Okay. Did you go out and look at the 
12 rear of your vehicle before you hooked up? 
13 A. I'm sure -- I'm sure I grabbed the winch 
14 and all that stuff. I'm sure I got a glance of it, 
15 yeah. But I wasn't measuring tires, no. 
16 Q. Sure enough. Where was -- where was the 
17 winch when you say you grabbed that? Where is it 
18 kept? 
19 A. Just right on the center of the bed. The 
2 0 winch itself is all the way up by the cab, and it 
21 comes -- I have it strung back and hooked at the end 
22 of the bed. 
23 Q. You have it -- picture. 
24 Here's a picture. I'll show that to you. 
25 It's the Allred vehicle, correct? 
/I 
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1 A. The winch sits here, and you run the 
2 cable all the way and hook it at the end of the bed 
3 to save time. 
4 Q. Okay. All right. And that's what you 
5 did on this day? 
6 A. What's that? 
7 Q. So what did you do? You get out of your 
8 vehicle. Tell me what you do next as far as hooking 
9 it up with the winch and everything else. What did 
10 you do next? 
11 A. Get out of the vehicle, cable release, 
12 pull it, pull your cords as far as you need to get to 
13 the car, hook it on the car, engage the release so 
14 it's not released, obviously, and winch it in with 
15 these controls right here. 
16 Q. Okay. So we can use the photo and put it 
17 in words. And let me find a different color so it 
18 can show up on here. 
19 MR. JEFFERIES: You're going to draw on 
20 that? 
21 MR. GILCHRIST: Yeah. 
22 MR. JEFFERIES: Do you want blue? I've 
23 got blue. 
24 MR. GILCHRIST: I think I'm going to get a 
25 yellow or red or something that will show up better. 
V 
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1 There we go. 
2 Q. (BY MR. GILCHRIST) All right. I've got 
3 a blue Sharpie. It will show up better than a pen. 
4 I want you to circle some things for me so we can 
5 remember later, so you don't have to do this again. 
6 Fair enough? 
7 A. (Nods head.) 
8 Q. So I need you to circle where the winch 
9 would sit, the release, and then the controls. 
10 A. The winch is right here. 
11 Q. Okay. 
12 A. The controls are right here. 
13 Q. And is the release lever right next to 
14 the winch? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. Okay. Can I draw a line from there and 
17 put a "W" for winch? Is that all right? 
18 A. (Nods head.) 
19 Q. And a "C" for this one, for controls? 
20 A. Yep. 
21 Q. Is that right? 
22 A. Yep. 
23 Q. I did that okay. All right. 
24 All right. So you come up and park, you 
25 said, parallel to the road, correct? 
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1 A. Yes, 
2 Q. And then you get out of your vehicle, go 
3 to the winch, and take the chain? What do you got, a 
4 cord? 
5 A. Cable. 
6 Q. Cable. Thank you. It's a cable, of 
7 course. You take the cable and run it the length of 
8 the bed? 
9 A. It's already run the length of the bed. 
10 Q. Okay. So you just take it off the end 
11 and hook it up to the other vehicle, correct? 
12 A. Pull it out as far as you need to and 
13 then --
14 Q. Right. 
15 A. -- hook it up to the vehicle. 
16 Q. Okay. And then the controls are what you 
17 operate the winch, and they are on the rear driver's 
18 side, correct? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. And they're circled and have a "C," 
21 correct? 
22 A. (Nods head.) 
23 Q. Yes? That's a yes? 
24 A. Yes. 
25 Q. We need audible answers. Thank you. 
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1 Somewhere it said in the written 
2 materials that you had three attempts before you got 
3 this thing pulled out. Is that true? 
4 A. I don't recall. 
5 Q. Okay. Do you remember if you did it in 
6 one attempt, two, three, or more? 
7 A. It seems like I had winched him in, and 
8 we had them delineator posts because they were right 
9 there; and in order for me to not have to reconnect 
10 and all that stuff, I winched him in as far as I 
11 could and then drove forward to get him pulled up on 
12 the road. 
13 Q. Okay. All right. 
14 A. Because he was -- the median is like this 
15 (indicating), and he's just sliding. 
16 Q. The median, you were showing with your 
17 hands, is at an angle? 
18 A. Yes. 
19 Q. Or slope. 
2 0 A. Mm-hmm. 
21 Q. And so as you're pulling, you've got 
22 Mr. Johnson's vehicle hooked up and you're pulling 
23 it, it's not coming up the slope. It's just sliding 
24 along it. Is that what you're indicating with your 
25 hands? I've got to put these things into words 
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1 because he can only take down words, so that's why 
2 I'm repeating what you're showing me. 
3 A. Yes. I was trying to get him pulled up 
4 on the road, and it slipped, yes. 
5 Q. Okay. So he's sliding sideways instead 
6 of coming up the slope, the Johnson vehicle? 
7 A. To some degree. 
8 Q. Okay. So to fix that problem tell me 
9 again what you did. 
10 A. I pulled him as close as I possibly could 
11 to the truck and then drove forward. 
12 Q. Started your truck up and --
13 A. I left it running. 
14 Q. Okay. You left it running. Thank you. 
15 So you got back into your truck and drove 
16 it forward? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. How far? 
19 A. I don't recall. Maybe 10 feet. 
20 Q. Okay. And when you did that, did that 
21 solve the problem? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. Okay. What did you do at that point, 
24 after you had driven forward 10 feet? 
25 A. Immediately released him from my vehicle. 
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1 Q. Okay. Where was his vehicle at that 
2 point? 
3 A. Directly behind mine. 
4 Q. Okay. How far back from yours was it? 
5 A. Fairly close. Like I said, I winched him 
6 in as far as I could. 
7 Q. So can you give me an educated estimate 
8 as to how far away it was? 
9 A. My guess, 6 feet. 
10 Q. All right. And what happened at that 
11 point? You have now pulled him up. 
12 A. He asked me what papers do we need 
13 signed, and I asked -- I said, "Let's go up to the 
14 next exit to do the paperwork." 
15 Q. Okay. And you had unhooked him by this 
16 point? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. Okay. You unhooked him before you had 
19 that conversation, I assume? 
20 A. Oh, yeah, or in the process of unhooking 
21 him. You know what I'm saying? 
22 Q. And you're having this conversation about 
23 the paperwork? 
24 A. He's asking me what do we need to do for 
25 paperwork, and I said, "Let's go over to the next 
r\ 
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1 exit," because people were flying by us. 
2 Q. Right. And where are you standing at 
3 this point? 
4 A. I had my hand right here on the tow 
5 truck. 
6 Q. Just kind of past the controls on the 
7 back corner? 
8 A. Yeah, right on the rear edge of the tow 
9 truck. 
10 Q. And where is Mr. Johnson, the other 
11 driver, standing? 
12 A. Like I said, about 6 feet in back. 
13 Q. Back by his car or right next to you? 
14 A. Right in front of his car. 
15 Q. Okay. All right. And you're unhooking. 
16 Did you get the cable unhooked and reattached to your 
17 vehicle before the impact happened to the other 
18 vehicle? 
19 A. I believe so. 
2 0 Q. And where do you reattach that? 
21 A. In the back of the bed. 
22 Q. All right. 
23 After you have the conversation with 
24 Mr. Johnson as to the paperwork and going to the next 
25 exit, what happens next? 
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1 A. He turns -- I says, "Let's go up here on 
2 the next exit. People are going to -- you know, 
3 we're going to get hurt." And he turned around and 
4 started waiving traffic to slow down. 
5 Q. Okay. 
6 A. At that point a car started barreling 
7 down at him, and he had to hit the skids and run from 
8 the car. 
9 Q. Okay. And do you remember what kind of 
10 vehicle it was or anything about it? 
11 A. (Shakes head.) 
12 Q. No. Did you see that vehicle coming at 
13 him? 
14 A. Yeah. I was yelling, "Run. Run." 
15 Q. Okay. And was he still in front of his 
16 vehicle at that point? 
17 A. I don't recall exactly. I believe so. 
18 Q. Okay. Had he moved -- you say he was 
19 trying to slow traffic down. Had he moved to do 
2 0 that? 
21 A. I don't recall. 
22 Q. Okay. 
23 A. All I remember is he turned around and 
24 waived for him to slow down. 
25 Q. Okay. But you don't remember where he --
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1 do you remember where he was standing in relation to 
2 his vehicle? 
3 A. It seemed like he was in front of his 
4 vehicle, maybe off to the side a little bit. 
5 Q. On the --
6 A. Driver's. 
7 Q. Driver's side. Would that have been to 
8 the median side, then? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. Okay. All right. And this vehicle 
11 comes. Could you tell how fast it was going? 
12 A. They were going pretty quick. 
13 Q. Okay. And was there traffic in the other 
14 lane, in the right lane, too? 
15 A. I was paying more attention to my 
16 customer because it was a pretty scary deal. I 
17 thought he was going to get run over. 
18 Q. Okay. So what happened next? 
19 A. I had my hand on my tow truck, and all of 
2 0 a sudden my tow truck disappeared. 
21 Q. Okay. 
22 A. Loud horn. I immediately run around to 
23 the other side, to the passenger side, of the Passat, 
24 I opened the door, called 911. 
25 Q. Okay. What happened to the vehicle that 
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1 was bearing --or was that the vehicle -- let me ask 
2 you this: What happened to the vehicle that you saw 
3 coming at Mr. Johnson and you told him to run? What 
4 happened to that vehicle? 
5 A. It stopped about where his car did 
6 finally after it went through a lot of snow for a 
7 long time. 
8 Q. Okay. A lot of snow on the road or on 
9 the edge? 
10 A. In the median. 
11 Q. Okay. Did it go down the slope or just 
12 on the --
13 A. It was barreling through that median 
14 right at him. 
15 Q. Okay. So it left the travel surface and 
16 went down the median where his car had been? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. Okay. How far back from his vehicle was 
19 it when it left the road travel surface and went down 
2 0 the median? Do you know? 
21 A. I'd like to -- he -- I bet you he 
22 traveled through that median for at least --at least 
23 200 yards. 
24 Q. Okay. And where did that vehicle come to 
25 rest in relation to your vehicle? 
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1 A. Behind it. 
2 Q. Okay. How far? 
3 A. Twenty feet. 
4 Q. And so Johnson -- Mr. Johnson, your 
5 customer, ran down to the median too? 
6 A. He was running through the median trying 
7 to get away from this car, yes. 
8 Q. Okay. How close did that car ever come 
9 to him? 
10 A. Real close. 
11 Q. Pretty close. 
12 A. Real close. 
13 Q. Real close. All right. 
14 Did you ever -- did you see the vehicle 
15 that struck your tow truck? 
16 A. I was watching Mr. Johnson run for his 
17 life. 
18 Q. All right. So I assume that means you 
19 did not. 
2 0 A. I did not see it coming. There were too 
21 many other things going. 
22 Q. All right. So do you have any idea where 
23 it came from or how fast it was traveling or anything 
24 like that? 
25 A, I -- I can't say, no. 
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1 Q. Okay. All right. 
2 All right. So do you know what kind of 
3 vehicle that was? 
4 A. It was a Passat. 
5 Q. You learned that afterwards, after it 
6 came to rest? 
7 A. Yeah. 
8 Q. All right. 
9 So you -- I think you said you had run 
10 back to the cab and called 911? 
11 A. No. 
12 Q. Okay. Pick up the story, then. What 
13 happened next? 
14 A. I ran around to the passenger side of my 
15 tow truck where the car was into it, and I opened her 
16 door --
17 Q. Passenger door? 
18 A. Yes. 
19 Q. Yes. 
20 A. to see if everybody was all right and 
21 immediately called 911. 
22 Q. Okay. And what did you see when you 
23 looked in to see if they were all all right? 
24 A. They weren't all right. 
25 Q. Okay. What did it look like? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
35 
1 A. She was obviously, you know, panicked, 
2 and he was -- had his -- just he -- I don't remember 
3 exactly. 
4 Q. But he looked like he was in bad shape? 
5 A. Yeah. 
6 Q. Okay. So you called 911. What happened 
7 next? 
8 A. As I was calling 911, I look over, and 
9 there's still cars flying by me at 7 0 miles an hour, 
10 and I says, "I've got to go get things stopped or 
11 you're -- we're all going to get hurt." You know 
12 what I mean? 
13 Q. Mm-hmm. 
14 A. So I ran up to traffic and started trying 
15 to slow everybody down. 
16 Q. Okay. And what happened next? 
17 A. People just kept coming like they didn't 
18 care. Once they started slowing down, it was just 
19 too late. 
2 0 Q. So what happened? There were a bunch of 
21 vehicles involved. What do you imagine happening 
22 next? Not imagine. What do you remember happening 
23 next? 
24 A. I just remember the cars hitting --or 
25 trying to hit their brakes, and another semi collided 
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1 with another semi. 
2 Q. Okay. Did all those things happen after 
3 this first sequence where they -- the first car went 
4 off the road and Mr. Johnson was chasing -- being 
5 chased by it more or less and then something struck 
6 yours? 
7 A. About the time the car stopped through 
8 the median that Mr. Johnson was running from is when 
9 I was struck. 
10 Q. Okay. But as far as all the other 
11 vehicles and all the other collisions and vehicles 
12 that end up wrecked, those -- did all those happen 
13 after that? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. Okay. Thank you. How long do you think 
16 all this sequence took, the first car going, the one 
17 that Johnson was running from, until everything else 
18 stopped? 
19 A. I don't know. I'm not particularly fast, 
2 0 but I ran as fast as I could up that road. 
21 Q. Okay. 
22 A. I mean, I probably ran 2 00-300 yards up 
23 that road, as far as I could, to try to get somebody 
24 stopped. 
25 Q. Had any of these other -- there's a bunch 
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( 
1 of cars wrecked. Had any of that happened before you 
2 got up to 200-300 yards? 
3 A. I don't --it was all so fast I was --
4 Q. Maybe? 
5 A. I don't remember. 
6 Q. Okay. 
7 A. I remember the semi was after I was up 
8 the road, yeah. 
9 Q. Okay. All right. 
10 What happened next after that, after all 
11 the chaos ended? 
12 A. 911 kept trying get me to, you know, give 
13 information. I went back down to see how the -- how 
14 the people were that struck my vehicle. 
15 Q. Okay. 
16 A. I reached through the back of her car and 
17 grabbed some of her clothing or somebody's clothing 
18 and told her to put pressure on his wound. I gave 
19 her my coat. Things like that. 
2 0 Q. Okay. 
21 A. 911 wanted to now how the guy in the 
22 truck -- you know, how the other accidents were 
23 doing. 
24 Q. Okay. I think -- let me make sure. I'm 
25 trying to figure out your vantage point, where you 
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1 were. When you were watching Johnson run through the 
2 median, you were standing where again? 
3 A. Right on the very back of my tow truck. 
4 Q. That's what I thought you said. Back 
5 rear driver's --
6 A. I had my hand on the very corner. 
7 Q. Okay. And were you still standing there 
8 when the black Passat ran into it? 
9 A. Like I said, my -- the tow truck 
10 disappeared from my hand, yeah. 
11 Q. All right. How far did the tow truck get 
12 moved once it disappeared from your hand? 
13 A. I bet it jumped at least 10 to 15 feet. 
14 Q. Okay. Did you have your emergency brake 
15 or some kind of hand brake on when you were going? 
16 A. Oh, yeah. 
17 Q. Always? 
18 A. (Nods head.) 
19 Q. All right. And what kind of brakes did 
2 0 it have as far as that goes, hand brakes or emergency 
21 brakes? 
22 A. The lever brake by your left foot. 
23 Q. Okay. And you always set that? 
24 A. Oh, yeah. 
25 Q. Okay. Do you set any other kind of 
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39 
1 brakes or chalks or any other kind of devices when 
2 you tow? 
3 A. No. 
4 Q. Just that foot brake? 
5 A. (Nods head.) 
6 Q. Yes? 
7 A. It's a hand brake. 
8 Q. Hand brake. Excuse me. So just that 
9 hand brake? 
10 A. Mm-hmm. 
11 Q. Yes? Is that a yes? 
12 A. Or there's the stinger you can put down 
13 if you need to when you're pulling somebody out. 
14 Q. Okay. And where is the stinger located? 
15 A. The very back of the vehicle. 
16 Q. Did you have to use that that day? 
17 A. No. 
18 Q. All right. So your vehicle gets --do 
19 you keep standing -- well, did you get -- bad 
2 0 question. Let me start over. 
21 Did you get knocked over or fall over or 
22 anything else when the impact occurred? 
23 A. No. 
24 Q. Okay. I think you said that you ran 
2 5 around to the passenger side of the Passat, correct, 
4 
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1 first thing that you did? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. Okay. 
4 Did you -- how long did it take before 
5 the police or the first emergency people arrived? 
6 A. Fifteen minutes. It seemed like forever. 
7 Q. I bet. Did you talk to them? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. Okay. Did you have to give them some 
10 kind of statement? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. Okay. And was that something that you 
13 wrote out? 
14 A. I believe, yeah, I wrote one out, maybe 
15 two. I don't know. 
16 Q. I was going to ask if there was more than 
17 one. 
18 Did they ever interview you later, away 
19 from the scene, "they" being the police? 
20 A. I've talked to -- like I said, as they 
21 was cleaning it up, everything, I talked to a number 
22 of officers there, yes. 
23 Q. Okay. Do you know if any of them 
24 recorded it or --
25 A. I wrote a statement, yeah. 
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1 Q. Okay. How about any of them use --
2 sometimes they have a dash cam or things like that, 
3 or a hand-held. Anything like that? Did anybody 
4 record it? 
5 A. Not that I'm aware of. 
6 Q. Okay. Were the lines -- was the fog line 
7 visible on the inside of the road that day? 
8 A. I don't recall. 
9 Q. What's that? 
10 A. I don't recall. As you can see, there's 
11 snow. 
12 Q. Right. That's why I'm asking. It's hard 
13 to tell from the pictures. 
14 A. Okay. And you can see that it's mostly 
15 trampled down from everybody running around right 
16 there, so... 
17 Q. Right. 
18 After you moved your vehicle to help pull 
19 the Johnson vehicle out, could you tell whether or 
20 not it was off of the travel lane? 
21 A. I pulled directly forward. 
22 Q. Okay. So could you tell at that point if 
23 you were off the travel lane or not? 
24 A. I was, as near I can remember, yes. 
25 Q. Could you see the fog line to tell 
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1 whether or not your vehicle was over it? 
2 A. I don't recall looking for a fog line. 
3 Q. Okay. What are you using, then, as your 
4 memory and statement that it was all the way off the 
5 travel lane? 
6 A. I remember pulling all the way over as 
7 far as I could get without hitting a delineator post. 
8 Q. Okay. 
9 A. I can't really run it over to pull him 
10 out. 
11 Q. Right. Where was the delineator post in 
12 relation to your vehicle? Do you remember? 
13 A. As you recall, I had said we was trying 
14 to avoid one when we was pulling him out. 
15 Q. Yes. Okay. 
16 A. Other than that I don't remember looking 
17 for a delineator post. 
18 Q. Okay. You have a memory that it was 
19 right there, and you pulled up right next to it? 
20 A. Right next to one that we was trying to 
21 avoid. 
22 Q. Okay. It looks like the inside fog line 
23 might be a yellow line. Do you remember that one way 
24 or the other? They look like they're yellow. Do you 
25 remember? 
<~\ 
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1 A. I don't remember. 
2 Q. Okay. 
3 MR.. PLANT: Can I see those pictures? 
4 Would you mind? 
5 MR. GILCHRIST: Actually, I need to 
6 have -- I'll have the one he circled marked as 
7 Exhibit 1. 
8 MR. PLANT: Okay. Thank you. 
9 MR. GILCHRIST: You can see the rest if 
10 you'd like. 
11 Q. (BY MR. GILCHRIST) All right. What 
12 happened -- how long do you think with you were at 
13 the scene? Let's start with that. How long do you 
14 think you were out there? 
15 A. Probably a couple hours. 
16 Q. Okay. And you -- and you talked to the 
17 officers. Were you there when they were doing their 
18 measurements? 
19 A. Yes. 
2 0 Q. And they talked to you at the same time? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. All right. What kind of things did they 
23 ask you? 
24 A. I remember filling out the statement, and 
25 then I remember them just taking measurements and 
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1 flying a little remote control helicopter up to take 
2 measurements, photographs. 
3 Q. Okay. And I think -- who have you -- did 
4 you give statements to anyone after the accident? 
5 A. Insurance companies. 
6 Q. Okay. All right. I'm sure that's true. 
7 Anybody else working for the government, for the 
8 state, for the highway patrol, for anything else? 
9 A. Not that I remember. 
10 Q. Okay. Did you have to fill out any kind 
11 of report for your employer? 
12 A. No. Well, I don't recall. 
13 Q. Okay. Did he, your employer, interview 
14 you about what happened? 
15 A. I'm sure he was curious and asked me. 
16 Q. Okay. All right. 
17 When you were hooking up and pulling the 
18 Johnson vehicle out of the median, what were the 
19 weather conditions like? 
20 A. Like a skiff of snow, a little bit of 
21 wind. 
22 Q. How cold was it? 
23 A. I don't recall. 
24 Q. Okay. 
25 Did the police officers ever ask you to 
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1 give any measurements as far as where your vehicle 
2 was when it was struck? 
3 A. Now, what was the question? 
4 Q. Did the police officers, when they were 
5 there making measurements, ask you to show them with 
6 marks, so they could do a measurement, where your 
7 vehicle was when it was struck? 
8 A. I don't recall. 
9 Q. Did you ever get a copy of the police 
10 diagram? 
11 A. No. 
12 Q. The vehicle that we've drawn and circled, 
13 were there any special -- oh, I don't know --
14 equipment or other -- on it other than a winch? 
15 Anything else that you hauled around that would be 
16 any weight, any other equipment? 
17 A. I don't know what there would be. 
18 Q. Anything in there that might have been 
19 stored underneath or hauling that had any weight to 
20 it? 
21 A. Not significant weight, no. 
22 Q. Okay. That's what I want to know. 
23 Was it -- was the surface slippery when 
24 you were walking around, the road surface? 
25 A. As I recall, yeah. 
A 
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1 Q. Did you ever talk to the driver of the 
2 vehicle that almost hit Mr. Johnson? 
3 A. No. 
4 Q. Did you ever see what happened to him? 
5 A. I was consumed with other things. 
6 Q. Fair enough. 
7 Had you ever talked to Johnson -- you 
8 know, you said, "Which way are you going?" and those 
9 kind of things. I may know the answer, but I need to 
10 ask it anyhow. Did you ever talk to him about what 
11 had happened to cause him to lose control? 
12 A. No. 
13 Q. Okay. 
14 You said in your answers to 
15 interrogatories you had a 2002 felony possession for 
16 an illegal substance. What was that? 
17 A. I don't recall. 
18 Q. Okay. Have you had any other felony 
19 convictions since then? 
20 A. No. 
21 Q. How long -- maybe I've asked this. How 
22 long do you think it took from the time that you 
23 switched directions until you got the Johnson vehicle 
24 up and out of the median? 
25 A. From when I asked him what direction he 
, r 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
47 
1 was going? 
2 Q. No. You've already asked him that and 
3 you go and you turn around and now you're going the 
4 direction, so you've stopped and you want to hook him 
5 up and pull him out. 
6 A. Ten minutes tops. 
7 Q. Okay. 
8 What kind of damage was done to the tow 
9 truck? 
10 A. The stinger on the back was severely 
11 bent. The axle was ripped out from the U bolts. The 
12 drive line was pretty much crinkled up to the tranny. 
13 Q. Where is the stinger again in relation to 
14 the --
15 A. Right underneath the back of the bed. 
16 Q. In the middle or off to one side? 
17 A. In the middle. 
18 Q. How is it secured? 
19 A. With a ram and a pivot point. 
20 Q. How big is the stinger? 
21 A. Big enough to lift the front of a 
22 vehicle. 
23 Q. Okay. So how big does that have to be? 
24 Can you give me the dimensions of the thing? 
25 A. It's as wide as the truck. 
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1 Q. Okay. The whole truck. 
2 A. It's for getting under the front tires 
3 and lifting the vehicle up. 
4 Q. Okay. And how did it get damaged again, 
5 the stinger? 
6 A. He run into it. 
7 Q. I understand that, but what happened to 
8 it? You're right. That's the right answer to that 
9 question. What was the damage to it? What happened 
10 to the stinger? How was it damaged? 
11 A. It was shoved clear up to as far as it 
12 could possibly go, I guess, and all the arms were 
13 bent. 
14 Q. Okay. 
15 Did you ever walk around that day to try 
16 to figure out where the impact point was on the road 
17 of these two vehicles? 
18 A. I don't know. Did I see where he hit it? 
19 Q. Yeah, where. Yeah, where on the road the 
20 impact happened in relation to where they came to 
21 rest. 
22 A. Where the impact happened -- I don't -- I 
23 was off the road as far as I could be, like I said. 
24 I don't know what you're trying to ask me here. 
25 Q. I'm just wondering if they said -- the 
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1 police said, "Hey, Mr. Kidman, come over here. Does 
2 this look like the point where the impact occurred?" 
3 Anything like that? 
4 A. Nobody ever asked me that. 
5 Q. Did you ever try to do it on your own? 
6 A. No. 
7 Q. Okay. That's all I wanted to know. 
8 Give me a moment. 
9 Did you ever talk to anybody else, any 
10 other drivers that were out there that day, 
11 afterwards? 
12 A. I'm sure I did. 
13 Q. Did anybody tell you what they had seen 
14 or understood had happened out there? 
15 A. I'm sure they did. 
16 Q. Do you remember --do you remember what 
17 they told you? 
18 A. I don't remember specifics. 
19 Q. Fair enough. You gave a statement to 
20 Progressive, the insurance company that's defending 
21 you in this case, I assume. Correct? 
22 A. I assume. 
23 Q. Any other insurance companies or 
24 investigators? 
25 A. I believe so. 
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1 Q. Do you know who that was? 
2 A. No. 
3 Q. Was it by phone or in person? 
4 A. Phone. 
5 Q. Did they send you a copy of it? 
6 A. I don't remember. 
7 Q. Maybe, maybe not? 
8 A. Probably not. 
9 Q. Do you have any copies of statements 
10 you've given to anybody? 
11 A. No. 
12 MR. GILCHRIST: That's all the questions I 
13 have. I appreciate it. 
14 MR. PLANT: Sir, I just have a few for 
15 you. As I introduced myself, I represent your 
16 customer, Ricky Johnson. 
17 THE WITNESS: Mm-hmm. 
18 EXAMINATION 
19 BY MR. PLANT: 
2 0 Q. I want to make sure I understand what you 
21 were doing out there in regards to him. You were 
22 called by the highway patrol or police to go out and 
23 fetch him from the median; is that correct? 
24 A. Yes. 
25 Q. And when you arrived, you talked to him 
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1 very, very briefly, said, "Which way are you going?" 
2 and he said, "Back towards Tremonton," and you turned 
3 around. When you got to -- I've said that right thus 
4 far, right? 
5 A. Mm-hmm. 
6 Q. Yes? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. You have to say "Yes" or "No" so we can 
9 get your response. 
10 Did Ricky have any involvement in 
11 determining where you would park your vehicle? 
12 A. Other than getting him out of the median? 
13 Q. Well, yeah. He's in the median, but now 
14 you're there to get him out of the median, right? 
15 A. So he had everything to do with me being 
16 in the median. 
17 Q. I understand. If he hadn't been there, 
18 you wouldn't have come out. Is that what you're 
19 saying? 
20 A. Yeah. 
21 Q. Once you're there, it was your job to get 
22 him out of the median, correct? 
23 A. Mm-hmm. 
24 Q. Yes? 
25 A. Yes. 
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1 Q. You have to say "Yes" or "No" so we can 
2 get your response on the record. 
3 MR. GILCHRIST: See, he gets our theory. 
4 I don't know why you don't. Just follow along. He'll 
5 fill you in. 
6 MR. PLANT: He and some other guy in 
7 Tucson. 
8 MR. GILCHRIST: Follow along. 
9 Q. (BY MR. PLANT) Just kidding. Back to 
10 being very serious, did he have any role in your --
11 in how it was that you decided to get him out of the 
12 median? In other words, did he -- did he -- did 
13 he --
14 A. Give me advice? 
15 Q. -- did he tell you -- did he give you any 
16 instruction or advice as to where to park your 
17 vehicle? 
18 A. No. 
19 Q. Did he give you any instruction or advice 
2 0 as to how to hook up your --
21 A. No. 
22 Q. -- your winch? 
23 A. (Shakes head.) 
24 Q. In fact, you did all of that, correct? 
25 A. Yes. 
/) . 
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1 Q. And that was your job, correct? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. And he had no role whatsoever other than 
4 being there, but once you undertook to get him out, 
5 he didn't tell you where to park? 
6 A. No. 
7 Q. He didn't tell you how to hook up? 
8 A. No. 
9 Q. He didn't tell you to move forward to 
10 avoid the delineator post? 
11 A. No. 
12 Q. In fact, that was all your job for which 
13 you were being paid, correct? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. Okay. 
16 Now, as you understand it, there's this 
17 other vehicle, the first vehicle that came through, 
18 that lost control and went into the median, much like 
19 Mr. Johnson had done, correct? 
20 A. Yeah. 
21 Q. Did you see that vehicle lose control? 
22 A. I just --
23 Q. Let me ask a better question. Where was 
24 that vehicle when you first noticed it? Was it 
25 already in the median, or was it going off the 
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1 median? 
2 A. No. They were in the road. And like I 
3 said, he, Mr. Johnson, had waived to him to slow 
4 down. 
5 Q. By moving his hands? 
6 A. It seemed almost instantaneously, you 
7 know, they went right off the road. 
8 Q. Okay. How far behind that vehicle -- oh, 
9 you didn't ever see the vehicle that struck your tow 
10 truck, right? 
11 A. I didn't see the flow of traffic. I was 
12 watching Mr. Johnson run. 
13 Q. Let me ask this, and you may have 
14 answered this, and I apologize if I'm repeating. How 
15 long after was it that you saw that first vehicle go 
16 off the road that you saw your tow truck disappear 
17 from your hand as you described it? 
18 A. The Passat had to be right next to the 
19 car that went off the road. It -- I mean, right in 
20 the same group. 
21 Q. Okay. Just timing-wise. 
22 A. Yeah. 
23 Q. Now, when Mr. Johnson -- as I understand 
24 it, then, essentially you're done with your job. 
25 When this accident occurred, you're finished, you've 
f ^ 
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I 
1 got him up on the payment, correct? 
2 A. (Nods head.) 
3 Q. Yes? 
4 A. Yes. ' 
5 Q. You've got your winch - - o r your cables 
6 hooked back into your vehicle. 
7 A. Yes. < 
8 Q. And you even discuss, "Let's go up there 
9 on the next exit to do the paperwork," right? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. And -- and so when he --
12 A. I probably was discussing it as I was 
13 doing this. 
14 Q. That's what I don't understand. When 
15 this first vehicle went off the road, was he in the 
16 process of already walking back to his vehicle, if 
17 you recall? 
18 A. Like I said, he asked me what to do about 
19 the paperwork, and I said, "Let's get off this road. 
2 0 People are coming too fast." At that point he turned 
21 around and started waiving at traffic to slow, and at 
22 that point traffic went for the median. 
23 Q. Okay. How far behind you was he --
24 strike that. 
25 How far away was he from the back of your 
V f\ 
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1 vehicle approximately? 
2 A. Probably around 6 feet. 
3 Q. When he started doing the up-and-down 
4 movement to slow down the vehicle, how far --
5 A. He was right in front of his vehicle. 
6 Q. So about 6 feet or so? 
7 A. Yeah. 
8 Q. Okay. Was his vehicle parked to the 
9 left -- after you had brought it up and it was there 
10 sitting where you -- you had brought it with your 
11 winch, was it to the left or to the right of your 
12 vehicle or straight behind it? 
13 A. Probably parallel with the driver side. 
14 Q. Parallel with the driver side? 
15 A. Well, right directly on the driver side 
16 of my vehicle. 
17 Q. So if you drew a line from your driver 
18 side to his driver side, they were --
19 A. I would say they were. 
2 0 Q. So because your vehicle was wider --
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. --it was further out of the road than 
23 your vehicle --
24 A. Yes. 
25 Q. -- right? 
^\ 
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1 A. Yeah. 
2 Q. Okay. At all times while you're doing 
3 this -- when I say "this," I mean at all times during 
4 this process -- were your lights on, on top? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. Were they still on when you were struck, 
7 your vehicle was struck? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. You never turned them off? 
10 A. No. 
11 Q. As you were standing there at that point, 
12 I assume -- because this is kind of scary, all these 
13 cars whipping by you, right? 
14 A. Yeah. 
15 Q. And you already know one guy has gone off 
16 the road, or you wouldn't be there, right? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. You know it's snowy and slippery and all 
19 that stuff. 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. And I assume, therefore, you're keeping 
22 an eye on traffic. 
23 A. Yes. 
24 Q. How far up the road could you see as you 
25 were standing there? Give me a sight distance. 
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1 You're at the controls and you look back up. I guess 
2 that's to the north? 
3 A. I --
4 Q. Or I guess the west. 
5 A. I could see all the way up where they 
6 started coming. There's the exit, and right as soon 
7 as -- that exit is at the top of the -- the highest 
8 point. I could see all the way up there. 
9 Q. Okay. So if vehicles -- let's see. 
10 You're eastbound when the -- when the accident 
11 occurs, correct? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. And that road, I've driven it quite a few 
14 times. It kind of goes east and west depending on --
15 A. Yeah. 
16 Q. Strike that. It goes east or it can go 
17 south. With me? Never mind. You're eastbound. 
18 A. Mm-hmm. 
19 Q. You're eastbound. Now, when you go back 
2 0 westbound, is the - - i s the road fairly steeply 
21 inclined? 
22 A. It's an incline, yeah. I wouldn't say 
23 it's fairly steep. 
24 Q. Okay. This is going to be a tough one. 
2 5 That exit that you talked about, is that kind of at 
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1 the crest of the hill? 
2 A. The top? 
3 Q. Yeah. 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. Okay. How far away would you guesstimate 
6 that is? 
7 A. Like I said, if I was to guesstimate, I 
8 would say 600 yards. 
9 Q. Could you see -- from where you were 
10 standing, could you see that 600 yards? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. So presumably a car 600 yards away could 
13 have seen you? 
14 A. Oh, yeah. 
15 MR, GILCHRIST: Objection, lacks 
16 foundation. 
17 Q. (BY MR. PLANT) And if I understand it 
18 right -- here's the question I need to ask. You 
19 probably can't answer. How -- if you were to take a 
20 straight line and go up, how much above you is -- are 
21 the vehicles where -- when they're at the top of that 
22 hill where the -- where the accident is? 
23 MR. GILCHRIST: Objection, foundation. 
24 A. I couldn't say. 
25 Q. Yeah, I didn't think so. I couldn't 
4^ 
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1 either if I were asked that question. But 
2 nonetheless, it was above you? 
3 A. Oh, yeah. 
4 Q. And t h e r e was an i n c l i n e ? 
5 A. (Nods head.) 
6 Q. And so when people were coming towards 
7 you, they were coming down and were presumably 
8 looking from that up position down and could see what 
9 was below them --
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. --if they're paying attention. 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. And this happened at 11:00 or so, so 
14 lighting was not an issue. 
15 A. No. 
16 Q. Was it overcast? 
17 A. A light skiff of snow as I remember. 
18 Q. I know. But in terms of the lighting 
19 condition, was the sun out at all, or was it --
2 0 A. I'm sure it was. 
21 Q. Okay. Other than your lights on -- what 
22 do you call that, that light bar on top of your 
23 vehicle? A light bar? 
24 A. Beacon. 
25 Q. Okay. A beacon. Did you have other 
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1 flashers on your vehicle, like normal emergency 
2 flashers? 
3 A. Hazards. I'm sure there's hazards on 
4 there somewhere. 
5 Q. Well, think about it. I don't want you 
6 to guess. Just normal truck hazards. Were there 
7 hazards on that vehicle? 
8 A. I can't say for sure, but --
9 Q. Here's a better question. Do you 
10 remember turning those hazards on? 
11 A. No. 
12 Q. Okay. Did you typically turn your 
13 hazards on or just your -- your beacon? 
14 A. Just the beacon. 
15 Q. And you were outside, so you knew it was 
16 working. There's no question that those yellow 
17 lights were on, correct? 
18 A. There's no question. 
19 Q. All right. Did you ever have any 
20 discussions with Ricky Johnson after this all 
21 happened about any of the events that occurred? 
22 A. It seems like --it seems like he sat in 
23 my truck for a while to stay warm. 
24 Q. Other than him going off the road 
25 sometime before you got there -- right? 
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1 A. Right. 
2 Q. -- and that's why you were there, do you 
3 know anything that he did that caused or contributed 
4 to this accident? 
5 A. No. 
6 MR. PLANT: All right. Thank you very 
7 much. 
8 MR. GILCHRIST: All right. I have a 
9 couple questions. 
10 Is it your testimony that you think your 
11 vehicle was all the way off the travel portion of the 
12 road when it was struck, or do you know one way or 
13 the other? 
14 THE WITNESS: I can't recall. 
15 MR. GILCHRIST: Okay. I don't have any 
16 more questions. Thank you. 
17 MR. PLANT: Do you have any? 
18 MR. JEFFERIES: Yeah, I've got a couple, 
19 just as we went along here, that I want to clarify. 
2 0 EXAMINATION 
21 BY MR. JEFFERIES: 
22 Q. Do you remember at what point in time you 
23 turned your lights on? 
24 A. Before I --
25 Q. I'm sorry. The beacon, I guess I should 
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1 say. 
2 A. Before I even pulled up to Ricky Johnson 
3 in the first place. 
4 Q. Okay. So before you turned around. 
5 A. Before I turned around. 
6 Q. Okay. What is it -- what is -- what is 
7 this apparatus that the winch hooks to in the back of 
8 the truck? I mean, you said that the cable hooks 
9 somewhere on the back of the truck to make it easier. 
10 What is that, that it hooks to? 
11 A. Just steel framing, I suppose. 
12 Q. I mean, is it something that the vehicle 
13 allows you to do? Is it -- is it hooking back here? 
14 Is it supposed to do that, I guess I should say? 
15 A. That's the way I've seen every tow 
16 recovery person do it. 
17 Q. Okay. And you said that the cable, you 
18 extended it at some point in time to give it enough 
19 distance to reach the car. 
20 A. Mm-hmm. 
21 Q. How is it that you extend that cable? Do 
22 you hold it and walk backwards, or do you --
23 A. There's a -- like I say, there's a free 
24 release. You pull it to disengage so it will freely 
25 spin, and you walk it back by foot, yeah. 
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1 Q. All right. So at some point in time you 
2 grabbed the cable, and you walked backwards the same 
3 distance from the truck as the car was off the road. 
4 A. Further. 
5 Q. Or further to give you enough --
6 A. This cable is approximately 50 feet long. 
7 Q. Okay. And do you remember doing that? 
8 Do you remember actually going backwards on the road 
9 while you had that cable in your hand? 
10 A. Yeah. 
11 Q. Okay. And from that vantage point, do 
12 you remember where you were parked in relationship 
13 to, you know, the lineage on the road or the 
14 shoulder? 
15 A. Do I remember how far -- are you asking 
16 me how far off the road I was? 
17 Q. Yes. Yes. 
18 A. I remember when I pulled up there I was 
19 trying to avoid hitting a delineator. 
20 Q. And when you say "delineator," is that 
21 the same thing as a mile marker? 
22 A. Yeah. 
23 Q. Okay. And so your testimony is there was 
24 one specific mile marker that was kind of in the way? 
25 A. Yeah. 
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I 
1 Q. Okay. And when you say that you were 
2 trying to avoid it, at what point in the process were 
3 you trying to avoid it? 
4 A. When I was trying to get him back up on 
5 the road, Ricky. 
6 Q. So it was after you had gotten back in 
7 your vehicle and was pulling him forward this 
8 delineator came into play? It was obstructing your 
9 driving? 
10 A. No. Obstructing me getting him back on 
11 the road. 
12 Q. Okay. How was it obstructing you getting 
13 him back up on the road? 
14 A. Because the delineator was behind my 
15 vehicle and in front of his. 
16 Q. Okay. And so> in my mind if you're 
17 driving and his vehicle is off to the side, then 
18 would that delineator have hit the cable at some 
19 point? Is that how it was obstructing your --
2 0 A. Mm-hmm. 
21 Q. -- pulling him back on the road? 
22 A. Or his vehicle. 
23 MR. GILCHRIST: That was a yes? 
24 MR. JEFFERIES: Yeah. Sorry. 
2 5 MR. GILCHRIST: Yes or no. 
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1 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
2 MR. GILCHRIST: Thank you. 
3 Q, (BY MR. JEFFERIES) Now, you say you had 
4 your hand on the tow truck at the point that it was 
5 removed from your hand; is that right? 
6 A. Yeah. 
7 Q. Which side of the --of the tow truck 
8 were you standing at that point? Was it --
9 A. The driver's side. 
10 Q. The driver's side, and so that would have 
11 been not -- that would have been away from the 
12 street; is that correct? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. Okay. And you said that there may have 
15 been a couple of attempts to pull the vehicle from 
16 out of the median, and what consists of an attempt to 
17 pull a vehicle out? 
18 A. Like I said, I winched him in. It wasn't 
19 pulling him all the way up on the road, so I winched 
20 him as close as I could to actually pick his vehicle 
21 up a little so it would draw it up on the road, and I 
22 pulled forward. 
23 Q. At some point does the winch disconnect 
24 from the vehicle? 
25 A. No. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
67 
1 Q. Okay. So it's always connected. You're 
2 just not able to pull him up. 
3 A. Exactly. 
4 Q. -Okay. And when you say you pulled him 
5 closer, does that mean that you went to the controls 
6 and physically moved his vehicle closer to your 
7 vehicle? 
8 A. I was winching him closer as is, but for 
9 me to get his front wheels back up onto the pavement 
10 all the way, I needed to winch him up closer to the 
11 truck because there's -- there's an angle -- you know 
12 what I'm saying? -- from the top of this -- from the 
13 top of this -- from the bottom of this bed to his 
14 car, which kind of gives me some leverage, and then 
15 it can pull him forward. 
16 Q. The process of pulling him closer, that's 
17 done through the control panel? 
18 A. Yes. 
19 Q. Okay. 
2 0 Okay. There was one point where I was 
21 little confused, where you said that you ran 200 to 
22 300 yards. Where along in the chronology of 
2 3 everything did this -- when did you run 200 to 
24 300 yards? 
25 A. After the Passat struck the vehicle, I 
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1 went running up the flow of traffic to stop it. 
2 Q. Okay. Which direction did you run? 
3 A. Westbound. 
4 Q. Okay. And so your purpose in running the 
5 200 to 300 yards was to prevent --
6 A. More collisions, from anybody else 
7 hitting the Passat and the truck. 
8 Q. Okay. Now, at some point when the 
9 Johnson vehicle came off the road -- let's see. I'm 
10 sorry. Scratch that. 
11 So the Johnson vehicle is already off the 
12 road when you arrive --
13 A. Mm-hmm. 
14 Q. into the median, and you mentioned 
15 that there was another vehicle that came off the road 
16 towards Mr. Johnson, but were there any vehicles that 
17 passed before that first vehicle that chased 
18 Mr. Johnson? Do you remember any vehicles that 
19 passed safely? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. Do you have any --
22 A. That's why I told Mr. Johnson, you know, 
23 "We're going to get hit. People are going way too 
24 fast." 
25 Q. In your best recollection, how many 
(h 
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1 vehicles would you estimate passed? 
2 A. It was a freeway, and in a ten-minute 
3 span, I mean, I don't know. I don't recall. 
4 Q. Okay. But more than five? 
5 A. I'd say yeah. 
6 Q. Okay. After the vehicle, the tow truck, 
7 was struck, do you have any recollection as to 
8 whether the lights were still on? 
9 A. They were still on. 
10 MR. JEFFERIES: I think that's all the 
11 questions I have. 
12 MR. PLANT: I have nothing further. 
13 MR. GILCHRIST: I don't have any more 
14 questions. Thank you. 
15 MR. JEFFERIES: We'll read. 
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1 CERTIFICATE OF DEPONENT 
2 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
3 ) 
COUNTY OF ) 
4 
I, CLINTON J. KIDMAN, deponent, HEREBY 
5 CERTIFY that I have read the foregoing testimony, 
numbered from 3 to 69, inclusive, and the same is a 
6 true and correct transcription of said testimony with 
the exception of the following corrections listed 
7 below giving my reasons therefor. 















SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this 
21 
day of 2010. 
22 
23 (Notary Public) 
24 My Commission expires: 
25 
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1 CERTIFICATE 
2 STATE OF UTAH ) 
) 
3 COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
4 THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the deposition of 
CLINTON J. KIDMAN was taken before me, Jerry R. 
5 Martin, a Registered Professional Reporter and Notary 
Public in and for the state of Utah; 
6 
That the said witness was by me, before 
7 examination, duly sworn to testify the truth, the 
whole truth, and nothing but the truth in said cause; 
8 
That the testimony of said witness was by 
9 me reported in stenotype, and therefore caused to be 
transcribed into typewriting, and that a full, true, 
10 and correct transcription of said testimony so taken 
and transcribed is set forth in the foregoing pages, 
11 numbered 3 to 69, inclusive, and said witness deposed 
and said as in the foregoing annexed deposition; 
12 
I further certify that I am not of kin or 
13 otherwise associated with any of the parties to said 
cause of action, and that I am not interested in the 
14 event thereof. WITNESS MY HAND AND OFFICIAL SEAL AT 
PROVO, UTAH, THIS 11TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2010. 
15 
16 MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 
17 JANUARY 1, 2012 
18 
19 
JERRY MARTIN, RPR 
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A. I don't remember. The last thing I 
actually physically remember before the accident 
was sometime in December, which is, you know, two 
months before the accident. I went to some 
Nutcracker play, which my family had done forever, 
but I went with some friends. So that's the last 
physical thing I remember. 
And then there's just one little thing. 
My niece has a birthday sometime in January and we 
went -- we went and met someplace for dinner for 
her and so sometime in January. So that's the last 
thing I remember, but that is just kind of boom. 
That wasn't like continuous memory. The last 
continuous thing I remember was that Nutcracker 
play and it was before Christmas. I don't even 
remember Christmas. 
And so apparently I was in a coma for 
three weeks or something and then I was at the 
hospital and I thought -- I'm like, "I don't know 
what's going on." I'm like, "What's going on?" 
I'm just like, "Duh." 
And I asked somebody how long I'd been 
there because, again, I thought I checked myself in 
the hospital. They said, "Oh, five weeks," or 
something like that. I'm like, "Five weeks. That 
Wade J. Van Tassell, RPR/RMR/CRR 
DEPOMAXMRRTT 
.. n 
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RICKY L. JOHNSON, CLINTON KIDMAN, 
ALLRED AUTOBODY, LLC, a Utah limited 
liability corporation, 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT RICKY 
L. JOHNSON'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No: 100100231 
Judge: Ben Hadfield 
Plaintiff, by and through counsel, hereby respectfully submits this Plaintiffs Memorandum 
in Opposition to Defendant Ricky L. Johnson's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Court should deny Defendant, Ricky Johnson's, motion for summary judgment because 
there are questions of fact as to whether Defendant was a proximate cause of Plaintiffs' injuries. 
Defendant claims that he was not a proximate cause of Plaintiffs' injuries because of the subsequent 
conduct of another actor, Clinton Kidman. The primary issue in a superseding-cause analysis is 
whether the subsequent actor's conduct was foreseeable. 
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Here, Defendant was driving down any icy freeway, lost control of his vehicle, and slid into 
a median. Defendant called for help and was informed that a tow truck was on its way. As 
Defendant was waiting for the tow truck, he was worried that other vehicles would slide off the road 
and hit him. The tow truck driver, Mr. Kidman, arrived on the scene shortly thereafter. Mr. Kidman 
was able to tow Defendant's vehicle back onto the freeway within 30 minutes of Defendant losing 
control and sliding into the median. 
As Defendant and Mr. Kidman were standing on the side of the freeway, they realized that 
their vehicles posed a threat to oncoming motorists and decided to finish up the paperwork down the 
road. However, as other motorists approached them, they started to slide off the roadway and crash 
into one another. While this was happening, Plaintiff was driving down the same freeway and 
crashed into the back of Mr. Kidman's tow truck, which was sticking out into the left lane of travel. 
Defendant's vehicle was still hooked onto Mr. Kidman's tow truck at impact. 
Based on these facts, a reasonable jury could find that Defendant should have foreseen that 
the tow truck he called may pose a threat to oncoming motorists and create a hazardous situation on 
the freeway while he was assisting Defendant. The Utah Supreme Court and courts from other 
jurisdictions have found that summary judgment was inappropriate in similar circumstances. And 
the Court should find that it is in this case as well. 
The Court should also deny Defendant's motion because superseding cause is no longer an 
issue with respect to unintentional torts. Utah's comparative-fault statute requires the Court to let 
a jury allocate fault to each defendant for the percentage of fault attributable to them. The definition 
of fault under the statute includes all degrees of negligence that proximately cause or contribute to 
an injury. If the Court grants Defendant's motion, the jury will not be allowed to allocate fault as 
required by the statute. Moreover, superseding cause now requires a subsequent intentional act 
2 
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under Utah law. There is no evidence here of a subsequent intentional act. The Court should 
therefore deny Defendant's motion. 
STATEMENT OF DISPUTED FACTS 
Plaintiff responds in like-numbered paragraphs to the statements of fact contained in 
Defendant's memorandum as follows: 
1. Plaintiff admits this statement of fact for purposes of responding to this motion. 
2. Plaintiff admits this statement of fact for purposes of responding to this motion. 
3. Plaintiff admits this statement of fact for purposes of responding to this motion. 
4. Plaintiff admits this statement of fact for purposes of responding to this motion. 
5. Mr. Johnson requested that the state shut down the interstate due to icy conditions 
that existed where he slid off the freeway, but the state refused to do so. (Dep. of 
Ricky L. Johnson 9:20 to 10:6, Ex A.) 
RESPONSE: Plaintiff objects to this statement of fact to the extent that it is not 
supported by the evidence. Defendant testified that he called the police, and they told Defendant 
that he did not have the authority to shut down the freeway. There is no evidence in the record 
that the police "refused" to shut down the freeway. {See Deposition of Ricky L. Johnson, pgs. 9-
10, attached as Exhibit A.) 
6. Plaintiff admits this statement of fact for purposes of responding to this motion. 
7. Plaintiff admits this statement of fact for purposes of responding to this motion. 
8. Plaintiff admits this statement of fact for purposes of responding to this motion. 
9. Plaintiff admits this statement of fact for purposes of responding to this motion. 
10. Plaintiff admits this statement of fact for purposes of responding to this motion. 
3 
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11. Plaintiff admits this statement of fact for purposes of responding to this motion. 
12. Mr. Kidman suggested to Mr. Johnson that they move to a location off of the 
freeway to complete the paperwork for the tow due to the conditions on the road 
at the time. (Dep. of Clinton J. Kidman 29:23 to 30:4, 55:8-13, Ex. B.) 
RESPONSE: Plaintiff objects to this statement of fact to the extent that it is incomplete. 
Mr. Kidman suggested to Defendant that they move to a location off of the freeway because 
"People [we]re going to - you know, we're going to get hurt." Defendant then turned around and 
started waiving for traffic to slow down. (See Deposition of Clinton J. Kidman, pgs. 28-30, 
attached as Exhibit B.) Mr. Kidman's testimony makes it clear that both he and Defendant could 
foresee that their vehicles on the side of the road posed a hazard to oncoming motorists and that 
is why they were going to move their vehicles. 
13. Plaintiff admits this statement of fact for purposes of responding to this motion. 
14. Plaintiff arrived at the scene after Defendant Kidman removed Mr. Johnson's 
vehicle from the median and was preparing to leave the scene. (Dep. of Clinton J. 
Kidman 29:15 to 30:8, Ex. B.) 
RESPONSE: Plaintiff objects to this statement of fact to the extent that it is 
inconsistent with Defendant's testimony. Defendant Johnson testified that his vehicle was still 
hooked up to Mr. Kidman's tow truck when the accident happened, even though Mr. Kidman 
testified that he had already unhooked Defendant's vehicle by that time. (See Exhibit A, pg. 42; 
and Exhibit B, pg. 28.) 
15. Plaintiff admits this statement of fact for purposes of responding to this motion. 
16. Plaintiff admits this statement of fact for purposes of responding to this motion. 
4 
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Plaintiff admits this statement of fact for purposes of responding to this motion. 
Plaintiff admits this statement of fact for purposes of responding to this motion. 
STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS 
In the morning of February 17, 2009, Defendant Johnson was driving his 1994 
Honda Civic eastbound on 1-84 near Tremonton, Utah. (See Exhibit A, pgs. 4-5.) 
As Defendant was driving, it started to snow and the freeway became very slick 
with snow and ice. (See Exhibit A, pg. 4; and Utah Highway Patrol Photos, 
attached as Exhibit C.) 
Defendant lost control of his vehicle in the snow and ice and slid off the freeway 
into the median, (See Exhibit A, pg. 8.) 
Defendant called the police for help, and they said that they would send a tow 
truck to assist him. (See Exhibit A, pgs. 9-10.) 
Nothing out of the ordinary happened between when Defendant contacted the 
police and the tow truck arrived. However, Defendant "[s]at there in solitude, 
scared to death that somebody else would slide off and hit [him]." (See Exhibit A, 
pg. 10.) In other words, Defendant admits he could foresee that other accidents 
may happen in the area. 
The tow truck driver, Clinton Kidman, arrived at the scene within 20 minutes. 
(See Exhibit B. pg. 17.) 
When Mr. Kidman arrived, the asphalt was covered with a solid sheet of ice and 
there was a slope to the median where Defendant's vehicle was located. (See 
Exhibit A, pg. 14; and Exhibit B, pgs. 26-7.) 
5 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8. However, it only took Mr. Kidman about 10 minutes to pull Defendant's vehicle 
out of the median and back onto the freeway. (See Exhibit A, pg. 21.) 
9. As their vehicles were sitting on the freeway, Mr. Kidman suggested to Defendant 
that they move them off of the freeway because "[pjeople [we]re going to - you 
know, we're going to get hurt." Defendant Johnson then turned around and 
started waiving for traffic to slow down. (See Exhibit B, pgs. 28-30.) 
10. While Defendant and Mr. Kidman were still parked on the freeway, Plaintiff 
Christopher Dee and his girlfriend, Julie Hunsaker, were driving back home from 
a trip to Sun Valley. (See Deposition of Julie Hunsaker1, pg. 20, attached as 
Exhibit D.) 
11. As they were approaching the location where Defendant and Mr. Kidman were on 
the freeway, they saw that several other vehicles had also slid off freeway. (See 
Exhibit D, pg. 26.) 
12. Plaintiff tried to slow down, but the back of Mr. Kidman's tow truck was covering 
approximately one-third to one-quarter of the left-hand lane of 1-84. (See Exhibit 
D, pgs. 28 and 33; and Exhibit C.) 
13. Plaintiff crashed into the back of Mr. Kidman's tow truck. The T-bar of the tow 
truck went through Plaintiffs windshield, hit him in the head, and pinned his head 
against the back of his seat. (See Exhibit A, pgs. 37-8; and Exhibit C.) 
14. Plaintiff was seriously injured in the accident. (See Exhibit A, pg. 38.) 
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15. Defendant and Mr. Kidman disagree as to whether Defendant's truck was still 
connected to the tow truck at the time of impact. (See Exhibit A. pg. 42; and 
Exhibit B. pg. 28.) 
16. However, it is undisputed that if Defendant had not lost control and slid off the 
freeway, Mr. Kidman's tow truck would not have been there at the time of the 
collision. (See Exhibit B, pg„ 51.) 
ARGUMENT 
L THERE ARE QUESTIONS OF FACT AS TO WHETHER DEFENDANT'S 
NEGLIGENCE WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES. 
Defendant Johnson has filed a motion for summary judgment in which he argues that his fault 
in losing control of his vehicle and sliding off the freeway was not a proximate cause of Plaintiff s 
injuries. Defendant concedes for purposes of this motion that a reasonable jury could find that (1) 
Defendant owed Plaintiff a duty, (2) Defendant breached that duty, and (3) Plaintiff has sustained 
damages. (See Defendant's Memo, pgs. 5 and 7-8.) Thus, those elements of negligence are not at 
issue here, and the sole issue for the Court to decide is whether there are questions of fact as to 
whether Defendant's conduct was a proximate cause of Plaintiff s injuries. 
Utah courts have long recognized that proximate cause is usually an issue for the jury to 
decide, and that there can be more than one cause of an injury. McCorvey v. UDOT, 868 P.2d 41, 
45 (Utah 1993). When proximate cause involves a potential superseding cause, the primary issue 
is the foreseeability of the subsequent conduct. Waiters v. Querry, 588 P.2d 702, 702 (Utah 1978). 
Here, a reasonable jury could find that Defendant should have foreseen that losing control of his 
vehicle on an ice-slicked freeway may create a hazardous situation on the freeway by requiring a tow 
7 
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truck to come and pull Defendant out of the median. 
In Watters, supra, the Utah Supreme Court held, in a similar situation, that the issue of 
proximate cause was for the jury to decide. There, the plaintiff was driving behind the first 
defendant. The first defendant made a sudden stop, and the plaintiff stopped behind him. However, 
the second defendant rear-ended the plaintiffs car. The trial court basically instructed the jury that 
the second driver's acts could be a superseding cause without considering the issue of foreseeabililty. 
The jury found that the first defendant was negligent, but that his negligence was not a proximate 
cause. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court because the issue of foreseeability 
should have been properly submitted for the jury to decide: 
The difficulty with the instruction about which plaintiff complains is that, as applied 
to the instant situation, it would seem to exculpate defendant Hemingway (who 
created a dangerous situation) if it is found that the defendant Querry (the later actor) 
was negligent, whether or not the latter's conduct was foreseeable. If the principle 
of law just discussed is properly applied to the evidence in this case, it appears to us 
that there is a legitimate question as to whether a jury could reasonably find that 
defendant Hemingway, in making the alleged abrupt stop, should have foreseen that, 
in traffic such as there was on that highway, some momentarily inattentive driver 
following her would not be able to react and brake quick enough to avoid collision 
with her car or the car behind hers. 
7</.at7042. 
Likewise, in Jensen v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., 611 P.2d 363 (Utah 
1980), the Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment on 
proximate cause. In that case, the first defendant parked his van in an intersection. The second 
defendant wanted to make a left-hand turn, but could not see around the van. The second defendant 
2On a subsequent appeal, the Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed its position that the issue of 
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waited for two minutes and then decided to drive around the van. When he did this, he collided with 
the plaintiffs car. The trial court held that the second defendant's negligence was a superseding 
cause. On appeal, however, the Utah Supreme Court reversed: 
We hold that the evidence before the District Court was not such that it could be said 
that reasonable minds could not differ that this conduct was not foreseeable by [the 
first defendant]. Hence a jury issue is present and summary judgment is 
inappropriate. 
Id. at 366. 
The Honorable John Paul Kennedy held that the defendant's negligence was a proximate 
cause in a bench trial of a similar case. Finch v. Overman, et aL, Civil No. 050912066 (3rd Dist. 
2008) (attached as Exhibit E). In Finch, the defendant caused an accident on 1-15, and the accident 
caused traffic to back up. One hour later, the plaintiff was driving on 1-15 about one-third of a mile 
south of the accident. When the driver of the truck in front of him saw the traffic jam, he swerved 
off to the side of the road. The plaintiff swerved as well, but had to go farther off the road to avoid 
the truck in front of him. The plaintiffs vehicle hit an embankment and he was injured. Judge 
Kennedy ruled for the plaintiff and reasoned: 
But for the Overman accident, there would have been no backup on 1-15 at the time 
that Finch approached. It was foreseeable that an accident of the serious nature of the 
Overman accident could back up traffic for an hour after the accident and for a 
substantial distance behind the location of the accident. Thus, the dangerous 
conditions caused by the Overman accident were persisting at the time of the Finch 
accident, and the traffic flow had not yet returned to normal. 
Id. at pg. 13, Conclusion of Law: A. 
Courts from other jurisdictions have reached similar results. For instance, in J. Wigglesworth 
Co. v. Peeples, 985 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999), the first defendant was driving a wide load. 
He missed his required exit and got stuck in a construction zone, which caused traffic to back up 
9 
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about 300 yards. As plaintiff approached some trucks that were about 40-50 vehicles behind the 
backup, he got on his CB radio and warned the trucks behind him. The second defendant heard this 
warning, but could not stop in time. The trial court refused to instruct the jury on superseding cause, 
and the court of appeals upheld this ruling: 
[T]his is precisely the type of intervening act (i.e., a wreck involving a third party) 
that Kirby, in the exercise of ordinary care, could reasonably foresee would result 
from missing his exit, blocking traffic, and backing up his eighteen wheeler in a 
construction zone. Because it was reasonably foreseeable, as a matter of law 
Harmon's act could not be a new and independent cause. 
Id. at 665. (Emphasis added.) See, also, Cooke v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 14 So.3d 1192 
(Fla. Ct. App. 2009) (subsequent negligence was not a superseding cause even though the first 
accident happened one hour before and there was one to one-and-a-half miles in between the 
accidents); and Wingv. Morse, 300 A.2d491 (Me. 1973) (defendant was still a proximate cause even 
though there were 10 minutes in between his accident and the plaintiffs). 
Consistent with these authorities, the Court should rule that a reasonable jury could find 
Defendant's conduct to be a proximate cause of Plaintiff s injuries. There is no dispute for purposes 
of this motion that Defendant breached a duty owed to Plaintiff and that Plaintiff sustained serious 
injuries in the accident. The only issue for the Court to decide is whether Mr. Kidman's actions in 
removing Defendant's vehicle from the median were foreseeable to Defendant. 
There are a number of facts on which a reasonable jury could find in favor of Plaintiff on this 
issue. First, Defendant was the one who called for assistance and knew that he needed a tow truck 
to pull his vehicle out of the median. Defendant also knew that the area was slick and there were 
slopes in the median, which would make it difficult for Defendant to get towed out of the median. 
Second, as Defendant was waiting for Mr. Kidman, he admitted that he was worried that other cars 
10 
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would lose control in the area and hit him. In other words, Defendant knew that other accidents may 
happen while he was there. Third, the accident happened only 30 minutes after Defendant lost 
control and slid into the median, which is a much shorter time than Judge Kennedy considered in 
Finch or the Florida Court of Appeals considered in Cooke. Fourth, while Defendant and Mr. 
Kidman were back on the freeway, they decided that they needed to move their vehicles because 
people were going to get hurt, which means they both recognized the hazardous situation. Fifth, 
several other vehicles had slid off the freeway before Plaintiff arrived at the scene. So, the area 
where the accident happened was objectively hazardous. Sixth, Defendant's vehicle was still hooked 
up to the tow truck when Plaintiff hit it. Thus, in Judge Kennedy's words, "the dangerous conditions 
caused by [Defendant's] accident were persisting at the time of [Plaintiffs] accident.. . ." Lastly, 
it is undisputed that, but for Defendant's negligence, Mr. Kidman's tow truck would not have been 
on the side of the freeway. Therefore, the Court should find that the hazard posed by Mr. Kidman's 
actions in towing Defendant's car were foreseeable to Defendant. 
The Court should also not be persuaded by the cases Defendant cited. Defendant primarily 
relied on Bansanine v. Bodell, 927 P.2d 675 (Ut. Ct. App. 1996) in support of his motion. However, 
Bansanine is not on point. Bansanine involved a situation in which the court held that it was not 
foreseeable that the plaintiff would get shot because of the defendant's careless driving. Shooting 
someone involves an intentional superseding act, which is not at issue here. We are dealing with the 
subsequent negligence of a tow truck driver who was still at the scene of Defendant's accident and 
was still hooked up to Defendant's vehicle when Plaintiff hit the tow truck. 
Defendant also briefly cited the Court to Fordham v. Oldroyd, 131 P.3d 280 (Ut. Ct. App. 
2006), aff'd, 111 P.3d 411. The court in Fordham was considering whether to adopt the 
11 
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"professional rescuer" doctrine. That doctrine is inapplicable here. Fordham is therefore also not 
on point. It should be noted that Defendant did not cite the Court to any cases that are even remotely 
similar to our fact situation. Perhaps that is because the most analogous Utah cases and cases from 
other jurisdictions do not support Defendant's position. Consequently, the Court should not be 
persuaded by the cases Defendant cited. 
II. SUPERSEDING CAUSE IS NOT AN ISSUE IN THIS CASE. 
The Court should also deny Defendant's motion because superseding cause is not an issue 
in this case. Under modern comparative-fault statutes, juries are required to compare and allocate 
fault among negligent parties. Such a requirement renders superseding cause unnecessary in this 
situation. Further, superseding cause only applies in Utah when the subsequent conduct was 
intentional. Thus, superseding cause does not apply here. 
A. Superseding Cause No Longer Applies with Comparative Fault. 
In 19863, the Legislature enacted the Liability Reform Act, U.C.A. § 78B-5-817, et seq. 
("LRA"). Under the LRA, a plaintiff may recover from any defendant or group of defendants whose 
fault exceeds the fault of the person seeking recovery, and the fact finder must allocate the 
percentage of fault attributable to each defendant. U.C.A. § 78B-5-818(4). In other words, the fact 
finder must compare the fault of each party. The LRA defines fault as, "any actionable breach of 
legal duty, act, or omission proximately causing or contributing to injury or damages sustained by 
a person seeking recovery, including negligence in all its degrees . . . ." U.C.A. § 78B-5-817(2). 
Under this statutory scheme, the Court is required to let the jury compare and allocate the 
3This is important because the Utah superseding cause cases cited above by Plaintiff pre-
date the LRA. The LRA has also been renumbered since 1986. The current citation is above. 
12 
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fault (i.e., negligence) of Defendant and Mr. Kidman. However, if the Court rules that Mr. Kidman's 
negligence was a superseding cause, and does not allow the jury to compare and allocate fault, the 
Court will have violated the requirements of the LRA. Thus, superseding cause no longer has a 
place with respect to unintentional torts in light of the LRA. MUJIII, CV210, Superseding Cause, 
Committee Notes. 
In the pre-LRA case, Harris, supra, the Utah Supreme Court used comparative-fault 
principles to overrule prior superseding-cause precedent. The court was considering a two-pronged 
test from a prior case: 
(1) where a motorist sees a stationary obj ect in the road and negligently fails to avoid 
it, his negligence is, as a matter of law, a superseding cause, but (2) if the motorist 
negligently fails to see the stationary object in time to avoid it, the issue of whether 
the motorist's negligence is a superseding cause is for the jury. 
Harris, 671 P.2d at 221. The court decided to overrule the first prong from that test and reasoned, 
in part: 
Finally, the unsound distinction made in Hillyard serves to frustrate the purpose of 
the Comparative Negligence Statute by precluding the kind of comparison of fault 
that a jury ought to make. The allocation of liability should be made on the basis of 
the relative culpability of both parties. To do that the jury must assess the 
reasonableness or unreasonableness of the second driver's actions in light of all of 
the circumstances, including whatever action it takes to avoid a collision, his initial 
speed, the initial speed of the first car, road conditions, traffic conditions, and the 
like. 
Id. at 222. 
More recent cases from other jurisdictions have similarly followed suit. For instance, in 
Barry v. Quality Steel Products, Inc., 820 A.2d 258 (Conn. 2003), the court held that superseding 
cause no longer had a place under Connecticut's comparative-fault system. There, the plaintiffs sued 
two defendants, and the defendants argued that some subsequent actors' conduct was a superseding 
13 
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cause. The plaintiff filed a motion with the court to prevent it from instructing the jury on 
superseding cause. The court denied the motion. On appeal, the court abandoned superseding cause 
in unintentional-tort cases: 
[W]e conclude that the doctrine of superseding cause no longer serves a useful 
purpose in our jurisprudence when a defendant claims that a subsequent negligent act 
by a third party cuts off its own liability for the plaintiffs injuries. We conclude that 
under those circumstances, superseding cause instructions serve to complicate what 
is fundamentally a proximate cause analysis. Specifically, we conclude that, because 
our statutes allow for apportionment among negligent defendants (citation omitted); 
and because Connecticut is a comparative negligence jurisdiction (citation omitted); 
the simpler and less confusing approach to cases, such as the present one, where the 
jury must determine which, among many, causes contributed to the plaintiffs' injury, 
is to couch the analysis in proximate cause rather than allowing a defense of 
superseding cause. 
Id. at 256-6. 
See, also, Torres v. El Paso Elec. Co., 987 P.2d 386 (N.M. 1999), overruled on other 
grounds, Herrara v. Quality Pontiac, 73 P.3d 181 (N.M. 2003) (refusing to instruct on superseding 
cause for subsequent third-party negligence); Commonwealth v. Babbitt, 111 S.W.3d 786,793 (Ky. 
2005) (stating, "the rationale for the doctrine of superseding cause has been substantially diminished 
by the adoption of comparative negligence."); Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liab. Physical Harm 
§ 34, Proposed Final Draft No. 1, Cmt. C. ("Just as comparative responsibility has obviated the need 
for a number of legal rules designed to ameliorate the harshness of contributory negligence, and 
comparative contribution obviated the need for the active-passive rule permitting indemnity, rather 
than contribution, the advent of comparative principles has reduced the role of superseding cause."); 
The Unanticipated Ripples of Comparative Negligence: Superseding Cause in Products Liability 
and Beyond, 53 S.C.L.Rev. 1103 (2002); and Why Superseding Cause Analysis Should be 
Abandoned, 72 Tex. L.Rev. 161 (1993). 
14 
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In light of these authorities the Court should find that superseding cause no longer applies 
to subsequent negligent conduct, because it is the jury's role to determine whether Defendant 
proximately caused Plaintiffs' injuries. 
B. Superseding Cause Only Applies to Intentional Torts. 
The jury instruction in MUJI II sets forth the elements that must be proved for a jury to find 
that Mr. Kidman's conduct was a superseding cause: 
Defendant claims that he is not liable for Plaintiffs' harm because of the later fault 
of Mr. Kidman. To avoid liability for the harm, Defendant must prove all of the 
following: 
(1) that Mr. Kidman's conduct occurred after Defendant's conduct; 
(2) that a reasonable person would consider Mr. Kidman's conduct 
extraordinary; 
(3) that Defendant could not foresee that Mr. Kidman would act in 
[Alternative A: an intentional] [Alternative B: a negligent] 
manner; and 
(4) that the harm resulting from Mr. Kidman's conduct was different 
from the kind of harm that could have been reasonably expected from 
Defendant's conduct. 
MUJI II, CV210 Superseding Cause. (Emphasis added.) The MUJI II Committee drafted the third 
element with alternatives because there is a dispute as to whether superseding cause still applies with 
respect to unintentional torts. Id. Here, the Court should find that superseding cause only applies 
when there is a subsequent intentional act that is foreseeable. 
This conclusion is supported the post-LRA case, Bansanine, supra. In that case, the 
plaintiffs decedent was driving with a friend when a car following behind them blinded the friend 
with his lights. This angered the friend who got behind the car and flipped on his high beams. The 
15 
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two cars got in a highspeed chase, which ultimately ended with the driver of the other car shooting 
plaintiffs decedent. The plaintiff sued the friend claiming that his reckless driving resulted in the 
death of plaintiff s decedent. The friend filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that the firing 
of the gun was a superseding cause. On appeal, the court adopted § 442B of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, which provides: 
Where the negligent conduct of the actor creates or increases the risk of a particular 
harm and is a substantial factor in causing that harm, the fact that the harm is brought 
about through the intervention of another force does not relieve the actor of liability, 
except where the harm is intentionally caused by the third person and is not 
within the scope of the risk created by the actor's conduct. 
Id. at 677-78; and Restatement (Second) of Torts § 442B. (Emphasis added.) 
"To relieve the defendant of liability [under the rule in Bansanine], the third person must not 
only act intentionally, the actor's intent must be to harm the plaintiff." MUJIII, CV210 Superseding 
Cause, Committee Notes. Here, there is no evidence that Mr. Kidman acted intentionally or intended 
to harm Plaintiff. Therefore, the Court should find that superseding cause does not apply here and 
deny Defendant's motion. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court to enter an order DENYING 
Defendant Ricky L. Johnson's motion. 
DATED this j2|5day of January 201 1. 
EISENBERG & GILCHRIST 
G. Gflchri'st 
Jo/dan P. Kendell 
K
-Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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P R O C E E D I N G S I 
RICKY L . JOHNSON, 1 
c a l l e d a s a w i t n e s s f o r a n d on b e h a l f o f t h e p l a i n t i f f , if 
b e i n g f i r s t d u l y s w o r n , w a s e x a m i n e d a n d t e s t i f i e d a s | i 
f o l l o w s : l l 
EXAMINATION I 
BY MR. GILCHRIST: 1 
Q You n e e d t o s t a t e y o u r name f o r t h e r e c o r d , t§ 
p l e a s e . If; 
A R i c k y L e e J o h n s o n . | | 
| | Q And y o u s t i l l l i v e i n Payson? If 
If 
A Yes, I do. [I 
Q 555 N o r t h 500 W e s t , T r a i l e r 5 1 ? jj 
A Y e s , s i r . | | 
Q Thank y o u . I s e e y o u ' r e w e a r i n g a n Okland | | 
C o n s t r u c t i o n — a r e y o u w o r k i n g f o r them? ll 
A No, s i r . | | 
Q You h a v e — | | 
A Y e s , s i r . | | 
Q — a t some p o i n t ? | | 
Are y o u c u r r e n t l y w o r k i n g f o r anybody? |1 
A F i n i s h e d h a r v e s t i n I d a h o . | | 
Q L e t ' s c u t t o i t and t a l k a b o u t t h e a c c i d e n t |l 
t h a t happened on February 17 o f l a s t y e a r . A l l r i g h t ? | | 
A Y e s , s i r . | | 
JEANETTE LUND, RPR, CCR 1 
R e p o r t e r s , I n c . | | 
Page 3 1 
Q Okay. Thank y o u . I t h i n k i n t h e a n s w e r s t o | | 
i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s y o u s a i d t h a t you had b e e n v i s i t i n g y o u r l| 
mother who l i v e s i n P a u l , I d a h o , c o r r e c t ? |i 
A Y e s , s i r . |§ 
Q And you had b r e a k f a s t w i t h h e r ? | | 
A Y e s , s i r . | | 
Q Do you remember what t i m e y o u l e f t h e r h o u s e | | 
i n Paul? 1 
A Gosh , n o , s i r , I h o n e s t l y d o n ' t . I w o u l d h a v e | 
t o p r o b a b l y b a c k t r a c k t h e t i m e i t t o o k t o g e t T r e m o n t o n | | 
t o t h e r e . I d i d n ' t make a s t o p a f t e r t h a t . I d o n ' t | 
know. I n e v e r e v e n t h o u g h t a b o u t t h a t . I m e a n , I d o n ' t | | 
know. ll 
Q Did you make a s t o p i n Tremonton — | | 
A No . | 
Q - - i s t h a t what y o u ' r e s a y i n g ? | | 
A No. I 
MR. PLANT: He d i d n ' t make a n y s t o p s . | 
MR. GILCHRIST: He d i d n ' t make a n y s t o p s . |i 
Thank y o u . | | 
Q (BY MR. GILCHRIST) So y o u d r o v e s t r a i g h t from | | 
h e r h o u s e t o t h e p o i n t where you l e f t t h e r o a d and t h e | | 
a c c i d e n t happened? | | 
A Y e s , s i r . | | 
Q A l l r i g h t . You know, I s h o u l d h a v e l o o k e d i t | | 
JEANETTE LUND, RPR, CCR | 
R e p o r t e r s , I n c . | | 
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up. I'm not from Idaho. Where is — is Paul by any 
other cities? 
A Rupert, Burley. 
Q Okay. Been there, done that. 
All right. Were you traveling alone that 
morning? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And driving a 1994 Honda Civic? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Is it — do you still have that vehicle? 
A No, sir. 
Q Was that an automatic or stick shift? 
A Five-speed stick. 
Q What were the weather conditions like when you 
left your mother's house in Paul? 
A Sunshine, cold. 
Q They changed at some point, correct? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Do you remember about where they changed? j 
A Sweetzer Summit. 1 
Q And when you hit Sweetzer Summit, how did the 1 
weather change? 
A It got very, very cloudy, and the drizzle 
right before the snow. 
Q And then did it start to snow at some point? 
JEANETTE LUND, RPR, CCR 
Reporters, Inc. 
Page 5 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Do you know approximately where you were then? 
A Coming down the grade looking at the snowbelt 
valley. 
Q What was the traffic like that day, light, 
moderate, heavy? 
A Light. 
Q There's been descriptions of the accident, 
that it happened near Rattlesnake Pass. Do you know 
where that is? 
A No, sir. 
Q From when it started snowing to the point 
where your vehicle left the road, do you have any idea 
how far that was in time or distance? 
A No, sir. Honestly, I don't. I slowed down --
everyone slowed down. No, sir, I don't, honestly. 
Q All right. That's fair. 
A I never really thought about any of this. 
Q I can understand and believe that. That's 
probably right. 
So tell me what speed you slowed down to. 
MR. PLANT: After it started snowing you mean? 
Q (BY MR. GILCHRIST) Yeah. You said when it 
started snowing, you slowed down. I was just following 
up on that. 





















































A I was down to 50, 55 miles an hour. if 
Q And with your '94 Honda, what gear would you M 
be in? i| 
A I was out of fifth gear, in fourth gear. |f 
Q So you've reduced your speed to 50, 55. Did if 
you go -- reduce any further before you left the road? if 
A Yes, sir. || 
Q Okay. So I want you to -- all right. So tell || 
me at what point you reduced your speed. ji 
A When I felt the traction of my car gone. || 
Q And where was that in relation to when your ll 
vehicle, in distance or time, left the road? if 
A I maintained that on the downhill slope l| 
perhaps five to six seconds. It 
Q And then you left the road after that five or || 
six seconds? if 
MR. PLANT: You have to answer out loud. || 
MR. GILCHRIST: You're nodding yes. R 
THE WITNESS: Yes. Yes. 1 
Q (BY MR. GILCHRIST) Which lane were you || 
traveling in, the right or the left lane? Jl 
A Right lane. ll 
Q So you're in the right lane, you start to lose If 
traction for about five or six seconds, and you reduce l| 
your speed, correct? 11 
JEANETTE LUND, RPR, OCR || 
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A It's a simultaneous movement. 11 
Q Yes, as you're losing traction, you're trying l| 
to drop speed? [I 
A Yes. 1 
Q So walk me through that sequence. When you ll 
said "simultaneous," what -- walk me through what If 
happened as you lost control of your vehicle. If 
A I go from fourth to third gear, gently tapping ll 
the brake, gently braking. 11 
Q Yes. 1 
A It is so bad my wheels in the little car, I ll 
can feel the ice I'm going over, and it's thick. I know ll 
I'm in trouble. I only have enough time to think, "Oh, B 
my gosh." I'm off the road that fast. It happened -- if 
you're sideways. You don't have time to do much. H 
Q Right, okay. || 
A And you're thinking "If I hit anything solid, If 
I'm going to flip this car." All I could do was just || 
say a silent prayer. I'm in the median. I come to a ll 
rest right before I hit one of the abutments that drain J| 
the median that would have flipped the car again. From | 
the time I went off, that's what I did. II 
Q Thank you. Did you have snow or regular tires ll 
on that vehicle? || 
A Brand new tires had just been put on. | 
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Q Just regular all terrain or were they snows? j 
A No, they were not snows. 
Q And when your vehicle went sideways, then it 
went off the median between the two traffic lanes? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q How far off the road do you think your vehicle 
went before it came to a rest? 
A It was almost near perfect middle of the 
median. Right down in the bottom. 
Q And the median has a grade to it? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q When your vehicle came to rest, what direction 
was it pointing? 
A Still facing south. 
Q Same way you had been facing? 
A Yes. 
Q So what did you do next? 
A I got on my cell phone and called the state 
police. 
Q What did they tell you? 
A They told me that I didn't have the authority 
to shut the interstate down. 
Q Did you talk to them about that? 
A Yes, sir. That was the first thing out of my 
mouth, "You've got to get someone out here." 
JEANETTE LUND, RPR, CCR 
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Q Because of the road and weather conditions? 
You're nodding yes? 
A Yes. 
Q All right. They told you you didn't have 
authority to shut the road down. What else did you 
discuss with the highway patrol? 
A They said they would send a tow truck driver 
and to stay in my vehicle. And I questioned them on 
that, and they said that was the safest place for me to 
be. 
Q How long did you wait before the tow truck 
arrived? 
A Thirty-five, 45 minutes. 
Q And then what happened -- well, did anything 
out of the ordinary -- I mean it's snowing obviously. 
Anything out of the ordinary happen between the time 
that you called and the tow truck arrived? 
A Nothing. Sat there in solitude, scared to 
death that somebody else would slide off and hit me. 
Q Tell me what happened when the tow truck 
arrived. 
A He looked over the situation, shook my hand, 
said, "This is pretty bad." And I said, "Yeah." He 
said, "What did the state police say?" And I told him 
that they said I don't have the authority to shut the 




















































interstate down. He said, "It needs to be shut down. | 
Has there been a UDOT truck here?" [ 
"No. No snowplows. Nothing." I 
He said, "Well, let's see if we can't get you I 
out." I 
Q Fair enough. Where was his vehicle — 1 
obviously he had parked and walked down to talk to you 1 
when you had this discussion? 1 
A Yes. 
Q Where had he parked his vehicle? 1 
A I need pen and paper. 1 
Q All right. That we can do. You can use the 
whole page. 
MR. PLANT: Off the record for a second. 
(Off-the-record discussion.) 
Q (BY MR. GILCHRIST) All right. We'll 
eventually mark this as Exhibit 1. You've drawn the two 
southbound lanes, correct? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q The way you were traveling, the median, and 
then we've got a portion of the northbound going in the 
other direction? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q All right. We were discussing where — we 
might as well put your vehicle in there and the tow 




MR. PLANT: The vehicle in the median? 
Q (BY MR. GILCHRIST) Yeah, the Honda. 
A Before or after? 
Q Let's start with before. 
MR. PLANT: Remember, he just asked you to 
write your vehicle. 
Q (BY MR. GILCHRIST) That's okay. Is that the 
culvert? 
A That's the culvert. 
MR. PLANT: What else do you want him to draw? 
. MR. GILCHRIST: The tow truck. We already 
talked about that. The tow truck as it's parked. 
THE WITNESS: These are the outriggers, the 
pontoons that he puts down to stabilize his vehicle. 
Q (BY MR. GILCHRIST) Okay. You're going to 
have to label him "tow truck" or just "tow," T-O-W --
"TT," even better. And put "H" for your Honda. There 
we go. And that's a culvert. That's fine, "Dirt 
culvert." All right. Fair enough. And your vehicle is 
pointed the same direction as the tow truck, an arrow 
there. 
All right. So what you've shown us now is 
where your vehicle is at rest and where the tow truck 
parks when he has a conversation with you, correct? 
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A Yes, sir. 
MR. JEFFERIES: Can I just interject a 
foundation objection, just as to where the tow truck is 
parked? 
MR. GILCHRIST: Sure. Fair enough. 
MR. JEFFERIES: Go ahead. 
Q (BY MR. GILCHRIST) All right. You have the 
conversation. Then what happens next? 
A Takes his cable out, takes it down to my car. 
This is all on a winch, but it's off of a pulley right 
here at the end of his T bar, and he hooks on underneath 
my car onto my framework where my A-frame comes out, 
with a large hook. 
Q Yes, okay. 
A First pull gets me right here. 
MR. PLANT: Do you want him to draw that? 
Q (BY MR. GILCHRIST) Yeah, first pull. Let's 
label that — 
MR. PLANT: No. 1. 
Q (BY MR. GILCHRIST) He's already labeled it 
"first pull," okay. 
So first pull, and does the tow truck move 
during that first pull? 
A No. 
Q All right. So the first pull your vehicle is 
JEANETTE LUND, RPR, CCR 
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now in the position you've marked "first pull." What 
happens next? 
A Second pull, he moves ahead. 
Q "He" being the tow truck? 
A Yes. Sets up here still, same way he set up 
here. We're moving along. The reason I have to say 
this, this is a solid sheet of over two inches of ice 
anywhere it's asphalt. He has to have his outriggers in 
the dirt or he slides. 
Q All right. 
A He sets up, pulls me here. Second pull, I am 
almost where he was. 
Q Almost where the tow truck was? 
A Almost. I'm still not on firm footing. The 
second pull would put me right about here. 
Q That's going to be hard to show, isn't it? 
Let's put a little arrow to the side and put "second 
pull." 
When the tow truck is doing this, was he on 
level ground or was he partially on the grade? 
A Outriggers lift the truck. 
Q Were the outriggers, then, on the grade or 
were they on level ground? 
A They were on the grade. 
Q And — 






















































A It's a gentle slope here. It's not as bad, as i 
drastic as you think. It's a gentle grade. 1 
Q All right. Appreciate that. So — if 
A Third pull he doesn't move up very far, not if 
very far at all. I can't tell you in feet. And then 1 
I'm on firm ground, third pull. [| 
Q So when he does these second and third pulls, || 
does he move his vehicle and park it and then pull you || 
or is he pulling you as he's driving forward? || 
A He sets up each time. if 
Q He isn't ever driving and pulling you at the || 
(l 
same time? 11 
A No. I 
Q Looking at what' s in front of me,- did you have || 
a chance to read Mr. Kidman's deposition? I| 
A No. 1 
Q He' s the tow truck driver, right? if 
A Yes. I 
Q All right. So what happens — where are we if 
now as far as all these squares? We've got some squares || 
we need to mark. What do we have there? if 
A Second setup, tow truck. if 
Q Fair enough. [1 
A Third setup. | 
Q All right. And — go ahead. I'm sorry. I'll 11 
JEANETTE LUND, RPR, CCR 1 
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let you finish. l| 
Where was your vehicle when we have third || 
setup? If 
A Directly behind him, it would be just like if || 
I drew it right here, only right here. || 
Q How close to his tow truck? if 
A I am not -- you could walk between it. I || 
don't know how many feet. He was between it when it ll 
happened. h 
Q You said you could walk -- is it close enough if 
you could touch -- if you put your arms out to each side || 
you could touch? || 
A A little longer than that. ij 
Q And what I was saying there was if you were p 
standing -- [| 
A Because the T bar -- u 
MR. PLANT: Let him finish. | 
Q (BY MR. GILCHRIST) That's okay. You can | 
finish and I'll ask my question. Because the T bar h 
what? [J 
A It had to be low enough to pull me like that. || 
Q Okay. If 
A If he had it up elevated, he couldn't pull me. 1 
Q I see. Fair enough. So he put the T bar — If 
obviously the T bar is down. So when you or someone l| 
JEANETTE LUND, RPR, CCR | 
Reporters, Inc. if 
Page 16 J 
^ J M,,-^- >*i<-vW * ' " ^ ' ^ < ' >.<- V * ^  **. V * *•>„ f, ~WV , '» >»„ V ', MSi. 
J e a n e t t e Lund 
R e p o r t e r s 
CSR RPR 
Inc Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.



























A . Yes. 
Q So what happens next? 
A The driver of the Navajo Truck Lines 
jackknifes right here before he even gets to us. 
Q Is he the one you said had jackknifed before 
or is this a different jackknife? 
A This is the first initial wreck. 
Q All right. Navajo — 
A No one -- there's nobody here while this is 
happening. Nothing is here while this is happening. 
MR. PLANT: "This" being — 
THE WITNESS: Right, while we're towed out. 
Q (BY MR. GILCHRIST) While you're being pulled 
out? 
None. 
No traffic whatsoever. No one passed us. 
Q How long do you t h i n k — I'm sorry. We're 
going to go back to the jackknife, but while I thought 
of it, how long do you think this sequence took to get 
you pulled out with the three pulls? 
A Fifteen minutes, ten minutes. 
Q So for that ten, 15 minutes, no traffic, and 
then all of a sudden here they come? 
A They come in a large group. 


































All right. So I'm trying to figure out — 
He hit the semi that ends up right here, 
Okay. 
When he went sideways, this semi came around 
and ended up right here. We've got two semis now. 
Q So we've got two semis in the southbound 
direction of traffic, one off the road, one in the right 
lane? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. And they both come to a stop? 
A Yes. 
Q And then we also — now we have Navajo back 
behind them flipped over and dead off the road on the 
right side? 
We have two more semis. 
Am I right? Is that right so far? 
Yes. 
Okay, two more semis. Yes, sir. 
I'm still standing here. Now I have my cowboy 
hat off waving. 
Q Okay. Yes, sir. I'm with you. What happens 
next? 
A I've got more coming down the hill. I can see 




























Q Yes, sir. And the Navajo semi you said was 
jackknifed? 
A Jackknifing. It's two inches of ice. 
Q Yes, sir. Okay. 
A It's a skating rink. 
Q Okay. 
A He's over here and his cab is twisted sideways 
sliding down the borrow pit in the median over here on 
the side. 
Q On the far right side of the road? 
A His trailer followed him, but the other 
drivers were down here now. 
Q Were past where your vehicle — 
A Uh-huh. They had come to a stop. Their 
rear -- and we had one more -- the one that he hit is in 
the median, and his trailer is tipped sideways. 
MR. PLANT: When you say "median" you mean --
THE WITNESS: The outside, right side median. 
Q (BY MR. GILCHRIST) Where we've drawn the "A" 
and "B"? 
A Right. His trailer is sideways with the back 
of it all torn apart. 
Q This is Navajo? 
A No. The Navajo is twisted sideways. He's 
dead. You can see that. You don't even have to walk 



























them. This car is in front of the two semis that are 
coming behind him. 
Q This is the Sable? 
A Yes. He can't get around this guy. 
Q He can't get around the guy who's stopped in 
the right lane? 
A In this lane. He tries to go to this lane and 
he can't -- this is when he loses control. 
Q "He," being the Sable, tries to move to the 
left lane and loses control, correct? 
A Yes. 
Q So his direction of travel is towards you? 
Yes. He's up here. 
But he's — 
He flies by me. 
To the north of you, okay. 
Flies by me and comes to a rest right here 
very suddenly. 
Q Stops on the travel surface or shoulder — 
A With impact, that's what stopped him. 
Q What does he hit? 
A The T bar. 
Q Now, is this the Sable or — this is the first 
car or the second car? 
A This is the first car. 
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A The T bar went through his windshield, 
shattered his windshield in between the canopy of his 
car. It pushed his head like this. 
Q You're showing me your left cheekbone, 
correct? 
Yes. 
Pushed his head to the right and up? 
Yes. Over the top of his headrest of his car. 
Was he being held in that position? 
Yes. 
By the T bar? 
Yes. He was hit a second time after. 
By the Silverado? 
Yes, that pushed it further and pushed his 
head further. That's why we could not touch him. We 
were scared to help him. We didn't know what to do. 
Q Did anyone render assistance to him before the 
paramedics arrived? 
A We tried. We tried to comfort him. We tried 
to tell him — cell phones -- his passenger was with 
him. It was a woman. I can't even remember. 
Q Because before you said he was alone, but he 
had a passenger with him? 
A Yeah. 
Q All right. 





































Q Did you do that at the scene? 
A Yes. 
Q And then it looks like two days later that 
somebody from Progressive called you, correct? 
A Yes. 
Q Other than those two statements, have you 
given any other statements to anyone? 
MR. PLANT: Formal written statements — 
formal recorded type statements? 
MR. GILCHRIST: Yes. 
MR. PLANT: Have you? 
THE WITNESS: No, unless what I've talked to 
you about. 
MR. PLANT: That's why I ask. He's talked to 
me at length but nothing recorded. 
MR. GILCHRIST: I would assume that, but I 
just wanted to make sure there wasn't one that I've 
missed. 
(Whereupon, Exhibit No. 1 was marked for 
identification.) 
Q (BY MR. GILCHRIST) So we've had your picture 
that you drew marked as Exhibit 1. All right? 
A Okay. 
MR. GILCHRIST: I don't have any more 
questions, then. Thank you. Told you I would make it 



















A We knew he was still alive. 
Q But he was pretty seriously injured? 
A Yes. 
Q All right. Did anyone move any of these 
vehicles prior to the police arriving? 








Were you there when the police were taking 
Yes. 
Had anyone moved them prior to that? 
Only when the county sheriff started saying do 
stuff, following instructions. 
Q After the photos were taken. 
A Yes, tried to clear traffic. 
Q_ Sure. Do you remember anything else we 
haven't discussed from the scene that day? 
A I can't think of anything else. 
Q You've been pretty thorough. I appreciate 
that. I just want to make sure I've asked you 
everything. 
You wrote out a statement for the police, 
correct? 
You're nodding yes? 
A Yes. 
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1 as short as I could. 
2 MR. JEFFERIES: I just have a few, if that's 
3 okay. 
4 MR. PLANT: He represents the tow truck 
5 driver. 
6 EXAMINATION 
7 BY MR. JEFFERIES: 
8 Q Yeah. I'm Resh Jefferies. I represent Allred 
9 Towing and Clint Kidman, the gentleman who was driving 
10 the truck. I just wanted to ask you just a few 
11 follow-up questions. 
12 You mentioned that there was a -- I believe 
13 you said two-inch-thick sheet of ice that you could feel 
14 underneath you as you were driving. 
15 A Yes, sir. 
16 Q And you talked about how the tow truck pulled 
17 you out. You were on the grade? 
18 A Yes. 
19 Q But you were sitting in dirt at that point in 
20 time? 
21 A Yes. 
22 Q Explain to me the difference between where the 
23 ice was located and where the dirt was located. How was 
24 it that you were on dirt? 
25 A Anything that was asphalt had a sheet of ice 
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1 on it, anything. The snowstorm that came through was 
2 accompanied by a high wind. It came through as a very, 
3 very, very — almost between water and sleet. When it 
4 hit the frozen highway, it just collected. The same 
5 thing happened on the other side of the mountains. 
6 That's why the state police couldn't come and help me. 
7 They were already involved in a wreck on the other side 
8 of the mountains going to Pocatello. 
9 Q I see in your Exhibit 1 here, you've drawn the 
10 location of the tow truck, and I see that it's kind of 
11 straddling the line there to some degree. 
12 A That's asphalt. 
13 Q The asphalt. This sheet of ice, did it 
14 prevent you from seeing the lines? Is that — 
15 A You could see them clearly. It was clear ice. 
16 Q It was clear ice, okay. That was my question. 
17 Now, you were hooked up to the tow truck at 
18 the point of impact? 
19 A Yes. 
2 0 Q Explain a little bit how the cars were able to 
21 impact the tow truck and not hit your car. Were they 
22 coining on an angle or --
23 A Yes, it was an angle, but I don't know how 
24 they missed my car. Both times. 
25 Q And so — I mean, we can assume they didn't go 



















MR. PLANT: So no? 
THE WITNESS: No. 
Q (BY. MR. JEFFERIES) A question about -- okay. 
From the time that you slid off into the median until 
the tow truck arrived to come get you, did you — was it 
snowing at that time? 
A No, it stopped. 
Q You said you were sitting in your car a good 
amount of time, like 30, 40 minutes, right? 
A It stopped. 
Q So as you're sitting there in your car and 
waiting for the tow truck, there's no snow? 
A No, it stopped. 
Q So nothing's happening at that time. No cars 
are coming off the road? 
A No. There's no traffic. 
Q When was the first conversation you had with 
the tow truck driver, do you remember? 
A When he pulled up, he came -- I seen him come 
northbound. He went up to the next exit, came back. I 
knew he was coming for me. And then he came back around 
and pulled to where he sat right there. 
Q Do you remember -- do you have any memory of 
his lights being on at the point when he drove from here 
to there? 



















through your car --
A God. God's hand. 
Q You mentioned that they were coming from the 
right lane to try and sort of avoid the semis towards 
the left lane? 
A Yes. 
Q In your opinion, is that the reason why they 
missed your car because they were coming from one lane 
to the other lane? 
A Yes. 
Now, how did you get home after the accident? 
The state police told me that I could leave. 





What were the conditions like at the time that 
you drove home? 
A I left the ice as I got on the road. I went 
around the accident. I drove south. I couldn't even 
call anybody on the cell phone and tell them what I had 
been through I was so shook up. I got to Tremonton. I 
pulled off and got a cup of coffee. 
Q Did you have any trouble getting out of the — 
going from the dirt to the ice as you drove out of 
there? 
A Front wheel drive. Good tires. 
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1 A As soon as he came by me, he had his lights 
2 on. 
3 Q You talked about — I know this is pretty 
4 traumatic, but where the gentleman had his neck pushed 
5 up against the T bar. You said there was a second 
6 impact that actually forced him more so. Did you 
7 actually see — 
8 A Yes. 
9 Q You saw that impact and saw him — 
10 A Yes. I can't believe he's still alive. 
11 Q And just for clarification, at one point you 
12 said that there was not — there was no one in the car 
13 with him, but then you later went back and said that 
14 there was actually — 
15 A To tell you the truth, I can't remember. 
16 Honestly, it seems like there was someone with him, 
17 because she -- because someone was saying "We've got to 
18 help this guy." 
19 Q Did you ever talk to the gentleman in the 
20 Silverado? I'm assuming it was a man. 
21 A Yes. 
22 Q Did you ever have a conversation with him? 
23 A Just about this guy we couldn't help. 
24 Everyone wanted to help him. 
25 Q Right. Just so that we have the sequence of 
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P R O C E E D I N G S | 
h CLINTON J. KIDMAN 1 
was called as a witness, having been first duly 1 
sworn, was examined and testified on his oath as 1 
1 follows: I 
--0O0— 1 
BY MR. GILCHRIST: | 
Q. All right. I need you to state your name [1 
for the record. t| 
A. Clinton J. Kidman. 1 
Q. Excuse me for a moment, Mr. Kidman. M 
You're 34 years old? || 
A. Mm-hmm. II 
Q. All right. Where do you live currently? M 
A. In Plymouth. ti 
Q. What's your address there? || 
A. 20425 North 4950 West, Plymouth, Utah | 
84330. 1 
Q. Thank you. Married? |l 
A. Yes. | 
Q. What' s your educational background? [| 
A. High school diploma. || 
Q. Where and when? [I 
A. I graduated in '94, Bear River. || 
Q. Okay. The employment history I have says || 
Page 3 1 
you were a painter for Bear River Fabrication? || 
A. A body tech, yeah. 11 
Q. Okay. How long did you do that? || 
A. About five years. If 
Q. And then you — excuse me. Let me talk || 
about that for a minute. Body tech, was that auto [1 
body painting? | 
A. Mm- hmm. || 
Q. Yes. Did you do any towing of vehicles || 
for that company? [| 
A. Yes. I 
Q. Were you certified when you did that? II 
A. Yes. I 
Q. Okay. When did you get your certificate [1 
first? |j 
A. (Hands certificate to counsel.) || 
Q. Thank you. You have a Wreck Master || 
certification card, WM Level 2 with a star, 3 with a J| 
star. Your operator ID is 071844; your expiration If 
date, 1/7/11. On the back, the code 2 is a WM Twin || 
Level No. 2, and 3 is a Recovery Level 3. It says it || 
expires in 11. || 
Do you remember when you first got that? If 
A. I don't. If 
Q. Okay. When did you start working for [| 
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Q. All right. Did you go directly from the j 
shop to the accident scene? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How long did that take you? 
A. I'd guess 20 minutes, maybe — maybe a 
little bit longer. 
Q. Okay. And what route did you take to get 
to the accident scene? 
A. 1-84. 
Q. Straight there? 
A. Yes. 
Q_. What was the weather like in town, at the 
shop, when you left? 
A. I don't really recall. 
Q. Okay. Do you remember the weather as you 
were traveling to the scene on 1-84? 
A. Slick, cold. 
Q. Okay. Snowing? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Do you remember what the visibility was? 
A. Not great. 
Q. Okay. Could you tell us any more than 
that as to car lengths or distances or anything like 
that, visibility, how far you could see as you were 
driving? 
Page 17 
A. Oh, it wasn't -- it wasn't horrible. I 
mean, you could see a ways, but... 
Q. All right. But you couldn't give us any 
more than that distance-wise? 
A. It was a light skiff of snow. 
Q. Okay. So it was snowing? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Was there a point where it got better or 
worse as you approached where this vehicle was? 
A. It seems like the later it got a little 
bit more snow. 
Q. As you got closer? Is that what you're 
saying? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Okay. What was the traffic like as you 
were driving to this area? 
A. I don't recall. 
Q. Do you remember how fast you were 
traveling? 
A. I'd say I went 60 miles an hour, if I was 
to guess. 
Q. Okay. When you arrived at the scene 
where you were going to pull the person from the 
median, did you have to check in with the shop? 
A. No. 
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Q. Okay. Had you used your cell phone at || 
all as you were traveling? || 
A. No. 1 
If It Q. All right. When you got there before the m 
accident, so you were just arriving and the car is m 
1 there, tell me what you found. You're just pulling If 
in, so tell me, what do you see? || 
A. On my way out there, he was in the If 
median. I pulled over on the fast side, and I asked [i 
1 
him what direction he was going. if Q. Okay. ll
A. He said he was headed back towards || 
Tremonton, so I went up on the exit, turned around ll 
towards Tremonton, and pulled over to the side, off M 
the side of the road. 1 
Q. Okay. How far a distance was it to go to 1 
the exit and turn around to the other side of the l| 
road? || 
A. Oh, I'd guess 500 yards. I don't know. 'if 
Q. All right. So you stopped -- how long do If 
you think you stopped and talked to Johnson before ll 
you had to go and change directions? How long did If 
that take? 1 
A. One second. U 
Q. Okay. All right. ll 
Page 19 1 
A. "Which direction are you going?" M 
"Tremonton." ll 
Q. See you. Okay. So you went up, turn [| 
around, and came back on the other side, right? J| 
A. Yes. 1 
Q. Okay. What did you do next when you || 
arrived back at the scene after switching sides? ll 
Then what happened? 11 
A. I pulled over to the side of the road and I 
got out of my truck, hooked it up, winched it in. h 
Q. Okay. What was the conditions like on p 
the road as far as snow covering? if 
A. They were slick. The wind had been | 
drifting over the road, and so it was particularly | 
slick. | 
Q. Okay. How far off the road was the p 
vehicle in the median? If 
A. Probably smack dab in the middle. || 
Q. Okay. When you pulled over to the side 1 
of the road, did you have your -- your lights on? If 
A. Yes. I had them on when I originally | 
started pulling up to ask him which direction he was ll 
going. | 
Q. Before you switched sides you put them | 
on? I 
Page 20 
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And then you get out of your vehicle, go 





Cable. Thank you. It's a cable, of 











It's already run the length of the bed. 
Okay. So you just take it off the end 
up to the other vehicle, correct? 
Pull it out as far as you need to and 
Right. 
-- hook it up to the vehicle. 
Okay. And then the controls are what you 










And they're circled and have a "C," 
(Nods head.) 
Yes? That's a yes? 
Yes. 



























because he can only take down words, so that's why 
I'm repeating what you're showing me. 
A. Yes. I was trying to get him pulled up 
on the road, and it slipped, yes. 
Q. Okay. So he's sliding sideways instead 
of coming up the slope, the Johnson vehicle? 
A. To some degree. 
Q. Okay. So to fix that problem tell me 
again what you did. 
A. I pulled him as close as I possibly could 
to the truck and then drove forward. 
Q. Started your truck up and — 
A. I left it running. 
Q. Okay. You left it running. Thank you. 
So you got back into your truck and drove 
it forward? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How far? 
A. I don't recall. Maybe 10 feet. 
Q. Okay. And when you did that, did that 
solve the problem? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. What did you do at that point, 
after you had driven forward 10 feet? 



























Somewhere it said in the written 
materials that you had three attempts before you got 
this thing pulled out. Is that true? 
A. I don't recall. 
Q. Okay. Do you remember if you did it in 
one attempt, two, three, or more? 
A. It seems like I had winched him in, and 
we had them delineator posts because they were right 
there; and in order for me to not have to reconnect 
and all that stuff, I winched him in. as far as I 
could and then drove forward to get him pulled up on 
the road. 
Q. Okay. All right. 
A. Because he was — the median is like this 
(indicating), and he's just sliding. 
Q. The median, you were showing with your 
hands, is at an angle? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Or slope. 
A. Mm-hmm. 
Q. And so as you're pulling, you've got 
Mr. Johnson's vehicle hooked up and you're pulling 
it, it's not coming up the slope. It's just sliding 
along it. Is that what you're indicating with your 
hands? I've got to put these things into words 

























A. Directly behind mine. 
Q. Okay. How far back from yours was it? 
A. Fairly close. Like I said, I winched him 
in as far as I could. 
Q. So can you give me an educated estimate 
as to how far away it was? 
A. My guess, 6 feet. 
Q. All right. And what happened at that 
point? You have now pulled him up. 
A. He asked me what papers do we need 
signed, and I asked -- I said, "Let's go up to the 
next exit to do the paperwork." 
Q. Okay. And you had unhooked him by this 
point? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. You unhooked him before you had 
that conversation, I assume? 
A. Oh, yeah, or in the process of unhooking 
him. You know what I'm saying? 
Q. And you're having this conversation about 
the paperwork? 
A. He's asking me what do we need to do for 
paperwork, and I said, "Let's go over to the next 
Page 2 6 Page 28 





/D^rr^o ?R f n ?FM 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.



















































exit," because people were flying by us. 
Q. Right. And where are you standing at 
this point? 
A. I had my hand right here on the tow 
truck. 
Q. Just kind of past the controls on the 
back corner? 
A. Yeah, right on the rear edge of the tow 
truck. 
Q. And where is Mr. Johnson, the other 
driver, standing? 
A. Like I said, about 6 feet in back. 
Q. Back by his car or right next to you? 
A. Right in front of his car. 
Q. Okay. All right. And you're unhooking. 
Did you get the cable unhooked and reattached to your 
vehicle before the impact happened to the other 
vehicle? 
A. I believe so. 
Q. And where do you reattach that? 
A. In the back of the bed. 
Q. All right. 
After you have the conversation with 
Mr. Johnson as to the paperwork and going to the next 
exit, what happens next? 
Page 29 
A. He turns — I says, "Let's go up here on 
the next exit. People are going to — you know, 
we're going to get hurt." And he turned around and 
started waiving traffic to slow down. 
Q. Okay. 
A. At that point a car started barreling 
down at him, and he had to hit the skids and run from 
the car. 
Q. Okay. And do you remember what kind of 
vehicle it was or anything about it? 
A. (Shakes head.) 
Q. No. Did you see that vehicle coming at 
him? 
A. Yeah. I was yelling, "Run. Run." 
Q. Okay. And was he still in front of his 
vehicle at that point? 
A. I don't recall exactly. I believe so. 
Q. Okay. Had he moved -- you say he was 
trying to slow traffic down. Had he moved to do 
that? 
A. I don't recall. 
Q. Okay. 
A. All I remember is he turned around and 
waived for him to slow down. 




















































do you remember where he was standing in relation to [| 
his vehicle? I§ 
A. It seemed like he was in front of his l| 
vehicle, maybe off to the side a little bit. H 
Q. On the — I 
A. Driver's. || 
Q. Driver's side. Would that have been to II 
the median side, then? || 
A. Yes. 1 
Q. Okay. All right. And this vehicle If 
comes. Could you tell how fast it was going? [1 
A. They were going pretty quick. t| 
Q. Okay. And was there traffic in the other l| 
lane, in the right lane, too? m 
A. I was paying more attention to my i 
customer because it was a pretty scary deal. I | 
thought he was going to get run over. || 
Q. Okay. So what happened next? [| 
A. I had my hand on my tow truck, and all of [1 
a sudden my tow truck disappeared. | 
Q. Okay. | 
A. Loud horn. I immediately run around to If 
the other side, to the passenger side, of the Passat, u 
I opened the door, called 911. [I 
Q. Okay. What happened to the vehicle that § 
Page 31 j 
was bearing — or was that the vehicle — let me ask If 
you this: What happened to the vehicle that you saw If 
coming at Mr. Johnson and you told him to run? What [1 
happened to that vehicle? [1 
A. It stopped about where his car did 11 
finally after it went through a lot of snow for a | 
long time. |jj 
Q. Okay. A lot of snow on the road or on j| 
the edge? || 
A. In the median. || 
Q. Okay. Did it go down the slope or just K 
on the -- fe 
A. It was barreling through that median If 
right at him. || 
Q. Okay. So it left the travel surface and II 
went down the median where his car had been? [| 
A. Yes. I] 
Q. Okay. How far back from his vehicle was If 
it when it left the road travel surface and went down | 
the median? Do you know? l| 
A. I'd like to -- he -- I bet you he | 
traveled through that median for at least -- at least || 
200 yards. | 
Q. Okay. And where did that vehicle come to | 
rest in relation to your vehicle? u 
Page 32 1 
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police said, "Hey, Mr. Kidman, come over here. Does 
this look like the point where the impact occurred?" 
Anything like that? 
A. Nobody ever asked me that. 
Q. Did you ever try to do it on your own? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. That's all I wanted to know. 
Give me a moment. 
Did you ever talk to anybody else, any 
other drivers that were out there that day, 
afterwards? 
A. I'm sure I did. 
Q. Did anybody tell you what they had seen 
or understood had happened out there? 
A. I'm sure they did. 
Q. Do you remember — do you remember what 
they told you? 
A. I don't remember specifics. 
Q. Fair enough. You gave a statement to 
Progressive, the insurance company that's defending 
you in this case, I assume. Correct? 
A. I assume. 
Q. Any other insurance companies or 
investigators? 
A. I believe so. 
Page 4 9 
Q. Do you know who that was? 
A. No. 
Q. Was it by phone or in person? 
A. Phone. 
Q. Did they send you a copy of it? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. Maybe, maybe not? 
A. Probably not. 
Q. Do you have any copies of statements 
you've given to anybody? 
A. NO. 
MR. GILCHRIST: That's all the questions I 
have. I appreciate it. 
MR. PLANT: Sir, I just have a few for 
you. As I introduced myself, I represent your 
customer, Ricky Johnson. 
THE WITNESS: Mm-hmm. 
EXAMINATION 
BY MR. PLANT: 
Q. I want to make sure I understand what you 
were doing out there in regards to him. You were 
called by the highway patrol or police to go out and 
fetch him from the median; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 




















































very, very briefly, said, "Which way are you going?" 1 
and he said, "Back towards Tremonton," and you turned If 
around. When you got to — I've said that right thus [l 
far, right? I| 
A. Mm-hmm. | 
Q. Yes? 1 
A. Yes. 1 
Q. You have to say "Yes" or "No" so we can | 
get your response. 11 
Did Ricky have any involvement in i 
determining where you would park your vehicle? | 
A. Other than getting him out of the median? | 
Q. Well, yeah. He's in the median, but now [1 
you're there to get him out of the median, right? If 
A. So he had everything to do with me being If 
in the median. If 
Q. I understand. If he hadn't been there, B 
you wouldn't have come out. Is that what you're || 
saying? | 
A. Yeah. 1 
Q. Once you're there, it was your job to get | 
him out of the median, correct? I| 
A. Mm-hmm. | 
» Q. Yes? | 
A. Yes. 1 
Page 51 J 
Q. You have to say "Yes" or "No" so we can || 
get your response on the record. if 
MR. GILCHRIST: See, he gets our theory. | 
I don't know why you don't. Just follow along. He'll 11 
fill you in. | 
MR. PLANT: He and some other guy in i 
Tucson. I 
MR. GILCHRIST: Follow along. | 
Q. (BY MR. PLANT) Just kidding. Back to 1 
being very serious, did he have any role in your — 1 
in how it was that you decided to get him out of the [i 
median? In other words, did he -- did he -- did ll 
he -- I 
A. Give me advice? 11 
Q. -- did he tell you — did he give you any [| 
instruction or advice as to where to park your Is 
vehicle? || 
A. No. | 
Q. Did he give you any instruction or advice if 
as to how to hook up your -- || 
A. No. | 
Q. -- your winch? 11 
A. (Shakes head.) | 
Q. In fact, you did all of that, correct? l] 
A. Yes. j| 
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Q. And that was your job, correct? j 
A. Yes. 
Q. And he had no role whatsoever other than 
being there, but once you undertook to get him out, 
he didn't tell you where to park? 
A. No. 
Q. He didn't tell you how to hook up? 
A. No. 
Q. He didn't tell you to move forward to 
avoid the delineator post? 
A. No. 
Q. In fact, that was all your job for which 
you were being paid, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. 
Now, as you understand it, there's this 
other vehicle, the first vehicle that came through, 
that lost control and went into the median, much like 
Mr. Johnson had done, correct? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Did you see that vehicle lose control? 
A. I just — 
Q. Let me ask a better question. Where was 
that vehicle when you first noticed it? Was it 
already in the median, or was it going off the 
Page 53 
median? 
A. No. They were in the road. And like I 
said, he, Mr. Johnson, had waived to him to slow 
down. 
Q_. By moving his hands? 
A. It seemed almost instantaneously, you 
know, they went right off the road. 
Q. Okay. How far behind that vehicle -- oh, 
you didn't ever see the vehicle that struck your tow 
truck, right? 
A. I didn't see the flow of traffic. I was 
watching Mr. Johnson run. 
Q. Let me ask this, and you may have 
answered this, and I apologize if I'm repeating. How 
long after was it that you saw that first vehicle go 
off the road that you saw your tow truck disappear 
from your hand as you described it? 
A. The Passat had to be right next to the 
car that went off the road. It -- I mean, right in 
the same group. 
Q. Okay. Just timing-wise. 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Now, when Mr. Johnson -- as I understand 
it, then, essentially you're done with your job. 






















































got him up on the payment, correct? i| 
A. (Nods head.) 1 
Q. Yes? 1 
A. Yes. 1 
Q. You've got your winch — or your cables [| 
hooked back into your vehicle. ll 
A. Yes. [1 
Q. And you even discuss, "Let's go up there j| 
on the next exit to do the paperwork," right? if 
ti A. Yes. |j 
Q. And — and so when he — || 
A. I probably was discussing it as I was || 
doing this. || 
Q. That's what I don't understand. When H 
this first vehicle went off the road, was he in the If 
process of already walking back to his vehicle, if || 
you recall? || 
A. Like I said, he asked me what to do about || 
the paperwork, and I said, "Let's get off this road. 11 
People are coming too fast." At that point he turned ll 
around and started waiving at traffic to slow, and at || 
that point traffic went for the median. [1 
Q. Okay. How far behind you was he — || 
strike that. || 
How far away was he from the back of your || 
Page 55 1 
vehicle approximately? ll 
A. Probably around 6 feet. W 
Q. When he started doing the up-and-down if 
movement to slow down the vehicle, how far -- || 
A. He was right in front of his vehicle. H 
Q. So about 6 feet or so? || 
A. Yeah. 1 
Q. Okay. Was his vehicle parked to the If 
left — after you had brought it up and it was there ll 
sitting where you -- you had brought it with your || 
winch, was it to the left or to the right of your ll 
vehicle or straight behind it? 1 
A. Probably parallel with the driver side. | 
Q. Parallel with the driver side? || 
A. Well, right directly on the driver side || 
of my vehicle. || 
Q. So if you drew a line from your driver II 
side to his driver side, they were -- l| 
A. I would say they were. || 
Q. So because your vehicle was wider — 1 
A. Yes. 1 
Q. --it was further out of the road than if 
your vehicle -- || 
A. Yes. 1 
Q. -- right? 1 
Page 56 1 
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1 August 20, 2010 12:05 p.m. 
2 P R O C E E D I N G S 
3 JULIE HUNSAKER, 
4 called as a witness herein, having been first duly sworn 
5 by the Certified Court Reporter to speak to the truth, 
6 was examined and testified as follows: 
7 (Exhibit No. 1 was marked for identification.) 
8 EXAMINATION 
9 (BY MR. ANDERSON) 
10 Q. Julie, I'm Mark Anderson. As you know, I 
11 represent Christopher Dee in this lawsuit. I appreciate 
12 you being here today. 
13 A couple of things instruction-wise I would like 
14 to talk to you about. 
15 In normal conversation it's common for people to 
16 nod or shake their head or say uh-huh or ung-huh. The 
17 problem with that in a deposition, it's difficult for the 
18 court reporter to interpret some of those answers. So I 
19 would ask you to try and remember to give me audible 
20 answers that are clear. 
21 A. Okay. 
22 Q. Almost every witness forgets this at some 
23 point. And so if you are nodding to a question of mine, 
24 I know exactly what your answer is, but I will probably 
25 say, "Is that a yes?" I'm not trying to annoy you. I'm 
R e p o r t e r s , I n c . 
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Because of my children, you know, we kind of decided to 
take things a little slower than maybe we would have 
otherwise just because that's such a delicate issue 
dealing with children that have just gone through a 
divorce. But we were very, very close and very happy and 
very much on the track of marriage. We both wanted it. 
We talked about it. 
Q. What is your relationship now with 
Christopher? How would you characterize it at this time? 
A. We have not communicated in several months. 
The nature of his brain injury really changed his 
personality extremely. And, you know, having -- with 
that being my profession, you know, working in neuro 
trauma with people with brain injuries, I have a strong 
understanding of brain injury, how the brain functions, 
what parts of the brain when they are affected, what the 
outcome is. And I was willing to work through that. And 
I think we were doing fine. 
There was a lot of external kind of pressures of 
reasons why it wouldn't work. His mother was not very 
supportive of our relationship just because we had been 
together and then broken things off and she really still 
harbored a lot of resentment about that from years and 
years before. 



















we were in a relationship, you could comprehend or 
understand the full spectrum of the situation. But 
someone with a brain injury who does not have complete 
cognitive understanding and function, that becomes 
problematic. The reasoning ability is impaired. 
Q. So if I'm interpreting what you are saying 
correctly, you thought it was over and knew that before 
he understood that because of his — 
A. Well, I was willing to work it out. The 
problem was that his injury so much affected his 
personality that when we were together, he would become 
very agitated, very angry and upset. He would do things 
that were inappropriate like going into my daughter's 
bedroom without an invitation to come look at her 
computer or just to have conversations with her that I 
felt were not appropriate. 
So it's my job as a mother — I mean this is just 
an example -- my job as a mother and a, you know, the 
parent of my children is to protect them. 
So I would say to him that I know that this is a 
choice that he made to go in to her room and is not 
something he would have done before, that he did not ever 
do before when we were dating. I would say, "Now, I 
understand that part of your reasoning ability has been 




























after his stay with the intensive care unit at McKay-Dee 
Hospital. And so there were a lot of issues that stemmed 
from my relationship with his mother actually that came 
about because of the stress that the whole accident had 
presented in her life and kind of some issues that she 
had to deal with that made our relationship -- my 
relationship with Christopher a very challenging one. 
And then just the nature of the changes of, you 
know, someone going through a brain injury who loses 
their livelihood and their ability to completely 
participate in gainful employment and being a stepfather. 
It was very troubling to my children to have him around 
with his frontal brain injury. It affects your executive 
function, your ability to make judgment calls and to be 
completely appropriate and to filter your conversations. 
Those kinds of issues began to present with 
significant enough problems that with my situation with 
three children and having to incorporate his family and 
mother so much into his care, it became an improbable 
situation to continue with the relationship. 
Q. Was there like sort of a formal thing where 
you both agreed that this wasn't going to work or was it 
more a thing where it just sort of slowed down and sort 
of gradually tapered off naturally? 
A. Well, it -- the hard thing is you and I, if 
Reporters, Inc. 
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1 appropriate and I can't have you going into her space." 
2 And he would become very upset and angry and not 
3 be able to understand the message that I was trying to 
4 present to him very logically. Instead it was almost 
5 like I was blaming him for something or — he just 
6 didn't -- he became very easily agitated and angry and 
7 upset which was not a part of his disposition prior to 
8 the accident. 
9 Q. If I understand it correctly, you and he had 
10 been at Sun Valley before the accident? 
11 A. Yes, we had gone for a snowshoeing weekend 
12 over the holiday. 
13 Q. At the time of the accident you were 
14 returning back to Salt Lake? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. The accident report says you were in a 
17 Volkswagen Passat? 
18 A. Yes. 
19 Q. Who owned that? 
20 A. That was my vehicle. 
21 Q. Typically is that a pretty good car in the 
22 snow? 
23 A. I had never had problems with it. It's not 
24 four-wheel drive. 
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Q. Or were they sort of driving in the middle? 
A. Kind of in the middle, but it was single 
file. I mean you couldn't really tell where the lanes 
were because there was so much snow and the plows had not 
been out. 
And then shortly before the accident, I don't 
know how many miles it had been, but there was a break in 
the weather. And apparently in that area, the snow had 
not been coming down so dramatically that the roads were 
just wet. They hadn't been snowpacked, slushy, but just 
wet and you could drive both lanes. 
So we were back up to close to normal highway 
speeds. I believe in that area it's 75. So normal 
highway speeds are, you know, 60 to 65. So that's 
probably where we were traveling, passing all of these 
vehicles that had been just going so slow and 
accumulating through the nature of the storm. 
So as we were passing, then as also indicated in 
the recorded statement, there was a geographical dip in 
the whole area where there were like some mountains off 
to the left and kind of a little bit of a valley and then 
some more mountains. And I think through that area there 
were just some very strong wind gusts that had turned the 
wet and slushy road that we were traveling on into ice 




























were having problems ahead of you? Is it possible to 
estimate for me how far that was? 
A. I don't know. I mean it's a straight road. 
There were no curves or bends in the road and it was not 
snowing at that point, so you can — you could see a 
pretty good distance ahead that there were cars off the 
road. 
Q. I think I interrupted you. I shouldn' t have 
done that. 
You were telling me you saw these cars that had 
slid off the road. Can you keep walking me through what 
happened after that? 
A. Sure. Christopher had slowed a little bit at 
that point as we approached the cars and recognized that, 
you know, there was trouble and not a lot of space and 
then just hit the ice. 
Q. Sometimes ice is very visible and you can see 
it's coming and sometijmes it looks just like the road. 
Could you describe what the ice looked like? 
A. Well, it was just covered in snow. At that 
point I'm sure that the wet road underneath had frozen 
and the wind had blown snow over the top of the ice pack. 
Q. Was it a situation where there was like bare 
pavement and then sort of a line where it turned white? 
A. I don't recall all of that information. We 
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1 Just as quickly as the geographical region 
2 changed, so did the road. It was not a whole — there 
3 was not a whole lot of warning that there was going to be 
4 the ice and snowpacked road ahead. 
5 That's when we came upon the scene of multiple 
6 cars that had already slid off the road and the tow truck 
7 driver that had come to help someone out of the median on 
8 the left. 
9 Q. In terms of time, seconds or minutes, how 
10 much warning would someone in Christopher's position have 
11 that the road surface was going to change dramatically? 
12 Would you have had like 60 seconds to see that or 30 or 
13 10? Can you estimate how long? 
14 A. No, that's difficult to estimate. It seemed 
15 like it happened -- like the whole thing happened so 
16 fast. Of course, we were traveling quite fast trying to 
17 pass other cars. I don't know maybe -- I mean from -- a 
18 distance you could see that there were cars already off 
19 the road and they had been there for a while. So I think 
20 the normal just sight -- I mean it was not snowing at 
21 that point, so there was a considerable amount of visual 
22 acuity in the distance that you could see. But I can't 
23 really estimate a time frame. 
2 4 Q. Can you estimate the distance between the 




















were just driving fairly fast speeds because the roads 
were clear and then they were not because of the wind. 
Q. And what happened after the car encountered 
the ice you described? 
A. Well, Christopher tried to maintain control 
of the vehicle. But because there were cars off of the 
side — and off the right-hand side, I don't recall them 
being actually in the lane of traffic. The cars on the 
left side, of course, the one was in the median that the 
tow truck driver had come to assist. 
The tow truck driver, to my recollection, was at 
an angle facing -- so the front of his truck was facing 
the median and to a slight degree. And that would have 
put him partway in the road and partway out of the road. 
Q. Were you still in the left lane at this 
point? 
A. Well, we were — we had been traveling in the 
left lane passing. And Christopher tried to get into the 
right-hand lane to go through the clearing in the road 
and then when he hit the ice, there was really little 
control that he had over the vehicle and he had not 
slowed significantly at that point to navigate through 
safely. I believe there was a car in front of us that 
did make it through. 
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Q. I understand your drawing is not to scale. 
It's a rough hand drawn drawing. You have put roughly-
half the tow truck in the travel lane. Did you do that 
on purpose or is that your best estimate or does that 
mean anything? 
A. You know, he — really, it happened so fast. 
And I don't recall exactly how far -- I mean there's 
pictures of the accident scene that may provide more 
enlightenment to how far the tow truck was in the lane. 
But really with all of the snow, it's difficult to tell 
how far he was in the lane and really even at the angle 
just because it happened so fast. 
And this angle may be a little bit exaggerated. 
I'm not sure. And if I had to just say, he could have 
been anywhere occluding a quarter to a third of the 
left-hand lane. 
(Exhibit No. 2 was marked for identification.) 
Q. So the drawing you just drew has been marked 
as Exhibit 2; is that right? 
A. Yes, I will go ahead and put on here left and 
right. 
(Exhibit No. 3 was marked for identification.) 
Q. I'm handing you what I have marked as Exhibit 
3. Does that photograph depict the position of the tow 




























Q. You can see in Exhibit 3 a white line where 
the man is sort of standing walking over there. Do you 
see that? 
A. I do. 
Q. Do you know what that line is? Is that the 
right fog line? Is that one of the middle — one of the 
lines that separates the two lanes of travel? Do you 
know from being there? 
A. If I had to guess, I would say that that's 
the center line that divides the two lanes of travel. I 
mean you can faintly see — I don't know if this is 
another line here, if this is just a snow line and then 
this would indicate the end of the shoulder (indicating.) 
I'm not sure. 
I mean there's — there's some lines that from 
perspective sake where color changes where, you know, I 
don't know if this is a snowplow pass that's created, you 
know, multiple levels of snow depth that have made this 
appear separate areas of the road, if this is the end of 
the shoulder, this line that looks like it goes to the 
rear tire of the tow truck, if that's the end of the 
shoulder and then his bed extends. 
Q. I can tell you are a scientist, Julie, 
because you are trying to analyze this. 




























A. I know at one point when they were trying to 
decide how to get Christopher out of the vehicle that 
they had instructed the tow truck driver to pull forward. 
So I don't know when this photo was taken, if it was 
before or after. That angle looks about right. It's 
hard to say. It's hard to say if my car hit the tow 
truck and then kind of swerved -- I guess that would have 
been to the right a little bit, because the damage to the 
front of this car seems -- the front of my car seems to 
be more on the right side in proportion -- or in 
perspective of where we have impacted the tow truck. 
Q. Just to summarize what you have said -- tell 
me if I'm right or wrong on this -- it sounds like you 
are not sure if the truck had moved between impact and 
when that photo was taken? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Do you know whether the force of the Passat 
hitting the tow truck moved the toe truck? Do you have 
information about that? 
A. I do not have information about that. 
Judging from -- just looking at the picture and what I 
remember from being inside the vehicle, it doesn't really 
appear that the tow truck's position has changed into 
where the impact would have been on Christopher's side, 
on the driver's side of the car. 
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1 one that's obviously a painted line, I would say that's 
2 the painted line dividing the two lanes of traffic. 
3 Q. Thank you. This is obviously a lawsuit 
4 against Mr. Dee. In your perspective, what did he do 
5 that was incorrect or wrong as a driver that contributed 
6 to the collision? 
7 A. Well, I personally view myself as a fairly 
8 safe driver. I would not have been driving that fast. 
9 And I did request that he drive slower at least three 
10 times in conversation while we were driving. 
11 Q. So you felt his speed was excessive for the 
12 conditions? 
13 A. Uh-huh. Yes. 
14 Q. I think you mentioned he was going around 60 
15 when this happened. What would you have felt a safe 
16 speed would have been at that time? 
17 A. From 40 to 45. 
18 Q. Anything else that you think he did wrong or 
19 that you think he should have done differently that could 
2 0 have prevented the accident? 
21 A. No. 
22 Q. It sounds like — 
23 A. He did try to navigate through the ice, but 
24 really there's no to minimal control when you hit black 
25 ice. I think he defensively tried to steer into the 
Reporters, Inc. 
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TTrd. Judicial District 
DEe;2 2 2008 
SALT'LAKE COUNTY 
^ puty Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DIVISION 
JUSTIN FINCH, 
Plaintiff, 
RICHARD M. OVERMAN and ; 
WERNER ENTERPRISES, INC, ; 
Defendants. • ' •] 
• '•< 
) FINDINGS OF FACT and CONCLUSIONS 
) OF LAW 
) Civil No. 050912066 • • •: 
Judge John Paul Kennedy -
' This matter came before the Court for a bench trial on November 5 and 6, 2008. Plaintiff 
was represented by Daniel F. Bertch of Bertch-Robson. • Defendant was represented by Heinz J. 
Mahler and Scott C. Powers of Kipp & Christian. Based upon the evidence presented at the trial, 
the Court enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: • 
Findings of Fact: 
The Plaintiff: 
. 1. Plaintiff Justin Finch (herein, "Finch") is a resident of Milford, Utah. He is now 
32 years old. 
2. • Finch is married with two children. He graduated from high school and has 
worked as a truck driver and equipment operator. He has been a truck driver for 
1 
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approximately 12-13 years, having received his Commercial Drivers License 
about 12 years ago. As a driver he'earned about $3,100 per month. He has never 
received any formal training in this career. Specifically, Finch testified that he 
had not received any training regarding-truck speed under various conditions. He 
. conceded that he has a duty to stop for slow or stopped traffic. 
The Finch Incident: 
3. On the morning of January 25, 2004, about 11:20 a.m., Finch was operating a , 
north-bound semi-tractor pulling a trailer on 1-15 at mile post 133. The trailer 
carried a full load of milk. Finch worked for Bradshaw Trucking, which was the 
owner of the equipment. Finch was driving to Salt Lake City and had driven this 
stretch on 1-15 with the same type of equipment two or three times per week for 
• 18 months. 
4. Finch began his run at about 8 a.m. He refueled in Beaver and then headed north 
on 1-15, bound for Meadow Gold on the west side of the Salt Lake Valley. He" 
had no passengers with him.. 
5. , Earlier on that day, there had been light rain and some snow. The sky was cloudy 
and the pavement was wet arid maybe a little slushy in places. Generally, on 1-15, 
• ; the road was wet, but clear of snow. 
6. Finch was following another truck driven by Jeff Atkin, a co-worker. Finch 
stayed about a quarter-mile behind Atkin to avoid spray from Atkin's truck. As 
they approached the place of the incident, however, Finch believed that the 
2 
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distance separating him from Atkin decreased to approximately one-eighth of a 
. mile. Their speeds were* approximately the same. 
As Highway 1-15 runs north from the town of Beaver, Utah, the terrain is initially 
generally flat. As the road continues to the location of the subject incident, it 
encounters some hills. Just south of the point of the incident, 1-15 reaches the 
crest of a hill. The video prepared by Defendant's Expert, David Lord, shows 
that 1-15 proceeds north along terrain which rises, levels, and then descends on a-
6% negative slope to the point of the incident. ' Approaching the point of the 
incident, both Finch and Atkin were moving at about 55 mph in the right lane of. 
the two north-bound lanes. Finch's speed was well below the posted speed of 75 
mph. Finch testified that he may have slowed a little more as he moved up the 
hill to the crest located south of the point of the incident. On cross-examination, 
Finch admitted that during his deposition he wasn't certain of his speed, but that 
he felt that it was a safe speed. Finch also stated that prior to the incident, he saw 
no warning lights1 and heard no warnings over the CB radio.2 The Court finds 
that Finch was unaware, of the Overman accident3 or of any backup, on the 
highway prior to his incident. Finch disagreed with the* estimate of the Highway 
. Patrol Trooper's report that he was moving at 75 mph. The Court does not credit 
"the Trooper's estimate. The Trooper was not monitoring Finch's speed at.the 
1
 Trooper Derek Spencer said that another trooper had proceeded south on 1-15 with his warning 
lights flashing. The testimony was unclear, however, whether Finch could have reasonably been able to 
see that trooper's vehicle or lights from the other side of the highway' (assuming they passed each otlier). 
2
 • Finch said that he and Atkin were in constant communication over the CB radio, but that they 
were on their own separate channel. 
3 See Findings 10 -17 for information regarding the Overman accident. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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time of the incident, and his estimate conflicts with the testimony of Finch, Atkin, 
Andrews, and Lord. The Court finds that Finch's speed was reasonable for. the 
conditions. -. 
8. As Atkin approached a point at approximately mile, marker 133, Atkin apparently 
saw some vehicles stopped'on the highway before him, and he applied his brakes 
• to avoid hitting them. Atkin testified that "cars were right there immediately"; he 
"was surprised and scared to death." When Atkin applied his brakes, he also 
swerved his vehicle to the right onto the paved shoulder! By moving his truck on 
to the shoulder lane of 1-15, Atkin was able to bring his vehicle to a stop without 
running, into any of the vehicles that were already stopped on the highway. 
Seeing the brake lights from Atkin's vehicle, Finch testified that he slammed on 
' his brakes -and tried also to go on to the shoulder. Because Atkin was already 
occupying the paved shoulder area,'however, Finch felt he was forced to go 
further off the road to the right to avoid a possible collision. Thie terrain to the 
right of the roadway consisted of an up-hill embankment. As Finch's truck 
proceeded up the embankment, it rolled over, almost one revolution. Finch 
testified that there were no baffles in the tanker to prevent the load from sloshing 
back and forth or side to side. The lack of baffles requires more skill and care by 
the driver and makes lane changes more difficult. 
The Overman Accident: 
9. About one hour prior to the Finch accident, another collision (herein, the 
"Overman accident") had occurred on 1-15 at a point about .4 of a mile north of 
mile post 133 (or about .3 of a mile north of the Finch accident). The Overman 
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accident took place on flat ground. At the time of the Overman accident, 
however, the visibility conditions along 1-15 were limited. 
Defendant Richard Overman (herein, "Overman") was a very experienced truck 
driver who worked for Defendant trucking company Werner Enterprises-. 
Overman had been a truck driver for 35 years. Overman had been trained in the 
. Army and received other training over the years with his employers. He had 
worked for Werner since 1987. During his service, he had received 15 one-year 
safety awards and a million-mile safety award which was presented to him after 
11 years of service with Werner. 
Overman was proceeding, north on 1-15, following behind a Toyota driven by 
Stetson Lords. As he crested the hill south of mile post 133, Overman stated that 
his speed was about 60 mph, which he believed to be safe at the time. When he 
reached the flat terrain at the bottom of the hill, however, he approached what was 
described as a snow-caused "white-out" condition. The Toyota had entered into 
the white-out ahead of him and had apparently slowed. Overman's vehicle was 
unable to slow sufficiently to avoid the Lords' Toyota and it crashed into the rear 
end of the Toyota. Overman's vehicle was moving at a speed of 68 mph .at the 
time of the crash. The Toyota was going about 25 mph. There was 30 inches of 
vehicle crush in the collision. . 
, The Overman truck and the Toyota were stuck together. and could not be 
separated. In addition, a passenger in the Toyota was trapped and could not exit 
the Toyota. Thus, the two vehicles created a road block in the right lane of 1-15. 
Initially, some traffic was able to go slowly past the Overman accident site in the 
left lane, but when emergency vehicles arrived at the scene, the highway heading 
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• north became entirely blocked. Emergency vehicles parked alongside" the 
. Overman crash as emergency personnel worked to extricate the trapped passenger 
from the Toyota. 
13: ' The Court finds that Overman was working, in the scope and course of his 
employment as an agent for Werner at the time of the Overman accident* Further, 
the Court finds that Overman was operating his vehicle at too great a speed when 
he entered the white-out and did not slow sufficiently as he approached the white-
out to avoid colliding with the Toyota. 
14. The Court finds that Ovennan did not exercise reasonable care in. the operation of 
his vehicle in that he was driving too fast for the conditions he faced. The Court 
therefore finds that Overman was negligent. 
15. After the Overman accident, Overman got out of his truck and attempted to assist 
the trapped Toyota passenger. Overman testified that the weather began to clear; 
and the road began to dry out. He testified that an hour later, at the time of the 
Finch accident, the weather was "nice" with no visibility problems. . 
16. Overman stayed by his. truck and was aware that the highway traffic behind him 
• was backing up. As he looked south at the line of vehicles stopped behind his 
truck about an hour after his own collision, he observed the Finch accident. At 
the time, Overman was' speaking with a Highway Patrol trooper and could see the 
vehicles behind him backed all the way up to the crest of the hill about .3 of a 
mile distant. He then saw Finch's truck "go air-borne." 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Finch's Injuries: 
17. . Prior to the accident, Finch was generally asymptomatic for about eight years. He 
considered himself in good condition, being active and healthy. He had injured' 
his shoulder as a young boy and reported back problems in the mid-1990t"s. . 
18. • Finch testified that he remembers hitting his head as his truck rolled. . After 
exiting his vehicle, Finch immediately lay down on the ground, near the highway . 
because his "back was hurting really bad between [his] shoulder blades." He was 
' . also concerned about pain in his eye. 
19. Not long after the Finch accident, emergency medical technicians took Finch to. 
the hospital" in Fillmore. Finch found the ride to the hospital to be miserable 
because he was strapped to a board. At the hospital, he was required to wait for 
the hospital's medical personal to stabilize a victim from the Overman accident. 
After about an.hour, Finch was taken to have some x-rays. Finally, he was • 
released, and his wife picked him up and took him home. He had cuts on top of 
his head and. face. At home he was pretty sore, and he did not go back to work. 
• The pain intensified. His eye was bleeding and he had glass in his ear. He made 
an appointment with Dr. Albrecht, an ophthalmologist in Beaver. He went to the 
Milford'Clinic for a cat scan of his head, neck and back." Also, he had a MRI. * 
Finch complained of pain in both shoulders,, with increasing problems in his right 
shoulder. Finch saw an orthopedic surgeon (Dr.- Nakken) in Cedar City for his 
right shoulder. Finch proceeded with the recommended physical therapy in the 
Milford hospital. 
20. Finch pursued physical therapy, but his right shoulder did not improve 
significantly. His doctor tried a medicated injection without success. After more 
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physical therapy, Finch noticed improvement in his range of motion, but found 
that his pain was still present. • Dr. Nakken then recommended surgery. After 
surgery, there was.more physical therapy. . 
Finch missed work from January 25 to about June 15, 2004, eventually returning 
to work on light duty and then full-time as a truck driver. 
• During the first year following surgery, Finch saw his doctor two or three times. 
He has since seen his doctor a couple of additional times. Currently, Finch still 
has back pain in his mid-back, which is more bothersome in winter. His condition 
plateaued about two years ago. His shoulder improved after surgery, but still is 
painful. He has some minor scarring above his left eye and in his scalp. 
Finch testified that despite his injuries he has been able to continue many of his 
past activities such as performing household chores, hauling wood, and pursuing 
recreational activities. He can do these things now with pain. His shoulder hurts 
every day. -
Finch's back problem was diagnosed as' a strain, a soft tissue injury with no 
broken, bones,- Although Finch testified that he did not remember having any 
previous back problems., the records of the emergency treatment at the Filmore 
hospital noted that he had said he had prior back pain.. Also, the Milford clinic 
records dated 1993, indicated that Finch saw Chiropractor Tom McGin for a 
problem with his right knee. In addition, also in 1993, Finch had an x-ray and 
reported a history of back pain to Milford Clinic. In 1995, Finch twisted his back 
and went back to work a day or two later. In 1996, he reported a back problem to 
the Milford Clinic. From 1996 to the date of the accident in 2004, no additional 
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back problems were reflected in Finch's medical records,, As already noted, 
. Finch was asymptomatic for about eight years prior to the accident. 
25. Finch renewed his CDL in July 2004, which required a certification of physical 
capability to drive. He has received no additional'medical treatment since the 
summer of 2004. 
Expert Testimony: 
26. The testimony of the experts in this case was conflicting. Perhaps the most 
'significant conflict appeared in the experts' respective determinations of when 
Finch was able to see the problem ahead of him on the highway. Plaintiff's 
expert Dennis Andrews testified on direct that Finch would have needed about 
610 feet to steer his vehicle to the right and to stop his vehicle at an initial speed 
of 55 mph. On cross-examination, Andrews stated that the required reaction.and 
stopping distance was at a minimum 456 feet, depending upon assumptions.4 
Andrews agreed that if Finch had more time to react and stop, he could have done 
so without running off the road. However, Andrews concluded that given the 
time that Finch actually did have, and taking into account the distance required to 
steer to the right and stop, Finch made a good decision to run off the road to avoid 
possibly hitting other vehicles. ! ' 
27. Defendant's expert David Lord testified that the 'crest of the hill was 2,000 feet 
south of the point of Finch's final resting point. In his opinion, Finch had more 
than sufficient time to stop his vehicle "multiple times" without any problem. He 
4 Andrews noted that there were differences and unknowns existing in the coefficient of friction for 
the road, shoulder, and embankments. His 456 foot estimate did not include the 240 feet Andrews said 
were needed to steer the vehicle to the right. In addition, he observed that the location of the last vehicle 
in the stopped line of traffic at the time of the accident was unknown. 
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further estimated that the distance needed to stop Finch's vehicle at 55 mph 
. would have been only about 330 feet.5 ' 
28. The Court carefully studied and re:studied the video presented as an exhibit by 
Defendants. The video was filmed by Lord during his preparation of his report. 
The Court finds, however, that the video does not support the opinions and 
findings of Lord. The most significant point of conflict is with respect to Lord's 
determination as to the "crest of the hill" While Lord testified that the crest of 
the hill was 2,000 feet from Finch's final stopping place,6 the Court's review of 
the video would place the crest of the hill about 600 feet from the final stopping 
place. This difference is explained by the fact that the top of the hill" is relatively 
•flat with a. downward break occurring about 600 feet from the stopping point. 
The Court finds that the video shows that a truck approaching on the other side of 
the highway is not visible until one reaches approximately the 133 mile marker • 
post, which is about one-tenth a mile south from the Finch crash site. This is 
confirmed by the upper 008 photo exhibit. Indeed, the Court finds that there is a 
blind-spot on the downhill side of the crest, which prevented a driver moving' 
north from being able to see a line of backed-up traffic.7 Hence, the Court finds 
that the 2,000-foot stopping distance determined by Lord is riot credible. Instead, . 
5
 Lord used a different coefficient of friction from that used by Andrews and did not include any 
distance to steer the vehicle to the right 
*&*" 
6
 The Defendants maintain that Finch would have had an even better view of the road because 
Finch sat in his truck cab which was higher off the ground than Lord's camera. This position, however, 
fails to discount Finch's sight-line which would have been obstructed by Atkin's truck in front of him. 
The Defendants point out that the Highway Patrol report shows that the trooper did not mark that 
the crest of the hill was a factor. On this point, the Court finds that the video shows otherwise. 
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the Court credits Andrews* determination that the available stopping distance was 
. about 610 feet. 
' 29. Based upon the calculations offered by Andrews, which the Court finds to be 
. ' * more reliable than those offered by Lord, the Court finds that Finch"reacted with 
reasonable care under the circumstances, which included the unanticipated road 
. blockage from the Overman accident and the blind spot on the downward slope of 
1-15. ' ' 
The Relationship Between the Finch and Overman Accidents:. 
30.' The Defendants contended that the time and "distance' separating the Finch 
accident from the earlier Overman accident were sufficient to require a finding 
that Overman's negligence was not a contributing cause of the Finch accident. 
The Court, however, finds as- a matter of fact that a reasonable person would have 
' been able to foresee that a serious collision such as occurred in the Overman 
• accident would result in.a blockage of the highway for a- substantial period of 
time, which in turn would result in a lengthy backup of highway traffic. But for 
the Overman accident, the road would not have been blocked.and traffic backed 
up at the time Finch approached. Also, the Court finds that the traffic flow had 
not yet returned to normal, and there was a continuing risk persisting from the 
Overman accident. Moreover, given the fact that Overman had just passed over 
the crest of the "hill, he would also have been aware that there is a blind-spot 
which would create a hazard for vehicles heading north and approaching the 
backed-up traffic. Thus, the Court finds that for a driver such as Overman, it was 
reasonably foreseeable that if an accident occurred four-tenths of a mile north of 
mile post 133, a line of stopped, backed-up traffic would form and that vehicles 
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•approaching the last vehicles in the stopped and backed up line would be 
hampered by the. blind-spot on the road and would likely be required to take 
evasive action to avoid a collision. 
Finch's Damages:' 
'31. The Court finds that Finch was asymptomatic for about eight years prior to the 
accident. His treatment in the'emergency room at the hospital and his. subsequent 
treatment were identified in the medical records as being related to the accident'. 
Moreover, it was obvious to a lay person that Finch's injuries were caused by the' 
accident, given the length of time that Finch had been asymptomatic prior to the 
accident and the immediate appearance of the injuries following the accident. 
Thus, the Court finds that the injuries and medical expenses were causally related 
to the accident. The total medical expenses incurred were about $14,000, which-
were paid by workers' compensation/insurance. Because the bills were paid by 
insurance/workers' compensation and indicated their relation to treatment for 
injuries sustained in the accident, the Court finds that the medical expenses 
incurred by Finch were necessary. The Court also finds that the amounts of such 
medical expenses were reasonable. In addition to the fact that they were paid, 
under applicable insurance, no evidence was submitted to contest their 
reasonableness. The Court further finds that as a result of the accident, Finch 
missed five months' work and that he had been'earning about $3,100 per month 
prior to the accident. Hence, his earnings' loss was $15,500. 
32. In addition, Finch has incurred pain and suffering due to the accident. He 
incurred pain at the time of the accident and subsequently during his medical 
treatment. He continues to have pain four years after the accident. The Court 
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• finds that despite his pain, Finch is still able to work and to function in a 
. relatively normal manner. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Finch's 
general damages total $40,000. . 
Conclusions of Law: 
A. Overman was negligent, and his negligence proximately caused the Finch 
accident. Overman had a duty to exercise reasonable care toward all travelers on 
the highway who could reasonably be foreseen to be affected by his negligent act 
at the time he did such act. Overman breached this duty in crashing into the 
Toyota arid causing subsequent backed up traffic on 1-15. But for the Overman 
• accident, there.would have been no backup on 1-15 at the time that Finch 
• approached. . It was foreseeable that an accident of the serious nature of the 
Overman accident could back up traffic for an hour after the accident and for a 
substantial distance behind the location of the accident. Thus, the dangerous 
conditions caused by the Overman accident were persisting- at the time of the 
Finch accident,-and the traffic flow had not yet returned to normal. See, e.g., 
Wing'v. Morse, 300 A.2d 491, 496 (Me. 1973) (holding that where a second 
accident occurred more than ten minutes after the' first accident, and where the 
second accident occurred while the highway was still clogged with traffic.from 
the first accident and before the lane blocked by the first accident had been 
cleared, the risks created by the negligence of the party who caused the first 
accident were still viable and could properly be. considered the proximate cause of 
the second accident); Marshall v. Nugent, 222 F. 2d 604, 612-613 (1st Cir. 1955) 
(holding that where a second accident occurred while the traffic situation caused 
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. by a prior accident was still persisting, not after the traffic flow had become 
normal again, the prior accident could properly be considered the proximate cause 
of the second accident). Moreover, a driver of Overman's skill and experience 
could reasonably foresee the danger a backup would cause in- light of the blind-
spot on the downward slope prior to the Finch accident scene. Marshall, 222 F. 
2d at 610-611 (holding that although it might be impossible to predict in advance 
just how a negligent act could subsequently work out to another's injury, that is 
not a bar to causation and recovery). Finally, no intervening acts by other parties 
cut off the causation due to the Overman accident and became superseding 
causes. While the Highway Patrol.and other emergency personnel were on the 
scene, their acts were not out of the ordinary so as to become superseding acts. 
No Utah appellate courts have dealt .with the effect of the presence of police and 
emergency personnel on the causation of a subsequent accident, but other 
jurisdictions have held that causation is not cut off as a matter of law as a result of 
the police assuming control of an accident scene. See Weary v. Holmes, 249 
A.D.2d 957,: 957-958 (NT. App. Div. 1998) (holding that where subsequent 
accidents occurred despite the efforts of police to warn.motorists of the first 
accident obstructing .the road, the. acts' of the police officers were not so 
extraordinary under the circumstances to be viewed as superseding acts breaking 
the causal link as a matter of law); Vanderbeek v. Cordon', 125 A.2d 531, 532-535 
(NJ." Super. Ct. App. Div. 1956) (where police took charge of first accident scene 
40 minutes before second accident occurred, actions of police and elapsed time 
were not conclusive as a matter of law that the police intervened and cut off the 
effect of the negligence from the first accident). 
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As a result of the Finch accident, Finch suffered injuries and incurred damages in 
the amounts of:-medical damages $14,000; lost earnings $15,500; and general 
damages for pain and suffering $40,000. .Finch's injuries were caused by the 
accident, and this was obvious to an ordinary lay person based on the long time 
period of eight years prior to. the accident during which Finch was asymptomatic 
' and the- immediate appearance of symptoms following the accident. Therefore, 
Finch was not required to use expert testimony to prove causation of his injuries. 
But see-Fox v. Brigham Young Univ., 2007 UT App 406, f|[22-23, 176 P.3d 446 
(holding that, expert testimony on causation of injuries is required where the 
injury involves obscure medical factors beyond the ordinary lay person's 
knowledge, and that it is only in obvious cases that a plaintiff is excepted from 
using expert testimony). However, the Court concludes that the Fox case is 
distinguishable from the circumstances of this case because the plaintiff in Fox 
told medical personnel that her knee had given out, causing her to fall, and that 
she had been diagnosed with osteoarthritis in that knee. Id. at f23. In this case, 
while Finch had experienced prior back pain and had a prior shoulder injury, he 
had not experienced symptoms of either injury for over eight years until such 
symptoms appeared immediately following the accident, so the cause of his 
injuries would be obvious to the ordinary lay person.. Moreover, Finch's medical 
expenses are necessary and reasonable where they were paid by workers' 
compensation and'where they were identified as related to treatment for.injuries 
suffered in the accident. See Stevenett v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1999 UT App 80, 
H28-32. • •' " .. 
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C. There was no comparative negligence on the part of Finch. Finch was driving.at a • 
" . reasonable speed prior to. the accident. Finch was unaware of the.Overman 
accident and its accompanying traffic tie-up, and his actions were reasonable in 
light of the stopped traffic on the highway and the blind spot caused by the 
downhill slope of the highway. Although Finch had a duty to stop for slowed or 
stopped traffic, he did not have a duty to stop, for traffic he was unaware of or 
could not see. Thus,* Finch was. not negligent in his actions and cannot be 
• ' .comparatively negligent. 
D. Because Defendant Overman at all relevant times in this, matter was working . 
' . within the course and scope of his employment, his employer Werner Enterprises 
is legally responsible for his negligence and the damages incurred herein. 
Dated: 1^/^fO^ .... 
' . - ' • ' BYTHECOURT: 
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RICKY L JOHNSON, CLINTON KIDMAN, 
ALLRED AUTOBODY, LLC, a Utah 
limited liability corporation, 
Defendants. 
REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT RICKY L. JOHNSON'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 100100231 
Judge Ben Hadfield 
COMES NOW Defendant Ricky L. Johnson, by and through his counsel of 
record, and submits the following Reply to Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant Ricky L. Johnson's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Court should grant Defendant Johnson's motion for summary judgment 
because there are no material issues of fact as to whether Mr. Johnson was a 
proximate cause of Plaintiff's injuries. After Mr. Johnson slid into the median on I-84, he Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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was not a hazard to any motorist on the road in either direction of travel. He then 
contacted the Utah Highway Patrol to request roadside assistance. It was only after the ( 
Highway Patrol sent Defendant Kidman to the scene and after Defendant Kidman 
unilaterally determined how to pull Mr. Johnson's vehicle out of the median that the 
conditions arose which led to the Plaintiff's injuries. Mr. Johnson neither controlled nor 
contributed to the way in which those conditions arose. Therefore, he was not a 
proximate cause of the Plaintiff's injuries and the Court should grant Mr. Johnson's t 
motion for summary judgment. 
II. STATEMENT OF UNCONTESTED MATERIAL FACTS1 
< 
1. On February 17, 2009, Defendant Ricky L. Johnson was traveling 
eastbound on Interstate 84 near Tremonton, Utah. (Dep. of Ricky L. Johnson 4:1-24, 
Ex. A; Compl. TJ7.) 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE: "Plaintiff admits this statement of fact for the 
purposes of responding to this motion." (PL's Mem. in Opp. to Mot. for Summ. J . 3.) 
2. As Mr. Johnson travelled eastbound, it began to snow. (Dep. of Ricky L. 
Johnson 5:21 to 6:1, Ex. A.) 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE: "Plaintiff admits this statement of fact for the 
purposes of responding to this motion." (PL's Mem. in Opp. to Mot. for Summ. J . 3.) 
1
 Reproduced from Mr. Johnson's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and 
incorporating Plaintiffs responses from his Memorandum in Opposition. 
2 
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3. Mr. Johnson lost control of his vehicle and slid off of the road into the 
median near an area known as Rattlesnake Pass, eastbound on 1-84. (Dep. of Ricky L. 
Johnson 8:11-15, Ex. A; Compl. H 7.) 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE: "Plaintiff admits this statement of fact for the 
purposes of responding to this motion." (PL's Mem. in Opp. to Mot. for Summ. J . 3.) 
4. After his vehicle came to a stop in the median, Mr. Johnson called the 
Utah Highway Patrol to request highway assistance. (Dep. of Ricky L. Johnson 9:17 to 
10:10, Ex. A.) 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE: "Plaintiff admits this statement of fact for the 
purposes of responding to this motion." (PL's Mem. in Opp. to Mot. for Summ. J . 3.) 
5. Mr. Johnson requested that the state shut down the interstate due to icy 
conditions that existed where he slid off the freeway, but the state refused to do so. 
(Dep. of Ricky L Johnson 9:20 to 10:6, Ex. A.) 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE: "Plaintiff objects to this statement of fact to the 
extent that it is not supported by the evidence. Defendant testified that he called the 
police, and they told Defendant that he did not have the authority to shut down the 
freeway. There is no evidence in the record that the police "refused" to shut down the 
freeway. (See Deposition of Ricky L. Johnson, pgs. 9-10, attached as Exhibit A [to PL's 
Mem. in Opp. to Mot. for Summ. J.].)" (PL's Mem. in Opp. to Mot. for Summ. J . 3.) 
DEFENDANT'S REPLY: Mr. Johnson's deposition speaks for itself on this point. 
The record is clear that Mr. Johnson made the request and that the State responded to 
3 
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the request negatively. However, it is immaterial to the issue of whether Mr. Johnson 
proximately caused the Plaintiff's injuries whether or not the State refused to shut down 
the interstate at Mr. Johnson's request. (See Dep. of Ricky L. Johnson 9:17 to 10:10, 
Def.'sEx.A.) 
6. Police dispatch contacted Defendant Allred Autobody, a state authorized 
tow truck operator, and requested that the company provide highway assistance to Mr. 
Johnson. (Dep. of Ricky L. Johnson 10:7-8, Ex. A; Dep. of Clinton J . Kidman 16:20-22, 
50:20-24, Ex. B; Compl. fl 8.) 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE: "Plaintiff admits this statement of fact for the 
purposes of responding to this motion." (PL's Mem. in Opp. to Mot. for Summ. J . 3.) 
7. Allred Autobody sent an employee, Defendant Clinton Kidman, in a tow 
truck to provide highway assistance to Mr. Johnson. (Dep. of Ricky L. Johnson 10:7-8, 
Ex. A; Dep. of Clinton J . Kidman 16:20-22, Ex. B; Compl. fl 8.) 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE: "Plaintiff admits this statement of fact for the 
purposes of responding to this motion." (PL's Mem. in Opp. to Mot. for Summ. J . 3.) 
8. Defendant Kidman did not arrive to the scene until roughly 20 minutes 
after Mr. Johnson called 911.2 (Dep. of Clinton J . Kidman 17:1-6, Ex. B.) 
2
 Defendant Ricky Johnson recalls that it took Mr. Kidman between 35 and 45 minutes to arrive on the 
scene from the time that his car slid into the median. (See Dep. of Ricky L. Johnson 10:11-13.) 
However, on summary judgment, the "facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom [are viewed] in 
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, H 6, 177 P.3d 600. 
Therefore, this memorandum incorporates Mr. Kidman's recollection of how long it took him to arrive on 
the scene after receiving the call to assist Mr. Johnson because Mr. Kidman's time frame is more 
favorable to the Plaintiff and to the other Defendants. 
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PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE: "Plaintiff admits this statement of fact for the 
purposes of responding to this motion." (PL's Mem. in Opp. to Mot. for Summ. J. 3.) 
9. Once Defendant Kidman arrived on the scene, Mr. Johnson did not direct, 
give advice on, or control how Defendant Kidman went about extricating Mr. Johnson's 
car from the median. (Dep. of Clinton J. Kidman 52:9 to 53:14, Ex. B.) 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE: "Plaintiff admits this statement of fact for the 
purposes of responding to this motion." (PL's Mem. in Opp. to Mot. for Summ. J. 3.) 
10. It took Mr. Kidman at least 10 more minutes to remove Mr. Johnson's 
vehicle from the median after Mr. Kidman arrived on the scene. (Dep. of Clinton J. 
Kidman 46:21 to 47:6, Ex. B.) 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE: "Plaintiff admits this statement of fact for the 
purposes of responding to this motion." (PL's Mem. in Opp. to Mot. for Summ. J. 3.) 
11. Mr. Kidman finished removing Mr. Johnson's vehicle from the median and 
pulled it up onto the pavement. (Dep. of Clinton J. Kidman 54:23 to 55:7, Ex. B.) 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE: "Plaintiff admits this statement of fact for the 
purposes of responding to this motion." (PL's Mem. in Opp. to Mot. for Summ. J. 4.) 
12. Mr. Kidman suggested to Mr. Johnson that they move to a location off of 
the freeway to complete the paperwork for the tow due to the conditions on the road at 
the time. (Dep. of Clinton J. Kidman 29:23 to 30:4, 55:8-13, Ex. B.) 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE: "Plaintiff objects to this statement of fact to the 
extent that it is incomplete. Mr. Kidman suggested to Defendant that they move to a 
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location off the freeway because 'People [we]re going to—you know, we're going to get 
hurt.' Defendant then turned around and started waiving for traffic to slow down. (See 
Deposition of Clinton J . Kidman, pgs. 28-30, attached as Exhibit B [to PL's Mem. in 
Opp. to Mot. for Summ. J.].) Mr. Kidman's testimony makes it clear that both he and 
Defendant could foresee that their vehicles on the side of the road posed a hazard to 
oncoming motorists and that is why they were going to move their vehicles." (PL's 
Mem. in Opp. to Mot. for Summ. J . 4.) 
DEFENDANT'S REPLY: Plaintiff's additions to the substantive record are 
immaterial to the issue of whether Mr. Johnson was a proximate cause of Plaintiff's 
injuries. Mr. Johnson further objects to Plaintiff's response because it includes improper 
argument in ascribing motive to the actions and statements of Mr. Johnson and Mr. 
Kidman. 
13. Plaintiff Christopher Dee was also traveling eastbound on Interstate 84 on 
February 17, 2009. (Compl. U 11.) 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE: "Plaintiff admits this statement of fact for the 
purposes of responding to this motion." (PL's Mem. in Opp. to Mot. for Summ. J . 4.) 
14. Plaintiff arrived at the scene after Defendant Kidman removed Mr. 
Johnson's vehicle from the median and was preparing to leave the scene. (Dep. of 
Clinton J . Kidman 29:15 to 30:8, Ex. B.) 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE: "Plaintiff objects to this statement of fact to the 
extent that it is inconsistent with Defendant's testimony. Defendant Johnson testified 
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that his vehicle was still hooked up to Mr. Kidman s tow truck when the accident 
happened, even though Mr. Kidman testified that he had already unhooked Defendant's 
vehicle by that time. (See Exhibit A [to PL's Mem. in Opp. to Mot. for Summ. J.], pg. 42; 
and Exhibit B [to PL's Mem. in Opp. to Mot. for Summ. J.], pg. 28.)" (PL's Mem. in Opp. 
to Mot. for Summ. J . 4.) 
DEFENDANT'S REPLY: Whether Mr. Johnson's vehicle was still attached to the 
tow truck or not is immaterial to the question of whether Mr. Johnson was a proximate 
cause of Plaintiff's injuries because, by that time, Mr. Johnson's presence on the side of 
the road was wholly the result of Mr. Kidman's decisions in operating the tow truck. 
15. Plaintiff's vehicle struck the tow truck driven by Defendant Clinton Kidman. 
(Dep. of Clinton J . Kidman 31:15-20, 33:14 to 34:4, Ex. B; Compl. U 11.) 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE: "Plaintiff admits this statement of fact for the 
purposes of responding to this motion." (PL's Mem. in Opp. to Mot. for Summ. J . 4.) 
16. The collision between the Plaintiffs vehicle and the tow truck resulted in 
serious injury to the Plaintiff. (Dep. of Clinton J . Kidman 35:4-5, Ex. B; Compl. ^ 12.) 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE: "Plaintiff admits this statement of fact for the 
purposes of responding to this motion." (PL's Mem. in Opp. to Mot. for Summ. J . 4.) 
17. The injuries that the Plaintiff suffered in the subject accident were such 
that Plaintiff has no memory of the events leading up to or following the subject 
accident. (Dep. of Christopher Dee 9:1-7, Ex. C.) 
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PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE: "Plaintiff admits this statement of fact for the 
purposes of responding to this motion." (PL's Mem. in Opp. to Mot. for Summ. J . 5.) 
18. Plaintiff brought claims against Defendant Ricky L Johnson for 
negligence. (Compl. fflj 14-18.) 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE: "Plaintiff admits this statement of fact for the 
purposes of responding to this motion." (PL's Mem. in Opp. to Mot. for Summ. J. 5.) 
III. REPLY TO STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS3 
PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS #1: In the morning of 
February 17, 2009, Defendant Johnson was driving his 1994 Honda Civic eastbound on 
I-84 near Tremonton, Utah. (See Exhibit A [from PL's Mem. in Opp. to Mot. for Summ. 
J.,pgs. 4-5.) 
REPLY: Defendant Johnson admits this statement of fact for the purposes of the 
instant motion. 
PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS #2: As Defendant was 
driving, it started to snow and the freeway became very slick with snow and ice. (See 
Exhibit A [to PL's Mem. in Opp. to Mot. for Summ. J.], pg. 4; and Utah Highway Patrol 
Photos, attached as Exhibit C [to PL's Mem. in Opp. to Mot. for Summ. J.].) 
REPLY: Defendant Johnson admits this statement of fact for the purposes of the 
instant motion. However, Defendant Johnson objects to Plaintiff's Exhibit C because 
3
 Statements of Additional Facts are copied verbatim from Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition. 
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there is no foundation to support the proposition that it shows a true and correct image 
of the condition of the roadway at the time of the subject accident. 
PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS #3: Defendant lost control 
of his vehicle in the snow and ice and slid off the freeway into the median. (See Exhibit 
A [to PL's Mem. in Opp. to Mot. for Summ. J.], pg. 8.) 
REPLY: Defendant Johnson admits this statement of fact for the purposes of the 
instant motion. 
PLAINTIFFS STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS #4: Defendant called the 
police for help, and they said that they would send a tow truck to assist him. (See 
Exhibit A [to PL's Mem, in Opp. to Mot, for Summ. J.I, pgs. 9-10.) 
REPLY: Defendant Johnson admits this statement of fact for the purposes of the 
instant motion. 
PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS #5: Nothing out of the 
ordinary happened between when Defendant contacted the police and the tow truck 
arrived. However, Defendant>"[s]at there in solitude, scared to death that somebody 
else would slide off and hit [him]." (See Exhibit A [to PL's Mem. in Opp. to Mot. for 
Summ. J.], pg. 10.) In other words, Defendant admits that he could foresee that other 
accidents may happen in the area. 
REPLY: Mr. Johnson strenuously objects to the argument that Plaintiff makes in 
his Statement of Additional Facts #5. Mr. Johnson admits to the material facts in item 
#5: that nothing out of the ordinary happened between the time that he contacted the 
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police and the time that the tow truck arrived, that he sat in solitude, and that he was 
scared to death that somebody else would slide off the interstate and hit him. 
PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS #6: The tow truck driver, 
Clinton Kidman, arrived at the scene within 20 minutes. (See Exhibit B [to PL's Mem. in 
Opp. to Mot. for Summ. J.], pg. 17.) 
REPLY: Defendant Johnson admits this statement of fact for the purposes of the 
instant motion. 
PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS #7: When Mr. Kidman 
arrived, the asphalt was covered with a solid sheet of ice and there was a slope to the 
median where Defendant's vehicle was located. (See Exhibit A [to PL's Mem. in Opp. to 
Mot. for Summ. J.], pg. 14; and Exhibit B [to PL's Mem. in Opp. to Mot. for Summ. J.], 
pgs. 26-7.) 
REPLY: Defendant Johnson admits this statement of fact for the purposes of the 
instant motion. 
PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS #8: However, it only took 
Mr. Kidman about 10 minutes to pull Defendant's vehicle out of the median and back 
onto the freeway. (See Exhibit A [to PL's Mem. in Opp. to Mot. for Summ. J.], pg. 21.) 
REPLY: Defendant Johnson admits this statement of fact as to the timeframe for 
the purposes of the instant motion. While it is immaterial to the instant motion, the 
record is unclear whether Mr. Kidman had pulled Mr. Johnson's vehicle "back onto the 
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freeway." (See Dep. of Ricky L. Johnson 18:3-5, Def.'s Ex. A. to Mem. in Supp. of Mot. 
forSumm. J.) 
PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS #9: As their vehicles were 
sitting on the freeway, Mr. Kidman suggested to Defendant that they move them off the 
freeway because "[p]eople [we]re going to—you know, we're going to get hurt." 
Defendant Johnson then turned around and started waiving for traffic to slow down. 
{See Exhibit B [to PL's Mem. in Opp. to Mot. for Summ. J.], pgs. 28-30.) 
REPLY: Defendant Johnson admits this statement of fact for the purposes of the 
instant motion except for the portion that states that "their vehicles were sitting on the 
freeway" and that Mr. Kidman suggested that they "move off the freeway." As stated in 
Mr. Johnson's reply to item #8, supra, the record is unclear about whether they were "on 
the freeway." However, whether his vehicle and the tow truck were on the freeway or to 
the side of the freeway is immaterial to the issue of whether Mr. Johnson was a 
proximate cause of the Plaintiff's injuries. 
PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS #10: While Defendant and 
Mr. Kidman were still parked on the freeway, Plaintiff Christopher Dee and his girlfriend, 
Julie Hunsaker, were driving back home from a trip to Sun Valley. (See Deposition of 
Julie Hunsaker[footnoteomitted], pg. 20, attached as Exhibit D [to PL's Mem. in Opp. to Mot. 
for Summ. J.].) 
REPLY: Defendant Johnson admits this statement of fact for the purposes of the 
instant motion. 
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PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS #11: As they were 
approaching the location where Defendant and Mr. Kidman were on the freeway, they 
saw that several other vehicles had also slid off the freeway. (See Exhibit D [to PL's 
Mem. in Opp. to Mot. for Summ. J.], pg. 26.) 
REPLY: Defendant Johnson admits this statement of fact for the purposes of the 
instant motion except for the portion that states that "Defendant and Mr. Kidman were 
on the freeway." As stated in Mr. Johnson's reply to item #8, supra, the record is 
unclear on this point. However, whether his vehicle and the tow truck were on the 
freeway or to the side of the freeway is immaterial to the issue of whether Mr. Johnson 
was a proximate cause of the Plaintiff s injuries. 
PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS #12: Plaintiff tried to slow 
down, but the back of Mr. Kidman's tow truck was covering approximately one-third to 
one-quarter of the left hand lane of I-84. (See Exhibit D [to PL's Mem. in Opp. to Mot. 
for Summ. J.], pgs. 28 and 33; and Exhibit C [to PL's Mem. in Opp. to Mot. for Summ. 
J.].) 
REPLY: Defendant objects to Plaintiff's Statement of Additional Facts #12 
because it mischaracterizes the cited record. Ms. Hunsaker's statement as to the 
location of the tow truck was a guess that she made after stating at least twice that she 
was unsure of the tow truck's position in relation to the lane of travel. (See Dep. of Julie 
Hunsaker 33:6-17, PL's Ex. D.) Defendant further objects because there is no 
foundation to support the proposition that Plaintiff's Exhibit C shows a true and correct 
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image of the location of the tow truck prior to the subject accident. Most importantly, the 
location of the tow truck at the time of the subject accident is immaterial to the issue of 
whether Mr. Johnson was a proximate cause of the Plaintiff's injuries because Mr. 
Johnson did not control any aspect of how the tow truck came to be in that location at 
that time. 
PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS #13: Plaintiff crashed into 
the back of Mr. Kidman's tow truck. The T-bar of the tow truck went through Plaintiff's 
windshield, hit him in the head, and pinned his head against the back of his seat. {See 
Exhibit A [to PL's Mem. in Opp. to Mot. for Summ. J.], pgs. 37-8; and Exhibit C [to PL's 
Mem. in Opp. to Mot. for Summ. J.].) 
REPLY: Defendant Johnson admits this statement of fact for the purposes of the 
instant motion. 
PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS #14: Plaintiff was seriously 
injured in the accident. (See Exhibit A [to PL's Mem. in Opp. to Mot. for Summ. J.], pg. 
38.) 
REPLY: Defendant Johnson admits this statement of fact for the purposes of the 
instant motion. 
PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS #15: Defendant and Mr. 
Kidman disagree as to whether Defendant's truck was still connected to the tow truck at 
the time of impact. (See Exhibit A [to PL's Mem. in Opp. to Mot. for Summ. J.], pg.42; 
and Exhibit B [to PL's Mem. in Opp. to Mot. for Summ. J.] p. 51.) 
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REPLY: Mr. Johnson objects to Plaintiff's Statement of Additional Facts #15 
because it mischaracterizes the evidence on record. First, Mr. Johnson does not have 
a truck. As stated in Plaintiffs Statement of Additional Facts #1, on the date of the 
subject accident, Mr. Johnson was driving a 1994 Honda Civic. (See also Dep. of Ricky 
L. Johnson 5:8-9, Ex. A. to Def.'s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J.) Notwithstanding 
the foregoing objection, Mr. Johnson admits that he and Mr. Kidman have different 
memories as to whether his vehicle was still connected to the tow truck at the time of 
impact. Most importantly, however, whether Mr. Johnson's vehicle was connected or 
not to the tow truck at the time of impact is immaterial as to the issue of whether Mr. 
Johnson was a proximate cause of the Plaintiff's injuries. 
PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS #16: However, it is 
undisputed that if Defendant had not lost control and slid off the freeway, Mr. Kidman's 
tow truck would not have been there at the time of the collision. (See Exhibit B [to PL's 
Mem. in Opp. to Mot. for Summ. J.], pg.51.) 
REPLY: Defendant Johnson objects to Plaintiff's Statement of Additional Facts 
#16 because it misrepresents Mr. Kidman's testimony. Mr. Kidman stated that 
"[Johnson] had everything to do with me being in the median." (Dep. of Clinton J . 
Kidman 51:13-16, Defs Ex. B to Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J.) It is immaterial to 
the question of whether Mr. Johnson was a proximate cause of the Plaintiff's injuries 
that Mr. Johnson's request for assistance caused Mr. Kidman to come to the median 
when the Plaintiff was injured on the roadway. 
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IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The Court should grant Mr. Johnson's Motion for Summary Judgment 
because there are no material issues of fact as to whether Mr. Johnson was 
a proximate cause of the Plaintiff's injuries. 
Plaintiff argues that there are material questions of fact as to whether Mr. 
Johnson's negligence was a proximate cause of the Plaintiffs injuries and that those 
question of fact should be submitted to the jury. He supports this argument with 
citations to traffic-accident cases that are factually distinct from the case at bar. The 
common element in the traffic-accident cases cited by Plaintiff is that the negligence of 
the original actors in those cases created a condition that blocked the lane of travel on 
the road way. In the case at bar, however, Mr. Johnson's original act created no 
condition that affected the roadway in any way. "We recognize at the outset that in 
appropriate circumstances summary judgment may be granted on the issue of 
proximate cause." Jensen v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 611 P.2d 363, 365 (Utah 
1980). 
Plaintiff first cites Watters v. Querry, 588 P.2d 702 (Utah 1978), a close case in 
which the Utah Supreme Court voted 3-2 to remand for a new trial. In Watters, the 
actions of Hemingway created a condition on the road for which the plaintiff had to stop 
suddenly. See id. at 702. The defendant, Querry, failed to perceive that the plaintiff 
had stopped and, as a result, rear-ended her. See id. The court's logic in remanding 
the case for a new trial was that 
there [was] a legitimate question as to whether a jury could 
reasonably find that defendant Hemingway, in making the 
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alleged abrupt stop, should have foreseen that . . . some 
momentarily inattentive driver following her would not be 
able to react and brake quick enough to avoid collision with 
her car or the car behind hers. 
Id. at 704. Where the original act actually blocked the roadway, submitting the question 
of proximate cause and foreseeability to the jury was appropriate. This is because the 
original breach of the general duty to other motorists on the roadway persisted and 
created a hazardous condition upon the roadway up through the time that the plaintiff 
was injured. 
In the instant case, however, Johnson's original act was so far removed from the 
subject accident that it is clear, as a matter of law, that he was not a proximate cause of 
the Plaintiff's injuries. Mr. Johnson's negligence resulted in his vehicle coming to a stop 
in the median along 1-84. His vehicle did not affect the roadway in any way. His original 
breach of his general duty to other motorists on the road created no persisting hazard 
on the road. It was simply not foreseeable that a following motorist would be injured in 
a collision on the roadway due to the presence of Mr. Johnson's vehicle in the middle of 
the median. It was only after the Highway Patrol sent Mr. Kidman to the scene and after 
Mr. Kidman elected to park his tow truck on the eastbound side of 1-84 that a condition 
came to exist on the road with which a following motorist might collide. Where Mr. 
Johnson's original act had no effect on the conditions on the roadway, no reasonable 
jury could find that a collision on the roadway was the foreseeable result of Mr. 
Johnson's original act. Therefore, "reasonable minds could not differ that [Mr. 
Johnson's original act].. . was not the proximate cause of [the Plaintiff's] injuries]." 
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Jensen, 611 P.2d at 365 n.4 (Utah 1980). Therefore, the Court should grant Mr. 
Johnson's motion for summary judgment. 
The other cases that the Plaintiff cites are distinguishable from the case at bar for 
exactly the same reason as Watters: they all involved an original act that blocked the 
roadway upon which the plaintiff in the case was driving. Those cases are irrelevant to 
the instant cases for the same reasons as Watters. 
Plaintiff makes seven arguments for facts "upon which a reasonable jury could 
find in favor of Plaintiff on [the] issue [of proximate cause]." But all of those facts are 
either immaterial or reach faulty conclusions. First, "Defendant called for assistance . . . 
[and] knew that the area was slick." This fact does not create a causal connection 
between Mr. Johnson's presence on the scene and the Plaintiffs injuries. The weather, 
not Mr. Johnson, created the slick conditions on the roadway. 
"Second, as Defendant was waiting for Mr. Kidman, he admitted that he was 
worried that other cars would lose control in the area and hit him." Just because Mr. 
Johnson was, justifiably, worried that other motorists might slide off of the icy road, it 
does not mean that Mr. Johnson was a proximate cause in this case. His presence in 
the median had no effect on road conditions. 
"Third, the accident happened only 30 minutes after Defendant lost control and 
slid into the median, which is a much shorter time than [in other cases cited by 
Plaintiff]." This fact is irrelevant because those other cases are distinguishable. 
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"Fourth, while Defendant and Mr. Kidman were back on the freeway, they 
decided that they needed to move their vehicles because people were going to get hurt, 
which means that both recognized the hazardous situation." The hazardous conditions 
that existed at that point were not caused by Mr. Johnson. He did not create the icy 
conditions on the road. He did not choose the location or control the means by which 
Mr. Kidman extricated his vehicle from the median. 
"Fifth, several other vehicles had slid off the freeway before Plaintiff arrived at the 
scene." This argument, taken within the context of Plaintiff's other arguments, seems to 
imply that Mr. Johnson caused all of these other vehicles to slide off the freeway. There 
is no evidence on the record to support this proposition. 
"Sixth, Defendant's vehicle was still hooked up to the tow truck when Plaintiff hit 
it." Even if this is true, it is irrelevant for the reasons mentioned on page 7, supra. 
Plaintiff argues that, "in Judge Kennedy's words, 'the dangerous conditions caused by 
[Defendant's] accident were persisting at the time of [Plaintiff's] accident.'" The only 
dangerous condition that Mr. Johnson's original act caused was the presence of a car in 
the center of the median. Plaintiff was not injured by a car in the center median. 
Finally, Plaintiff argues that "but for Defendant's negligence, Mr. Kidman's tow 
truck would not have been on the side of the freeway." Plaintiff misapplies the test for 
but-for causation with this argument. Black's Law Dictionary defines "but-for cause" as 
"[t]he cause without which the event could not have occurred." Black's Law Dictionary 
212 (7th ed. 1999). Plaintiff's argument ignores that the Utah Highway Patrol sent Mr. 
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Kidman and his tow truck to the scene and that Mr. Johnson did not control or contribute 
to the way that Mr. Kidman operated his truck. A more accurate statement would read, 
"But for Defendant's negligence and but for the Utah Highway Patrol directing Mr. 
Kidman to go to the scene, and but for Mr. Kidman's unilateral decisions in pulling Mr. 
Johnson out of the median, then Mr. Kidman's tow truck would not have been there at 
the time of the collision." It is the actions of these other persons, without even taking 
into consideration the extant icy road conditions and the Plaintiff's driving "quite fast 
trying to pass other cars," (Dep. of Julie Hunsaker 25:15-17, Ex. D. to PL's Mem. in 
Opp. to Mot. for Summ. J.) that create the circumstances under which no reasonable 
jury would find that Mr. Johnson was a proximate cause of the Plaintiff's injuries. Once 
Mr. Johnson's vehicle slid into the median, he posed no threat to any person on the 
roadway in either direction. Any of the events that took place after he called 911 were 
wholly out of his control. For these reasons, Plaintiff fails to raise a material issue of 
fact upon which a reasonable jury could find that Mr. Johnson's actions were a 
proximate cause of his injuries. Therefore, the Court should grant the instant motion. 
B. Superseding cause analysis does not apply to this case. 
Plaintiff is correct in arguing that superseding cause analysis should not apply to 
this case. This is true because, where Mr. Johnson's original breach of his general 
duty to other motorists on the road did not create a persisting hazard on the roadway, 
the effects of that original breach had dissipated well-before the Plaintiff's arrival and 
injury. Therefore, the Court should grant the instant motion. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, Defendant Ricky L. Johnson respectfully requests 
that this Court enter an order granting his motion for summary judgment and dismissing 
the Plaintiff's claims against him with prejudice. 
DATED this _f day of February, 2011. 
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
Tern? M. Plant 
Joshua T. Gardner 
Attorneys for Ricky L. Johnson 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this of February, 2011,1 served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT RICKY L JOHNSON'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT by placing 
the same in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Robert G. Gilchrist 
Jordan P. Kendell 
EISENBERG & GILCHRIST 
215 South State Street, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Joseph J. Joyce 
Resh Jefferies 
J. JOYCE & ASSOC. 
10813 S. River Front Pkway, Suite 460 
South Jordan, Utah 84095
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RICKY L. JOHNSON, CLINTON KIDMAN, 
ALLRED AUTOBODY, LLC, a Utah 
limited liability corporation, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 100100231 
Judge: Ben H. Hadfield 
THE ABOVE MATTER is before the Court pursuant to Defendant Ricky L. Johnson's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. In preparation of its decision, the Court has reviewed the Motion 
and Memorandum, Plaintiffs Opposition, Defendant's Reply, each document submitted before 
the Court, and the applicable case law and statutory provisions. In addition, oral arguments were 
received on March 22, 2011. Having considered the foregoing, the Court issues this 
Memorandum Decision. 
SUMMARY OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
On February 17, 2009, Defendant Ricky Johnson was traveling eastbound on 1-84 west of 
Tremonton, Utah when it began to snow. Mr. Johnson lost control of his vehicle and slid off of 
the road into the median near the area known as Rattlesnake Pass. Mr. Johnson called the Utah 
Highway Patrol for highway assistance. Utah Highway Patrol contacted Defendant Allred 
Autobody, a state authorized tow truck operator, and requested the company provide assistance 
to Mr. Johnson. Allred Autobody sent an employee, Defendant Clinton Kidman, to assist Mr. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
arrived on the scene, Mr. Johnson did not direct, give advice, or control how Mr. Kidman 
extricated Mr. Johnson's car from the median, which took approximately 10 minutes. 
Plaintiff was also traveling on this same road. Plaintiffs vehicle struck the tow truck, 
resulting in serious injuries to Plaintiff. Plaintiff has no memory of the events leading up to or 
following the subject accident. Whether Mr. Jolinson's vehicle was still attached to the tow truck 
when the accident happened or had already been unhooked is in dispute. However, this fact is 
immaterial for purposes of this Motion. Mr. Kidman testified that he stated that Mr. Johnson and 
he should move their vehicles off the freeway. Defendant disputes the location of where the 
vehicles were parked - whether they were on or off the freeway. 
DISCUSSION 
Arguments: 
Defendant Ricky Johnson (hereinafter "Defendant") argues that he cannot be liable for 
Plaintiffs injuries because he was not, as a matter of law, a proximate cause of those injuries. 
For purposes of this Motion, Defendant is not disputing that Defendant owed Plaintiff a duty of 
care, that Defendant breached that duty or that Plaintiff suffered damages as a result of the 
breach. 
Plaintiff argues that there are questions of fact as to whether Defendant's negligence was 
a proximate cause of Plaintiff s injuries and therefore the jury should be allowed to decide. 
Plaintiff argues that a reasonable jury could find that Defendant should have foreseen that losing 
control of his vehicle may create a hazardous situation on the freeway by requiring a tow truck 
driver to come and pull Defendant out of the median. 
Analysis: 
The Court finds that Defendant's negligence in skidding off the roadway was not the 
direct cause of the "dangerous condition" that caused Plaintiffs iniuries. The ransp. of thf> 
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I 
not dispute that Defendant did not exert control over how Mr. Kidman went about his business of 
towing Defendant's vehicle out of the median. Defendant did not direct Mr. Kidman on how to 
tow his vehicle out of the median or where Mr. Kidman should park his tow truck in order to do 
the towing. Rather, Defendant reasonably relied upon Mr. Kidman to tow his vehicle out of the 
median safely given the totality of the circumstances present. Therefore, the Court concludes that 
Defendant's negligence in skidding off the roadway could not reasonably be found to have 
caused Plaintiffs injuries. 
The Court finds that the cases cited by Plaintiff are distinguishable from the 
circumstances present in this case. Specifically, the cases cited by Plaintiff have one thing in 
common: the defendants' vehicles were the "dangerous condition" on the roadway at the time the 
plaintiffs suffered their injuries and until this "dangerous condition"was gone it was foreseeable 
that a plaintiff might sustain injuries. See Waiters v. Query, 588 P.2d 702 (Utah 1978) (the car 
that abruptly stopped was the dangerous condition and was in the roadway when the plaintiff was 
injured); Jensen v. Mountain State Tel & Tel Co., 611 P.2d 363, 365 (Utah 1980) (the van 
parked in the intersection was the dangerous condition and was there when plaintiff was injured); 
Finch v. Overman, et al.9 Civil No. 050912066 (Utah 3rd Dist. Ct. 2008) (defendant caused a 
serious traffic accident that backed up traffic and traffic was still backed up at the time plaintiff 
was injured). 
However, in this matter it cannot reasonably be held that Defendant's vehicle, by being in 
the median, was the "dangerous condition." Rather, it was Mr. Kidman's tow truck, allegedly 
being parked negligently in the roadway, which caused a dangerous condition that foreseeably 
could cause a plaintiff to sustain injuries. It is true that "but for" Defendant's negligence in 
skidding off the roadway, Mr. Kidman's tow truck would not have been on the scene. However, 
it cannot be held that Defendant could foresee that a tow truck operator would negligently Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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did not directly cause Mr. Kidman to allegedly park in the roadway. This was Mr. Kidman's 
separate and subsequent act and independent choice. As pointed out by Defendant, the 
circumstances in this case are the equivalent of the plaintiff in Jensen suing the person who had 
called defendant (Mountain Bell) for service. Therefore, the Court finds that Defendant's 
negligence cannot reasonably be held to have been a proximate cause of Plaintiff s injuries. 
Based on the foregoing, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. Counsel 
for Defendant Johnson is directed to prepare an order in conformance herewith. 
Dated this 2°\ day of March, 2011. 
BY THE COURT: 
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MAIL: TERRY M PLANT 136 E S TEMPLE STE 1700 SALT LAKE CITY UT 
84111 
Date: 6 Uajli 
Deputy Court Clerk 
of' f 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
taf) Court of Sppeate James Z. Davis Presiding Judge 
Carolyn B. McHugh 
Associate Presiding Judge 
« s r «•«- " v s t f r s i r ' •!i',AM D1Si M 'y&mnbf 
Wjm«,„A.Tho„,,J, &*!*]«, City. Utah B411...B30 ^ j y . j ^
 fiM 10= 35 " ^^^S^ 
J. Frederic Voros. Jr. Appellate Clerks' Office (801) 578-3900
 D i a n e Abegglen 
Judge Judges'Reception (801) 578-3950 Appellate Court. Administrator 
Stephen L. Roth FAX (801) 578-3999 
j u d a e Utah Relay 1-800-346-4128 Lisa A. Collins 
* , _ _ . . * Clerk of the Court 
Micnele M. Christiansen 
Judge 
June 22, 2011 
ROBERT G. GILCHRIST 
JORDAN P. KENDELL 
BRAYTON PURCELL 
215 S STATE ST STE900 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
RE: Dee v. Johnson et al Case No. 20110464-CA 
Dear Counsel: 
Please be advised that this case has been assigned to the Court of Appeals. Further proceedings 
will be handled by this court. Please note that the case number will remain the same as it was in 
the Supreme Court, with the exception that it will have a -CA after the number. 
As of this date, this court has not received a transcript request or a certificate that no transcript 
is needed. If within seven days of the date of this letter, this court has not received written 
notice that the transcript has been requested or certificate that transcript is not required, a 
briefing schedule will be established without benefit of the transcript. 
Effective July 1, 2009, the transcript request may be ordered on line by going to the court's web 
site www.utcourts.gov and selecting "Of Interest to the Legal Community" and "Request a 
Transcript". 
If you have a question regarding a transcript you may contact: 
Ashlee MacEwen, (801) 578-3947, ashleem@email.utcourts.gov 
Nicole Gray, (801) 238-7975, nicoleg@email.utcourts.gov 
Lisa Collins, (801) 578-3907Jisaac@email.utcourts.gov 
Please note, failure to perfect an appeal at any time during the appeal process may result in 
dismissal of the appeal. 
CrystaL0ragun 
JudidaTAssistant 
cc: JORDAN P KENDELL 
JOSEPH J. JOYCE ^ 
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